{ "nbformat": 4, "nbformat_minor": 0, "metadata": { "colab": { "provenance": [] }, "kernelspec": { "name": "python3", "display_name": "Python 3" }, "language_info": { "name": "python" } }, "cells": [ { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "# Implémentation d'un Chatbot documentaire (RAG)" ], "metadata": { "id": "nmdxjrJq3dbh" } }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "## PARTIE 1 : Récupération de la base de données" ], "metadata": { "id": "8CSP9YkO3k4s" } }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "Les rapports du GIEC (**Groupe intergouvernemental d’experts sur l’évolution du climat**) ou IPCC en anglais, fournissent un état des lieux régulier des connaissances les plus avancées sur le changement climatique, ses causes, ses impacts et les mesures possibles pour l’atténuer et s’y adapter.\n", "\n", "La synthèse du sixième rapport d’évaluation du GIEC a été publiée le lundi 20 mars 2023. Fruit d’une collaboration internationale, ce nouveau rapport synthétise les connaissances scientifiques acquises entre 2015 et 2021. D'autres rapports ont été publiés entre temps sur des sujets spécifiques.\n", "\n", "Nous nous intéressons à quatre de ces documents:\n", "\n", "* Sixth Assessment Report\n", "* The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate\n", "* Climate Change and Land\n", "* Global Warming of 1.5°C\n", "\n", "\n" ], "metadata": { "id": "mVJ7cbicJvSn" } }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "### 1. Récupération des documents" ], "metadata": { "id": "kmQsEn6lDdhc" } }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Créez un dossier 'RAG_IPCC' dans les fichiers de votre session colab\n", "\n", "import os\n", "\n", "folder_path = \"/content/RAG_IPCC\"\n", "os.makedirs(folder_path)" ], "metadata": { "id": "XbaJom4lm4oc" }, "execution_count": 1, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "code", "execution_count": 9, "metadata": { "colab": { "base_uri": "https://localhost:8080/" }, "id": "l7BAdBb23cLd", "outputId": "a3d5a43c-1467-4a96-a241-cb6bd4a1e047", "collapsed": true }, "outputs": [ { "output_type": "stream", "name": "stdout", "text": [ "--2024-05-31 19:50:17-- https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf\n", "Resolving www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)... 104.20.255.3, 104.20.254.3, 172.67.16.107, ...\n", "Connecting to www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)|104.20.255.3|:443... connected.\n", "HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK\n", "Length: 4913496 (4.7M) [application/pdf]\n", "Saving to: ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf’\n", "\n", "IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVo 100%[===================>] 4.69M --.-KB/s in 0.1s \n", "\n", "2024-05-31 19:50:18 (43.8 MB/s) - ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf’ saved [4913496/4913496]\n", "\n", "--2024-05-31 19:50:18-- https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2022/03/02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.pdf\n", "Resolving www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)... 104.20.255.3, 104.20.254.3, 172.67.16.107, ...\n", "Connecting to www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)|104.20.255.3|:443... connected.\n", "HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK\n", "Length: 4366638 (4.2M) [application/pdf]\n", "Saving to: ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.pdf’\n", "\n", "02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.p 100%[===================>] 4.16M --.-KB/s in 0.09s \n", "\n", "2024-05-31 19:50:18 (48.6 MB/s) - ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.pdf’ saved [4366638/4366638]\n", "\n", "--2024-05-31 19:50:18-- https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2022/11/SRCCL_Technical-Summary.pdf\n", "Resolving www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)... 104.20.255.3, 104.20.254.3, 172.67.16.107, ...\n", "Connecting to www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)|104.20.255.3|:443... connected.\n", "HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK\n", "Length: 7930366 (7.6M) [application/pdf]\n", "Saving to: ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/SRCCL_Technical-Summary.pdf’\n", "\n", "SRCCL_Technical-Sum 100%[===================>] 7.56M 661KB/s in 12s \n", "\n", "2024-05-31 19:50:31 (637 KB/s) - ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/SRCCL_Technical-Summary.pdf’ saved [7930366/7930366]\n", "\n", "--2024-05-31 19:50:31-- https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf\n", "Resolving www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)... 104.20.255.3, 104.20.254.3, 172.67.16.107, ...\n", "Connecting to www.ipcc.ch (www.ipcc.ch)|104.20.255.3|:443... connected.\n", "HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK\n", "Length: 818524 (799K) [application/pdf]\n", "Saving to: ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf’\n", "\n", "SPM_version_report_ 100%[===================>] 799.34K --.-KB/s in 0.06s \n", "\n", "2024-05-31 19:50:32 (13.9 MB/s) - ‘/content/RAG_IPCC/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf’ saved [818524/818524]\n", "\n" ] } ], "source": [ "# Téléchargez les 4 fichiers dans ce dossier\n", "\n", "url_6th_report = \"https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf\"\n", "url_ocean = \"https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2022/03/02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.pdf\"\n", "url_land = 'https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2022/11/SRCCL_Technical-Summary.pdf'\n", "url_warming = 'https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf'\n", "\n", "for url in [url_6th_report, url_ocean, url_land, url_warming]:\n", " !wget -P /content/RAG_IPCC {url}" ] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "### 2. Extraction du contenu textuel" ], "metadata": { "id": "KRJNqRjZEc8S" } }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Choisissez une méthode d'extraction du contenu du pdf page à page\n", "\n", "!pip install pymupdf" ], "metadata": { "colab": { "base_uri": "https://localhost:8080/" }, "id": "bfXHLrBMRA51", "outputId": "12070e01-e3b4-4a15-bd1f-dcb2f2a13c20" }, "execution_count": 3, "outputs": [ { "output_type": "stream", "name": "stdout", "text": [ "Collecting pymupdf\n", " Downloading PyMuPDF-1.24.5-cp310-none-manylinux2014_x86_64.whl (3.5 MB)\n", "\u001b[2K \u001b[90m━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\u001b[0m \u001b[32m3.5/3.5 MB\u001b[0m \u001b[31m23.1 MB/s\u001b[0m eta \u001b[36m0:00:00\u001b[0m\n", "\u001b[?25hCollecting PyMuPDFb==1.24.3 (from pymupdf)\n", " Downloading PyMuPDFb-1.24.3-py3-none-manylinux2014_x86_64.manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl (15.8 MB)\n", "\u001b[2K \u001b[90m━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\u001b[0m \u001b[32m15.8/15.8 MB\u001b[0m \u001b[31m30.2 MB/s\u001b[0m eta \u001b[36m0:00:00\u001b[0m\n", "\u001b[?25hInstalling collected packages: PyMuPDFb, pymupdf\n", "Successfully installed PyMuPDFb-1.24.3 pymupdf-1.24.5\n" ] } ] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "import pymupdf\n", "\n", "list_pdfs = os.listdir(\"RAG_IPCC\")\n", "extracted_text = []\n", "for pdf in list_pdfs:\n", " print(f\"*** PROCESSING FILE : {pdf} ***\")\n", " file_path = os.path.join(folder_path, pdf)\n", " doc = pymupdf.open(file_path)\n", " number_of_pages = doc.page_count\n", " print(f\"Number of pages : {number_of_pages}\")\n", " for n, page in enumerate(doc):\n", " page_text = page.get_text()\n", " extracted_text.append({\"document\": pdf, \"page\": n, \"content\": page_text})\n" ], "metadata": { "colab": { "base_uri": "https://localhost:8080/" }, "collapsed": true, "id": "tf31A-7BQ_HD", "outputId": "efd6b7d5-19ca-4734-d6c4-d8ec9c1acc02" }, "execution_count": 11, "outputs": [ { "output_type": "stream", "name": "stdout", "text": [ "*** PROCESSING FILE : SRCCL_Technical-Summary.pdf ***\n", "Number of pages : 40\n", "*** PROCESSING FILE : IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf ***\n", "Number of pages : 186\n", "*** PROCESSING FILE : 02_SROCC_TS_FINAL.pdf ***\n", "Number of pages : 34\n", "*** PROCESSING FILE : SPM_version_report_LR.pdf ***\n", "Number of pages : 24\n" ] } ] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "### 3. Création des chunks" ], "metadata": { "id": "xAwhuborGHcZ" } }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "import nltk\n", "nltk.download('punkt')" ], "metadata": { "colab": { "base_uri": "https://localhost:8080/" }, "id": "_hX1fXwpuNTy", "outputId": "8ce6cef3-185d-4b2e-f2ce-62f58488c737" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [ { "output_type": "stream", "name": "stderr", "text": [ "[nltk_data] Downloading package punkt to /root/nltk_data...\n", "[nltk_data] Unzipping tokenizers/punkt.zip.\n" ] }, { "output_type": "execute_result", "data": { "text/plain": [ "True" ] }, "metadata": {}, "execution_count": 6 } ] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Implémentez une fonction de splitting par nombre de mots\n", "\n", "def splitting_by_numer_of_words(text, chunk_size):\n", " \"\"\"\n", " Découpe un texte en chunks de taille donnée (nombre de caractères).\n", "\n", " Args:\n", " text (str): Le texte à splitter.\n", " chunk_size (int): La taille souhaitée des chunks (nombre de mots).\n", "\n", " Returns:\n", " list: Une liste de chunks de texte.\n", " \"\"\"\n", " chunks = []\n", " for phrase in text.split('\\n'):\n", " words = phrase.split()\n", " for i in range(0, len(words), chunk_size):\n", " chunks.append(' '.join(words[i:i + chunk_size]))\n", " return chunks\n", "\n", "# Implémentez une fonction de splitting par phrase\n", "\n", "def splitting_by_sentences(text):\n", " \"\"\"\n", " Découpe un texte en chunks par phrases.\n", "\n", " Args:\n", " text (str): Le texte à découper.\n", "\n", " Returns:\n", " list: Une liste de chunks de texte (phrases).\n", " \"\"\"\n", " sentences = nltk.sent_tokenize(text)\n", " return sentences" ], "metadata": { "id": "MRQtDsp8rv8L" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "!pip install -qU langchain-text-splitters" ], "metadata": { "id": "12Msy5XXGcks" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Implémentez une fonction de splitting intelligente avec différents paramètres\n", " #(nombre maximal de mots, caractère de fin de chunks etc.)\n", "\n", "from langchain_text_splitters import RecursiveCharacterTextSplitter\n", "\n", "text_splitter = RecursiveCharacterTextSplitter(\n", " chunk_size=500,\n", " chunk_overlap=20,\n", " length_function=len,\n", " is_separator_regex=False,\n", ")" ], "metadata": { "id": "z0h3SAKiUAkU" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Créez vos chunks avec la fonction de splitting qui semble la plus pertinente\n", "# ATTENTION : on veut garder un maximum de metadonnées dans la base (titre, page etc.)\n", "\n", "chunks = []\n", "for page_content in extracted_text:\n", " chunks_list = text_splitter.split_text(page_content['content'])\n", " # chunks_list = splitting_by_numer_of_words(page_content['content'])\n", " # chunks_list = splitting_by_sentences(page_content['content'])\n", " for chunk in chunks_list:\n", " chunks.append({\"document\": page_content['document'],\n", " \"page\": page_content['page'],\n", " \"content\": chunk})\n", "\n", "chunks" ], "metadata": { "colab": { "base_uri": "https://localhost:8080/" }, "collapsed": true, "id": "WcsVVR87UNUs", "outputId": "5555c753-c18a-4445-b1fb-14f3e244fb35" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [ { "output_type": "execute_result", "data": { "text/plain": [ "[{'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 0,\n", " 'content': '1\\nCLIMATE CHANGE 2023\\nSynthesis Report\\nA Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': 'CLIMATE CHANGE 2023\\nSynthesis Report\\nHoesung Lee (Chair), Katherine Calvin (USA), Dipak Dasgupta (India/USA), Gerhard Krinner (France/Germany), Aditi Mukherji \\n(India), Peter Thorne (Ireland/United Kingdom),\\xa0Christopher Trisos (South Africa), José Romero (Switzerland), Paulina Aldunce \\n(Chile), Ko Barrett (USA), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), William W. L. Cheung (Canada), Sarah L. Connors (France/United Kingdom),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': 'Fatima Denton (The Gambia), Aïda Diongue-Niang (Senegal), David Dodman (Jamaica/United Kingdom/Netherlands), Matthias \\nGarschagen (Germany), Oliver Geden (Germany), Bronwyn Hayward (New Zealand), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Frank \\nJotzo (Australia), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Rodel Lasco (Philippines), June-Yi Lee (Republic of Korea), Valérie Masson-Delmotte \\n(France), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Abdalah Mokssit (Morocco), Friederike E. L. Otto'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': '(United Kingdom/Germany), Minal Pathak (India), Anna Pirani (Italy), Elvira Poloczanska (United Kingdom/Australia), Hans-Otto \\nPörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Alex C. Ruane (USA), Jim \\nSkea (United Kingdom), Priyadarshi R. Shukla (India), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Aimée Slangen (The Netherlands), Youba'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': 'Sokona (Mali), Anna A. Sörensson (Argentina), Melinda Tignor (USA/Germany), Detlef van Vuuren (The Netherlands), Yi-Ming Wei \\n(China), Harald Winkler (South Africa), Panmao Zhai (China), Zinta Zommers (Latvia)\\nReferencing this report:\\nIPCC, 2023: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report \\nof the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': '184 pp., doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647. \\xa0Core Writing TeamEdited by\\nHoesung Lee\\nChairman\\nIPCCJosé Romero\\nHead, Technical Support Unit\\nIPCCThe Core Writing Team\\nSynthesis Report\\nIPCC\\nJosé Romero (Switzerland), Jinmi Kim (Republic of Korea), Erik F . Haites (Canada), Yonghun Jung (Republic of Korea), Robert \\nStavins (USA), Arlene Birt (USA), Meeyoung Ha (Republic of Korea), Dan Jezreel A. Orendain (Philippines), Lance Ignon (USA),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 2,\n", " 'content': 'Semin Park (Republic of Korea), Youngin Park (Republic of Korea)Technical Support Unit for the Synthesis Report'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'iiTHE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE \\n© Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023\\nISBN 978-92-9169-164-7\\nThis publication is identical to the report that was approved (Summary for Policymakers) and adopted (longer report) at the 58th \\nsession of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on 19 March 2023 in Interlaken, Switzerland, but with the \\ninclusion of copy-edits.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'The designations employed and the presentation of material on maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on \\nthe part of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of \\nits authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. \\nThe mention of specific companies or products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by IPCC in preference to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'others of a similar nature, which are not mentioned or advertised. \\nThe right of publication in print, electronic and any other form and in any language is reserved by the IPCC. Short extracts \\nfrom this publication may be reproduced without authorization provided that complete source is clearly indicated. Editorial \\ncorrespondence and requests to publish, reproduce or translate articles in part or in whole should be addressed to: IPCC c/o World'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'Meteorological Organization (WMO) 7bis, avenue de la Paix Tel.: +41 22 730 8208 P .O. Box 2300 Fax: +41 22 730 8025 CH 1211 \\nGeneva 2, Switzerland E-mail: IPCC-Sec@wmo.int www.ipcc.ch Paola Arias (Colombia), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Ismail Elgizouli (Sudan), Gregory Flato (Canada), Mark Howden (Australia), \\nCarlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Steven K Rose (USA), Yamina Saheb'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': '(Algeria/France), Roberto Sánchez Rodríguez (Mexico), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Cunde Xiao (China), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria)\\nAndrés Alegría (Germany/Honduras), Kyle Armour (USA), Birgit Bednar-Friedl (Austria), Kornelis Blok (The Netherlands), Guéladio \\nCissé (Switzerland/Mauritania/France), Frank Dentener (EU/Netherlands), Siri Eriksen (Norway), Erich Fischer (Switzerland),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'Gregory Garner (USA), Céline Guivarch (France), Marjolijn Haasnoot (The Netherlands), Gerrit Hansen (Germany), Mathias \\nHauser (Switzerland), Ed Hawkins (UK), Tim Hermans (The Netherlands), Robert Kopp (USA), Noëmie Leprince-Ringuet (France), \\nJared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Debora Ley (Mexico/Guatemala), Chloé Ludden (Germany/France), Leila Niamir (Iran/The \\nNetherlands/Austria), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Shreya Some (India/Thailand), Sophie Szopa (France), Blair Trewin (Australia),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (The Netherlands), Gundula Winter (The Netherlands/Germany), Maximilian Witting (Germany)\\nHoesung Lee (Chair, IPCC), Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Edvin Aldrian (Indonesia), Ko Barrett (United States of America), Eduardo \\nCalvo (Peru), Carlo Carraro (Italy), Diriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Fatima Driouech (Morocco), Andreas Fischlin (Switzerland), \\nJan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Nagmeldin G.E. Mahmoud (Sudan), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Carlos'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Andy \\nReisinger (New Zealand), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Sergey Semenov (Russian Federation), Priyadarshi Shukla (India), \\nJim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Kiyoto Tanabe (Japan), Muhammad Irfan Tariq (Pakistan), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz \\n(Hungary), Carolina Vera (Argentina), Pius Yanda (United Republic of Tanzania), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria), Taha M. Zatari'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': '(Saudi Arabia), Panmao Zhai (China)Review Editors\\nContributing Authors\\nScientific Steering Committee\\nArlene Birt (USA), Meeyoung Ha (Republic of Korea)Visual Conception and Information Design\\n“Fog opening the dawn” by Chung Jin Sil\\nThe Weather and Climate Photography & Video Contest 2021, Korea Meteorological Administration'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 3,\n", " 'content': 'http://www.kma.go.kr/kma © KMAPhoto ReferenceCover: Designed by Meeyoung Ha, IPCC SYR TSUJean-Charles Hourcade (France), Francis X. Johnson (Thailand/Sweden), Shonali Pachauri (Austria/India), Nicholas P . Simpson \\n(South Africa/Zimbabwe), Chandni Singh (India), Adelle Thomas (Bahamas), Edmond Totin (Benin)Extended Writing Team'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 4,\n", " 'content': 'iii\\nForeword and Preface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'v\\nForewordForeword\\nThis Synthesis Report (SYR) concludes the Sixth Assessment Report \\n(AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). \\nThe SYR synthesizes and integrates materials contained within the \\nthree Working Groups Assessment Reports and the Special Reports \\ncontributing to the AR6. It addresses a broad range of policy-relevant \\nbut policy-neutral questions approved by the Panel. \\nThe SYR is the synthesis of the most comprehensive assessment of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'climate change undertaken thus far by the IPCC: Climate Change 2021: \\nThe Physical Science Basis; Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation \\nand Vulnerability; and Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate \\nChange. The SYR also draws on the findings of three Special Reports \\ncompleted as part of the Sixth Assessment – Global Warming of 1.5°C \\n(2018): an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of \\n1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response \\nto the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts \\nto eradicate poverty (SR1.5); Climate Change and Land (2019): an IPCC \\nSpecial Report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, \\nsustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas \\nfluxes in terrestrial ecosystems (SRCCL); and The Ocean and Cryosphere \\nin a Changing Climate (2019) (SROCC).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'The AR6 SYR confirms that unsustainable and unequal energy and land use \\nas well as more than a century of burning fossil fuels have unequivocally \\ncaused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C \\nabove 1850–1900 in 2011–2020. This has led to widespread adverse \\nimpacts and related losses and damages to nature and people. The \\nnationally determined contributions (NDCs) committed by 2030 show the \\ntemperature will increase by 1.5°C in the first half of the 2030s, and will'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'make it very difficult to control temperature increase by 2.0°C towards \\nthe end of 21st century. Every increment of global warming will intensify \\nmultiple and concurrent hazards in all regions of the world.\\nThe report points out that limiting human-caused global warming \\nrequires net zero CO 2 emissions. Deep, rapid, and sustained mitigation \\nand accelerated implementation of adaptation actions in this decade \\nwould reduce projected losses and damages for humans and ecosystems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'and deliver many co-benefits, especially for air quality and health. \\nDelayed mitigation and adaptation action would lock-in high-emissions \\ninfrastructure, raise risks of stranded assets and cost-escalation, reduce \\nfeasibility, and increase losses and damages. Near-term actions involve \\nhigh up-front investments and potentially disruptive changes that can \\nbe lessened by a range of enabling policies. \\nAs an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United \\nNations Environment Programme (UNEP), the IPCC has provided \\npolicymakers with the most authoritative and objective scientific \\nand technical assessments in this field. Beginning in 1990, this \\nseries of IPCC Assessment Reports, Special Reports, Technical Papers, \\nMethodology Reports, and other products have become standard \\nworks of reference. The SYR was made possible thanks to the voluntary work, dedication'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'and commitment of thousands of experts and scientists from around \\nthe globe, representing a range of views and disciplines. We would like \\nto express our deep gratitude to all the members of the Core Writing \\nTeam of the SYR, members of the Extended Writing Team, Contributing \\nAuthors, and the Review Editors, all of whom enthusiastically took on \\nthe huge challenge of producing an outstanding SYR on top of the other \\ntasks they had already committed to during the AR6 cycle. We would'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'also like to thank the staff of the Technical Support Unit of the SYR and \\nthe IPCC Secretariat for their dedication in organizing the production of \\nthis IPCC report. \\nWe also wish to acknowledge and thank the governments of the IPCC \\nmember countries for their support of scientists in developing this \\nreport, and for their contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund to provide the \\nessentials for participation of experts from developing countries and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'countries with economies in transition. We would like to express our \\nappreciation to the government of Singapore for hosting the Scoping \\nMeeting of the SYR, to the government of Ireland for hosting the third \\nCore Writing Team meeting of the SYR, and to the government of \\nSwitzerland for hosting the 58th Session of the IPCC where the SYR \\nwas approved. The generous financial support from the government of \\nthe Republic of Korea enabled the smooth operation of the Technical'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 6,\n", " 'content': 'Support Unit of the SYR. This is gratefully acknowledged.\\nWe would particularly like to express our thanks to the IPCC Chair, the \\nIPCC Vice-Chairs and the Co-Chairs for their dedicated work throughout \\nthe production of this report. \\nPetteri Taalas\\nSecretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization\\nInger Andersen\\nUnder-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director \\nof the UN Environment Programme'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf', 'page': 7, 'content': 'Forward'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'vii\\nThis Synthesis Report (SYR) constitutes the final product of the \\nSixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on \\nClimate Change (IPCC). It summarizes the state of knowledge of \\nclimate change, its widespread impacts and risks, and climate change \\nmitigation and adaptation, based on the peer-reviewed scientific, \\ntechnical, and socio-economic literature since the publication of the \\nIPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2014.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'This SYR distills, synthesizes, and integrates the key findings of the \\nthree Working Group contributions – Climate Change 2021: The \\nPhysical Science Basis; Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and \\nVulnerability; and Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \\nThe SYR also draws on the findings of three Special Reports completed \\nas part of the Sixth Assessment – Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018): \\nan IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission \\npathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the \\nthreat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to \\neradicate poverty (SR1.5); Climate Change and Land (2019): an IPCC \\nSpecial Report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, \\nsustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes \\nin terrestrial ecosystems (SRCCL); and The Ocean and Cryosphere in a'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'Changing Climate (2019) (SROCC). The SYR, therefore, is a comprehensive, \\ntimely compilation of assessments of the most recent scientific, technical, \\nand socio-economic literature dealing with climate change.\\nScope of the report\\nThe SYR is a self-contained synthesis of the most policy-relevant \\nmaterial drawn from the scientific, technical, and socio-economic \\nliterature assessed during the Sixth Assessment. This report integrates'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'the main findings of the AR6 Working Group reports and the three \\nAR6 Special Reports. It recognizes the interdependence of climate, \\necosystems and biodiversity, and human societies; the value of \\ndiverse forms of knowledge; and the close linkages between climate \\nadaptation, mitigation, ecosystem health, human well-being, and \\nsustainable development. Building on multiple analytical frameworks, \\nincluding those from the physical and social sciences, this report'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'identifies opportunities for transformative action which are effective, \\nfeasible, just and equitable systems transitions, and climate resilient \\ndevelopment pathways. Different regional classification schemes are \\nused for physical, social and economic aspects, reflecting the underlying \\nliterature. \\nThe Synthesis Report emphasizes near-term risks and options for \\naddressing them to give policymakers a sense of the urgency required'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'to address global climate change. The report also provides important \\ninsights about how climate risks interact with not only one another \\nbut non- climate-related risks. It describes the interaction between \\nmitigation and adaptation and how this combination can better confront the climate challenge as well as produce valuable co-benefits. It \\nhighlights the strong connection between equity and climate action and \\nwhy more equitable solutions are vital to addressing climate change. It'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'also emphasizes how growing urbanization provides an opportunity for \\nambitious climate action to advance climate resilient development and \\nsustainable development for all. And it underscores how restoring and \\nprotecting land and ocean ecosystems can bring multiple benefits to \\nbiodiversity and other societal goals, just as a failure to do so presents \\na major risk to ensuring a healthy planet. \\nStructure\\nThe SYR comprises a Summary for Policymakers (SPM) and a longer report'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'from which the SPM is derived, as well as annexes. \\nTo facilitate access to the findings of the SYR for a wide readership, each \\npart of the SPM carries highlighted headline statements. Taken together, \\nthese 18 headline statements provide an overarching summary in \\nsimple, non-technical language for easy assimilation by readers from \\ndifferent walks of life. \\nThe SPM follows a structure and sequence like that in the longer report,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'but some issues covered in more than one section of the longer report \\nare summarized in a single location in the SPM. Each paragraph of the \\nSPM contains references to the supporting text in the longer report. \\nIn turn, the longer report contains extensive references to relevant \\nportions of the Working Group Reports or Special Reports mentioned \\nabove. \\nThe longer report is structured around three topic headings as \\nmandated by the Panel. A brief Introduction (Section1) is followed by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'three sections. \\nSection 2, ‘Current Status and Trends’, opens with the assessment of \\nobservational evidence for our changing climate, historical and current \\ndrivers of human-induced climate change, and its impacts. It assesses the \\ncurrent implementation of adaptation and mitigation response options. \\nSection 3, ‘Long-Term Climate and Development Futures’, provides an \\nassessment of climate change to 2100 and beyond in a broad range of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'socio-economic futures. It considers long-term impacts, risks and costs \\nin adaptation and mitigation pathways in the context of sustainable \\ndevelopment. Section 4, ‘Near-Term Responses in a Changing Climate’, \\nassesses opportunities for scaling up effective action in the period to \\n2040, in the context of climate pledges, and commitments, and the \\npursuit of sustainable development.\\nAnnexes containing a glossary of terms used, list of acronyms, authors,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 8,\n", " 'content': 'Review Editors, the SYR Scientific Steering Committee, and Expert \\nReviewers complete the report. PrefacePreface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'viii\\nProcess\\nThe SYR was prepared in accordance with the procedures of the IPCC. \\nA scoping meeting to develop a detailed outline of the AR6 Synthesis \\nReport was held in Singapore from 21 to 23 October 2019 and the \\noutline produced in that meeting was approved by the Panel at the 52nd \\nIPCC Session from 24 to 28 February 2020 in Paris, France.\\nIn accordance with IPCC procedures, the IPCC Chair, in consultation \\nwith the Co-Chairs of the Working Groups, nominated authors for the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'Core Writing Team (CWT) of the SYR. A total of 30 CWT members and \\n9 Review Editors were selected and accepted by the IPCC Bureau at its \\n58th Session on 19 May 2020. In the process of developing the SYR, \\n7 Extended Writing Team (EWT) authors were selected by the CWT and \\napproved by the Chair and the IPCC Bureau, and 28 Contributing Authors \\nwere selected by the CWT with the approval of the Chair. These \\nadditional authors were to enhance and deepen the expertise required'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'for the preparation of the Report. The Chair established at the 58th \\nSession of the Bureau an SYR Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) with a \\nmandate to advise the development of the SYR. The SYR SSC comprised \\nthe members of the IPCC Bureau, excluding those members who served \\nas Review Editors for the SYR.\\nDue to the covid pandemic, the first two meetings of the CWT were held \\nvirtually from 25 to 29 January 2021 and from 16 to 20 August 2021.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'The First Order Draft (FOD) was released to experts and governments \\nfor review on 10 January 2022 with comments due on 20 March 2022. \\nThe CWT met in Dublin from 25 to 28 March 2022 to discuss how \\nbest to revise the FOD to address the more than 10,000 comments \\nreceived. The Review Editors monitored the review process to \\nensure that all comments received appropriate consideration. \\nThe IPCC circulated a final draft of the Summary for Policymakers'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'and a longer report of the SYR to governments for review from \\n21 November 2022 to 15 January 2023 which resulted in over 6,000 \\ncomments. A final SYR draft for approval incorporating the comments \\nfrom the final government distribution was submitted to the IPCC \\nmember governments on 8 March 2023.\\nThe Panel at its 58th Session, held from 13 to 17 March 2023 in \\nInterlaken, Switzerland, approved the SPM line by line and adopted the \\nlonger report section by section. \\nAcknowledgements'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'Acknowledgements\\nThe SYR was made possible thanks to the hard work and commitment to \\nexcellence shown by the Section Facilitators, members of CWT and EWT, \\nand Contributing Authors. Specific thanks are due to Section Facilitators \\nKate Calvin, Dipak Dasgupta, Gerhard Krinner, Aditi Mukherji, Peter Thorne, \\nand Christopher Trisos whose work was essential in ensuring a high \\nstandard of the longer report sections and the SPM.We would like to express our appreciation to the IPCC member'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'governments, observer organizations, and expert reviewers for providing \\nconstructive comments on the draft reports. We would like to thank \\nthe Review Editors Paola Arias, Mercedes Bustamante, Ismail Elgizouli, \\nGregory Flato, Mark Howden, Steven Rose, Yamina Saheb, Roberto Sánchez, \\nand Cunde Xiao for their work on the treatment of FOD comments, and \\nGregory Flato, Carlos Méndez, Joy Jacqueline Pereira, Ramón Pichs-\\nMadruga, Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, and Noureddine Yassaa for their work'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'during the approval session, collaborating with author teams to ensure \\nconsistency between the SPM and the underlying reports.\\nWe are grateful to the members of the SSC for their thoughtful advice \\nand support for the SYR throughout the process: IPCC Vice-Chairs Ko \\nBarret, Thelma Krug, and Youba Sokona; Co-Chairs of Working \\nGroups (WG) and Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories \\n(TFI) Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Panmao Zhai, Hans-Otto Pörtner,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'Debra Roberts, Priyadarshi R. Shukla, Jim Skea, Eduardo Calvo Buendía, \\nand Kiyoto Tanabe; WG Vice-Chairs Edvin Aldrian, Fatima Driouech, \\nJan Fuglestvedt, Muhammad Tariq, Carolina Vera, Noureddine Yassaa, \\nAndreas Fischlin, Joy Jacqueline Pereira, Sergey Semenov, Pius Yanda, \\nTaha M, Zatari, Amjad Abdulla, Carlo Carraro, Diriba Korecha Dadi, \\nNagmeldin G.E. Mahmoud, Ramón Pichs-Madruga, Andy Reisinger, \\nand Diana Ürge-Vorsatz. The IPCC Vice-Chairs and WG Co-Chairs served'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'also as members of the CWT and we are grateful for their contributions.\\nWe wish to thank the IPCC Secretariat for their guidance and support \\nfor the SYR in preparation, release and publication of the Report: \\nDeputy Secretary Emira Fida, Mudathir Abdallah, Jesbin Baidya, \\nLaura Biagioni, Oksana Ekzarkho, Judith Ewa, Joëlle Fernandez, \\nEmelie Larrode, Jennifer Lew Schneider, Andrej Mahecic, Nina Peeva, \\nMxolisi Shongwe, Melissa Walsh, and Werani Zabula. Their support for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'the successful SYR was truly outstanding throughout the entire process.\\nOur thanks go to José Romero, Head of the SYR Technical Support Unit \\n(SYR TSU) and Jinmi Kim, Director of Administration, and the members \\nof the SYR TSU, Arlene Birt, Meeyoung Ha, Erik Haites, Lance Ignon, \\nYonghun Jung, Dan Jezreel Orendain, Robert Stavins, Semin Park, and \\nYoungin Park for their hard work to facilitate the development and \\nproduction of the SYR with deep commitment and dedication to ensure'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'an outstanding SYR. Our thanks also go to Woochong Um and his team \\nat the Asian Development Bank for facilitation of the SYR TSU operation.\\nWe extend our appreciation of the enthusiasm, dedication, and \\nprofessional contributions of WG TSU members Sarah Connors, \\nClotilde Péan, and Anna Pirani from WG I, Marlies Craig, \\nKatja Mintenbeck, Elvira Poloczanska, Melinda Tignor from WG II and \\nRoger Fradera, Minal Pathak, Raphael Slade, Shreya Some, and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'Geninha Gabao Lisboa from WG III, working as a team with the SYR TSU, \\nwhich contributed to the successful outcome of the Session.\\nWe are appreciative of the member governments of the IPCC who \\ngraciously hosted the SYR scoping meeting, a CWT Meeting and \\nthe 58th Session of the IPCC: Singapore, Ireland, and Switzerland, \\nrespectively. We express our thanks to the IPCC member governments, \\nWMO, UNEP and the UNFCCC for their contributions to the Trust Fund'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 9,\n", " 'content': 'which supported various elements of expenditure. We wish to particularly \\nPrefacePreface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 10,\n", " 'content': 'ix\\nthank the Korea Meteorological Administration, Republic of Korea for its \\ngenerous financial support of the SYR TSU. We acknowledge the support \\nof IPCC’s parent organizations, UNEP and WMO, and particularly WMO \\nfor hosting the IPCC Secretariat. Finally, may we convey our deep \\ngratitude to the UNFCCC for their cooperation at various stages of this \\nenterprise and for the prominence they give to our work in several fora.\\n \\nHoesung Lee\\nChairman of the IPCC\\n \\nAbdalah Mokssit'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 10,\n", " 'content': 'Abdalah Mokssit\\nSecretary of the IPCCPrefacePreface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': 'xiForeword -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v\\nPreface ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vii\\nSummary for Policymakers ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': 'Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3\\nA. Current Status and Trends ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4\\nBox SPM.1 | Scenarios and pathways ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9\\nB. Future Climate Change, Risks, and Long-Term Responses ------------------------------------------------- 12'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': 'C. Responses in the Near Term ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24\\nClimate Change 2023 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35\\nSection 1: Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38\\nSection 2: Current Status and Trends ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': '2.1 Observed Changes, Impacts and Attribution ----------------------------------------------------------------42\\n2.1.1 Observed Warming and its Causes ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 42\\n2.1.2 Observed Climate System Changes and Impacts to Date ------------------------------------------ 46\\n2.2 Responses Undertaken to Date -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': '2.2.1 Global Policy Setting --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52\\n2.2.2 Mitigation Actions to Date -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53\\n2.2.3 Adaptation Actions to Date ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55\\n2.3 Current Mitigation and Adaptation Actions and Policies are not Sufficient ------------------------- 57'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': '2.3.1 The Gap Between Mitigation Policies, Pledges and Pathways that Limit Warming to \\n1.5°C or Below 2°C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57\\nCross-Section Box.1| Understanding Net Zero CO2 and Net Zero GHG Emissions ---------------------- 80\\n2.3.2 Adaptation Gaps and Barriers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 12,\n", " 'content': '2.3.3 Lack of Finance as a Barrier to Climate Action ------------------------------------------------------- 63\\nCross-Section Box.2 | Scenarios, Global Warming Levels, and Risks ----------------------------------------- 63Contents\\nFront matter\\nSPM\\nSections'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': 'xiiSection 3: Long-Term Climate and Development Futures---------------------------------------------------- 67\\n3.1 Long-Term Climate Change, Impacts and Related Risks ------------------------------------------------- 68\\n3.1.1 Long-term Climate Change ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68\\n3.1.2 Impacts and Related Risks -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '3.1.3 The Likelihood and Risks of Abrupt and Irreversible Change -------------------------------------- 77\\n3.2 Long-term Adaptation Options and Limits ------------------------------------------------------------------ 78\\n3.3 Mitigation Pathways --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82\\n3.3.1 Remaining Carbon Budgets ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '3.3.2 Net Zero Emissions: Timing and Implications --------------------------------------------------------- 85\\n3.3.3 Sectoral Contributions to Mitigation -------------------------------------------------------------------- 86\\n3.3.4 Overshoot Pathways: Increased Risks and Other Implications ------------------------------------- 87\\n3.4 Long-Term Interactions Between Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development ----------------- 88'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '3.4.1 Synergies and trade-offs, costs and benefits ---------------------------------------------------------- 88\\n3.4.2 Advancing Integrated Climate Action for Sustainable Development ----------------------------- 89\\nSection 4: Near-Term Responses in a Changing Climate ----------------------------------------------------- 91\\n4.1The Timing and Urgency of Climate Action ------------------------------------------------------------------ 92'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '4.2 Benefits of Strengthening Near-Term Action --------------------------------------------------------------- 95\\n4.3 Near-Term Risks -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 97\\n4.4 Equity and Inclusion in Climate Change Action ---------------------------------------------------------- 101\\n4.5 Near-Term Mitigation and Adaptation Actions ---------------------------------------------------------- 102'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '4.5.1 Energy Systems -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104\\n4.5.2 Industry ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104\\n4.5.3 Cities, Settlements and Infrastructure ----------------------------------------------------------------- 105\\n4.5.4 Land, Ocean, Food, and Water -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 106'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '4.5.5 Health and Nutrition -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 106\\n4.5.6 Society, Livelihoods, and Economies ------------------------------------------------------------------ 107\\n4.6 Co-Benefits of Adaptation and Mitigation for Sustainable Development Goals ------------------ 108\\n4.7 Governance and Policy for Near-Term Climate Change Action ---------------------------------------- 110'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '4.8 Strengthening the Response: Finance, International Cooperation and Technology --------------- 111\\n4.8.1 Finance for Mitigation and Adaptation Actions ----------------------------------------------------- 111\\n4.8.2 International Cooperation and Coordination -------------------------------------------------------- 112\\n4.8.3 Technology Innovation, Adoption, Diffusion and Transfer ----------------------------------------- 113'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 13,\n", " 'content': '4.9 Integration of Near-Term Actions Across Sectors and Systems ---------------------------------------- 114'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 14,\n", " 'content': 'xiiiAnnexes ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 117\\nI. Glossary -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 119\\nII. Acronyms, Chemical Symbols and Scientific Units ----------------------------------------------------------------- 131'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 14,\n", " 'content': 'III. Contributors --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 135\\nIV. Expert Reviewers --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143\\nV. Publications by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ---------------------------------------------- 161'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 14,\n", " 'content': 'Index -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 163Annexes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 15,\n", " 'content': 'xivSources cited in this Synthesis Report\\nReferences for material contained in this report are given in curly brackets {} at the end of each paragraph.\\nIn the Summary for Policymakers, the references refer to the numbers of the sections, figures, tables and boxes in the underlying \\nIntroduction and Topics of this Synthesis Report.\\nIn the Introduction and Sections of the longer report, the references refer to the contributions of the Working Groups I, II and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 15,\n", " 'content': 'III (WGI, WGII, WGIII) to the Sixth Assessment Report and other IPCC Reports (in italicized curly brackets), or to other sections \\nof the Synthesis Report itself (in round brackets).\\nThe following abbreviations have been used:\\nSPM: Summary for Policymakers\\nTS: Technical Summary\\nES: Executive Summary of a chapter\\nNumbers denote specific chapters and sections of a report.\\nOther IPCC reports cited in this Synthesis Report:\\nSR1.5: Global Warming of 1.5°C\\nSRCCL: Climate Change and Land'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 15,\n", " 'content': 'SROCC: The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 16,\n", " 'content': 'Climate Change 2023\\nSynthesis Report\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nIPCC, 2023: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to \\nthe Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. \\nIPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 1-34, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001This Summary for Policymakers should be cited as:'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': '3\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersIntroduction \\nThis Synthesis Report (SYR) of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) summarises the state of knowledge of climate change, \\nits widespread impacts and risks, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. It integrates the main findings of the Sixth \\nAssessment Report (AR6) based on contributions from the three Working Groups1, and the three Special Reports2. The summary'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'for Policymakers (SPM) is structured in three parts: SPM.A Current Status and Trends, SPM.B Future Climate Change, Risks, and \\nLong-Term Responses, and SPM.C Responses in the Near Term3. \\nThis report recognizes the interdependence of climate, ecosystems and biodiversity, and human societies; the value of diverse \\nforms of knowledge; and the close linkages between climate change adaptation, mitigation, ecosystem health, human well-being'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'and sustainable development, and reflects the increasing diversity of actors involved in climate action. \\nBased on scientific understanding, key findings can be formulated as statements of fact or associated with an assessed level of \\nconfidence using the IPCC calibrated language4. \\xa0\\n1 The three Working Group contributions to AR6 are: AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis; AR6 Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'and Vulnerability; and AR6 Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Their assessments cover scientific literature accepted for publication \\nrespectively by 31 January 2021, 1 September 2021 and 11 October 2021.\\n2 The three Special Reports are: Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018): an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable \\ndevelopment, and efforts to eradicate poverty (SR1.5); Climate Change and Land (2019): an IPCC Special Report on climate change, desertification, land \\ndegradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems (SRCCL); and The Ocean and Cryosphere in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'a Changing Climate (2019) (SROCC). The Special Reports cover scientific literature accepted for publication respectively by 15 May 2018, 7 April 2019 and \\n15 May 2019.\\n3 In this report, the near term is defined as the period until 2040. The long term is defined as the period beyond 2040.\\n4 Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. The IPCC calibrated language uses five qualifiers to express a level of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'confidence: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, for example, medium confidence . The following terms are used to indicate the \\nassessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, \\nabout as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%; and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 18,\n", " 'content': 'extremely unlikely 0–5%) are also used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely . This is consistent with AR5 and the other \\nAR6 Reports.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': '4\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersA. Current Status and Trends\\nObserved Warming and its Causes\\nA.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally \\ncaused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850–1900 \\nin 2011–2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal \\nhistorical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, \\nbetween and within countries, and among individuals ( high confidence ). {2.1, Figure 2.1, \\nFigure 2.2 }\\nA.1.1 Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20]°C5 higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–19006, with larger increases \\nover land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83]°C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01]°C). Global surface temperature in the first two'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'decades of the 21st century (2001–2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10]°C higher than 1850–1900. Global surface temperature \\nhas increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years ( high confidence ). \\n{2.1.1, Figure 2.1 }\\nA.1.2 The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–20197 is 0.8°C to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': '1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. Over this period, it is likely that well-mixed greenhouse gases (GHGs) contributed \\na warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C8, and other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, \\nnatural (solar and volcanic) drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability \\nchanged it by –0.2°C to +0.2°C. {2.1.1, Figure 2.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'A.1.3 Observed increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions \\nfrom human activities over this period. Historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO 2 \\nof which more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989, and about 42% occurred between 1990 and 2019 ( high \\nconfidence ). In 2019, atmospheric CO 2 concentrations (410 parts per million) were higher than at any time in at least 2'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'million years ( high confidence ), and concentrations of methane (1866 parts per billion) and nitrous oxide (332 parts per \\nbillion) were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years ( very high confidence ). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1 }\\nA.1.4 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59 ± 6.6 GtCO 2-eq9 in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO 2-eq) \\nhigher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO 2-eq) higher than in 1990, with the largest share and growth in gross GHG emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'occurring in CO 2 from fossil fuels combustion and industrial processes (CO 2-FFI) followed by methane, whereas the highest \\nrelative growth occurred in fluorinated gases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. Average annual GHG emissions \\nduring 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade on record, while the rate of growth between 2010 and \\n2019 (1.3% yr-1) was lower than that between 2000 and 2009 (2.1% yr-1). In 2019, approximately 79% of global GHG'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': '5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated.\\n6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22]°C). Additionally, \\nmethodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase \\ndoes not represent additional physical warming since AR5.\\n7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 \\nis 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': '8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO 2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2] °C; \\nmethane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1 }\\n9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO 2-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'equivalents (CO 2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to \\nthe AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and \\nassess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 19,\n", " 'content': 'and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': '5\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for Policymakersemissions came from the sectors of energy, industry, transport, and buildings together and 22%10 from agriculture, \\nforestry and other land use ( AFOLU). Emissions reductions in CO 2-FFI due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP \\nand carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, \\nenergy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. ( high confidence ) {2.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'A.1.5 Historical contributions of CO 2 emissions vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in \\nterms of contributions to CO 2-FFI and net CO 2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO 2-LULUCF). \\nIn 2019, around 35% of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO 2-eq per capita11 (excluding \\nCO 2-LULUCF) while 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO 2-eq per capita; of the latter a substantial share lacks'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'access to modern energy services. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have \\nmuch lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO 2-eq and 4.6 tCO 2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO 2-eq), \\nexcluding CO 2-LULUCF . The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global \\nconsumption-based household GHG emissions, while the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. ( high confidence ) {2.1.1, \\nFigure 2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 2.2 }\\nObserved Changes and Impacts\\nA.2 Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have \\noccurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate \\nextremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and \\nrelated losses and damages to nature and people ( high confidence ). Vulnerable communities \\nwho have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'affected ( high confidence ). {2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 } (Figure SPM.1)\\nA.2.1 It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Global mean sea level increased by \\n0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr-1 between 1901 \\nand 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr-1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr-1'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'between 2006 and 2018 ( high confidence ). Human influence was very likely the main driver of these increases since at \\nleast 1971. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical \\ncyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has further strengthened since AR5. Human influence \\nhas likely increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s, including increases in the frequency of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'concurrent heatwaves and droughts ( high confidence ). {2.1.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Figure 3.4 } (Figure SPM.1 )\\nA.2.2 Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Human and \\necosystem vulnerability are interdependent. Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high \\nvulnerability to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'to acute food insecurity12 and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in many locations \\nand/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for \\nIndigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality \\nfrom floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'vulnerability. ( high confidence ) {2.1.2, 4.4 } (Figure SPM.1 )\\nA.2.3 Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, \\ncryospheric, and coastal and open ocean ecosystems ( high confidence ). Hundreds of local losses of species have been \\ndriven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes (high confidence ) with mass mortality events recorded on'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': 'land and in the ocean ( very high confidence ). Impacts on some ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as \\nthe impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain ( medium \\nconfidence ) and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw ( high confidence ). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3 } (Figure SPM.1 )\\n10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 20,\n", " 'content': '11 Territorial emissions.\\n12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result \\nof shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': '6\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersA.2.4 Climate change has reduced food security and affected water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable \\nDevelopment Goals (high confidence ). Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has \\nslowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence ), with related negative impacts mainly in mid-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'and low latitude regions but positive impacts in some high latitude regions (high confidence ). Ocean warming and \\nocean acidification have adversely affected food production from fisheries and shellfish aquaculture in some oceanic \\nregions (high confidence ). Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least \\npart of the year due to a combination of climatic and non-climatic drivers (medium confidence ). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3 } \\n(Figure SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': '(Figure SPM.1 )\\nA.2.5 In all regions increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity (very high confidence ). \\nThe occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases (very high confidence ) and the incidence \\nof vector-borne diseases (high confidence ) have increased. In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are \\nassociated with increasing temperatures (high confidence ), trauma from extreme events (very high confidence ), and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'loss of livelihoods and culture (high confidence ). Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement \\nin Africa, Asia, North America (high confidence ), and Central and South America (medium confidence) , with small island \\nstates in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size (high \\nconfidence ). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3 } (Figure SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'A.2.6 Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages13 to nature and people that are \\nunequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors. Economic damages from climate change have been detected \\nin climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism. Individual livelihoods have been \\naffected through, for example, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, human health'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity. (high confidence ) {2.1.2 } (Figure SPM.1 )\\nA.2.7 In urban areas, observed climate change has caused adverse impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure. \\nHot extremes have intensified in cities. Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy \\nsystems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events14, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'services and negative impacts to well-being. Observed adverse impacts are concentrated amongst economically and \\nsocially marginalised urban residents. (high confidence ) {2.1.2 }\\n13 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic (see \\nAnnex I: Glossary).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 21,\n", " 'content': 'Annex I: Glossary).\\n14 Slow-onset events are described among the climatic-impact drivers of the AR6 WGI and refer to the risks and impacts associated with e.g., increasing \\ntemperature means, desertification, decreasing precipitation, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean \\nacidification, sea level rise and salinization. {2.1.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': '7\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersFigure SPM.1: (a) Climate change has already caused widespread impacts and related losses and damages on human systems and altered terrestrial, \\nfreshwater and ocean ecosystems worldwide. Physical water availability includes balance of water available from various sources including ground water, water'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'quality and demand for water. Global mental health and displacement assessments reflect only assessed regions. Confidence levels reflect the assessment of \\nattribution of the observed impact to climate change. (b) Observed impacts are connected to physical climate changes including many that have been attributed \\nto human influence such as the selected climatic impact-drivers shown. Confidence and likelihood levels reflect the assessment of attribution of the observed'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'climatic impact-driver to human influence. (c) Observed (1900–2020) and projected (2021–2100) changes in global surface temperature (relative to 1850-1900), \\nwhich are linked to changes in climate conditions and impacts, illustrate how the climate has already changed and will change along the lifespan of three Adverse impacts from human-caused \\nclimate change will continue to intensify\\nTerrestrial\\necosystemsFreshwater\\necosystemsOcean\\necosystemsa) Observed widespread and substantial impacts and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'related losses and damages attributed to climate change\\nConfidence in attribution \\nto climate change\\nHigh or very high confidence\\nMedium confidenceLow confidenceIncludes changes in ecosystem structure, \\nspecies ranges and seasonal timingBiodiversity and ecosystemsWater availability and food production Health and well-being\\nCities, settlements and infrastructure\\nInland\\nflooding and\\nassociated \\ndamagesFlood/storm \\ninduced\\ndamages in\\ncoastal areasDamages\\nto key\\neconomic\\nsectorsDamages \\nto infra-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'to infra-\\nstructurePhysical \\nwater \\navailabilityAgriculture/\\ncrop \\nproductionFisheries\\nyields and\\naquaculture \\nproductionAnimal and\\nlivestock\\nhealth and \\nproductivityInfectious\\ndiseasesDisplacement Mental\\nhealthHeat,\\nmalnutrition\\nand harm \\nfrom wildfireObserved increase in climate impacts to human systems and ecosystems assessed at global level\\nAdverse impacts\\nAdverse and positive impacts\\nClimate-driven changes observed, \\nno global assessment of impact directionKey\\n1900 1940 1980 2060 2100'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'very high\\nhigh\\nvery lowlowintermediate2020future experiences depend on \\nhow we address climate change2011-2020 was around 1.1°C warmer than 1850-1900\\n warming \\ncontinues beyond 2100\\n70 years \\nold in 2050born\\nin 1980bornin 2020\\nborn\\nin 1950\\n70 years \\nold in 2090\\n70 years old\\n in 2020\\nGlobal temperature change above 1850-1900 levels\\n°C\\n0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 4 3.5c) The extent to which current and future generations will experience a'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'hotter and different world depends on choices now and in the near term\\nFuture emissions \\nscenarios:b) Impacts are driven by changes in multiple physical climate \\nconditions, which are increasingly attributed to human influence\\nAttribution of observed physical climate changes to human influence:\\nVirtually certain\\nIncrease \\nin hot \\nextremes Upper \\nocean\\nacidificationpHLikely\\nIncrease \\nin heavy \\nprecipitationVery likely\\nGlobal sea\\nlevel riseGlacier\\nretreatMedium confidence\\nIncrease in \\ncompound'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 22,\n", " 'content': 'compound\\nfloodingIncrease in \\nagricultural \\n& ecological \\ndroughtIncrease \\nin fire\\nweather'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': '8\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakersrepresentative generations (born in 1950, 1980 and 2020). Future projections (2021–2100) of changes in global surface temperature are shown for very low \\n(SSP1-1.9), low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5), high (SSP3-7.0) and very high (SSP5-8.5) GHG emissions scenarios. Changes in annual global surface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'temperatures are presented as ‘ climate stripes’, with future projections showing the human-caused long-term trends and continuing modulation by natural \\nvariability (represented here using observed levels of past natural variability). Colours on the generational icons correspond to the global surface temperature \\nstripes for each year, wit h segments on future icons differentiating possible future experiences. {2.1, 2.1.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Cross-Section Box.2,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': '3.1, Figure 3.3, 4.1, 4.3 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nCurrent Progress in Adaptation and Gaps and Challenges\\nA.3 Adaptation planning and implementation has progressed across all sectors and regions, \\nwith documented benefits and varying effectiveness. Despite progress, adaptation gaps \\nexist, and will continue to grow at current rates of implementation. Hard and soft limits to \\nadaptation have been reached in some ecosystems and regions. Maladaptation is happening'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'in some sectors and regions. Current global financial flows for adaptation are insufficient \\nfor, and constrain implementation of, adaptation options, especially in developing countries \\n(high confidence ). {2.2, 2.3 }\\nA.3.1 Progress in adaptation planning and implementation has been observed across all sectors and regions, generating \\nmultiple benefits (very high confidence ). Growing public and political awareness of climate impacts and risks has'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'resulted in at least 170 countries and many cities including adaptation in their climate policies and planning processes \\n(high confidence ). {2.2.3 }\\nA.3.2 Effectiveness15 of adaptation in reducing climate risks16 is documented for specific contexts, sectors and regions (high \\nconfidence ). Examples of effective adaptation options include: cultivar improvements, on-farm water management and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'storage, soil moisture conservation, irrigation, agroforestry, community-based adaptation, farm and landscape level \\ndiversification in agriculture, sustainable land management approaches, use of agroecological principles and practices \\nand other approaches that work with natural processes (high confidence ). Ecosystem-based adaptation17 approaches \\nsuch as urban greening, restoration of wetlands and upstream forest ecosystems have been effective in reducing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'flood risks and urban heat (high confidence ). Combinations of non-structural measures like early warning systems and \\nstructural measures like levees have reduced loss of lives in case of inland flooding (medium confidence ). Adaptation \\noptions such as disaster risk management, early warning systems, climate services and social safety nets have broad \\napplicability across multiple sectors (high confidence ). {2.2.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'A.3.3 Most observed adaptation responses are fragmented, incremental18, sector-specific and unequally distributed across \\nregions. Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist across sectors and regions, and will continue to grow under current \\nlevels of implementation, with the largest adaptation gaps among lower income groups. (high confidence ) {2.3.2 }\\nA.3.4 There is increased evidence of maladaptation in various sectors and regions. Maladaptation especially affects'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'marginalised and vulnerable groups adversely. (high confidence ) {2.3.2 }\\nA.3.5 Soft limits to adaptation are currently being experienced by small-scale farmers and households along some low-\\nlying coastal areas (medium confidence ) resulting from financial, governance, institutional and policy constraints \\n(high confidence ). Some tropical, coastal, polar and mountain ecosystems have reached hard adaptation limits (high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). Adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages, even with effective adaptation and before reaching \\nsoft and hard limits (high confidence ). {2.3.2 }\\n15 Effectiveness refers here to the extent to which an adaptation option is anticipated or observed to reduce climate-related risk. {2.2.3 }\\n16 See Annex I: Glossary. {2.2.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 23,\n", " 'content': '17 Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) is recognized internationally under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD14/5). A related concept is Nature-based \\nSolutions (NbS), see Annex I: Glossary.\\n18 Incremental adaptations to change in climate are understood as extensions of actions and behaviours that already reduce the losses or enhance the \\nbenefits of natural variations in extreme weather/ climate events. {2.3.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': '9\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersA.3.6 Key barriers to adaptation are limited resources, lack of private sector and citizen engagement, insufficient mobilization \\nof finance (including for research), low climate literacy, lack of political commitment, limited research and/or slow and \\nlow uptake of adaptation science, and low sense of urgency. There are widening disparities between the estimated costs'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'of adaptation and the finance allocated to adaptation (high confidence ). Adaptation finance has come predominantly \\nfrom public sources, and a small proportion of global tracked climate finance was targeted to adaptation and an \\noverwhelming majority to mitigation (very high confidence ). Although global tracked climate finance has shown \\nan upward trend since AR5, current global financial flows for adaptation, including from public and private finance'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'sources, are insufficient and constrain implementation of adaptation options, especially in developing countries ( high \\nconfidence ). Adverse climate impacts can reduce the availability of financial resources by incurring losses and damages \\nand through impeding national economic growth, thereby further increasing financial constraints for adaptation, \\nparticularly for developing and least developed countries ( medium confidence ). {2.3.2, 2.3.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'Box SPM.1 The use of scenarios and modelled pathways in the AR6 Synthesis Report\\nModelled scenarios and pathways19 are used to explore future emissions, climate change, related impacts and risks, and \\npossible mitigation and adaptation strategies and are based on a range of assumptions, including socio-economic variables \\nand mitigation options. These are quantitative projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Global modelled emission'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'pathways, including those based on cost effective approaches contain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, \\nand have to be assessed with the careful recognition of these assumptions. Most do not make explicit assumptions about \\nglobal equity, environmental justice or intra-regional income distribution. IPCC is neutral with regard to the assumptions \\nunderlying the scenarios in the literature assessed in this report, which do not cover all possible futures.20 {Cross-Section Box.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'WGI assessed the climate response to five illustrative scenarios based on Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)21 that \\ncover the range of possible future development of anthropogenic drivers of climate change found in the literature. High and \\nvery high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.522) have CO 2 emissions that roughly double from current levels \\nby 2100 and 2050, respectively. The intermediate GHG emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5) has CO 2 emissions remaining around'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'current levels until the middle of the century. The very low and low GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6) have CO 2 \\nemissions declining to net zero around 2050 and 2070, respectively, followed by varying levels of net negative CO 2 emissions. \\nIn addition, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)23 were used by WGI and WGII to assess regional climate changes, \\nimpacts and risks. In WGIII, a large number of global modelled emissions pathways were assessed, of which 1202 pathways'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'were categorised based on their assessed global warming over the 21st century; categories range from pathways that limit \\nwarming to 1.5°C with more than 50% likelihood (noted >50% in this report) with no or limited overshoot (C1) to pathways \\nthat exceed 4°C (C8). {Cross-Section Box.2 } (Box SPM.1, Table 1 )\\nGlobal warming levels (GWLs) relative to 1850–1900 are used to integrate the assessment of climate change and related'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'impacts and risks since patterns of changes for many variables at a given GWL are common to all scenarios considered and \\nindependent of timing when that level is reached. { Cross-Section Box.2 }\\n19 In the literature, the terms pathways and scenarios are used interchangeably, with the former more frequently used in relation to climate goals. WGI \\nprimarily used the term scenarios and WGIII mostly used the term modelled emission and mitigation pathways. The SYR primarily uses scenarios when'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'referring to WGI and modelled emission and mitigation pathways when referring to WGIII.\\n20 Around half of all modelled global emission pathways assume cost- effective approaches that rely on least-cost mitigation/abatement options globally. The \\nother half looks at existing policies and regionally and sectorally differentiated actions.\\n21 SSP-based scenarios are referred to as SSPx-y, where ‘SSPx’ refers to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway describing the socioeconomic trends underlying the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'scenarios, and ‘y’ refers to the level of radiative forcing (in watts per square metre, or W m-2) resulting from the scenario in the year 2100. {Cross-Section Box.2 }\\n22 Very high emissions scenarios have become less likely but cannot be ruled out. Warming levels >4°C may result from very high emissions scenarios, but can \\nalso occur from lower emission scenarios if climate sensitivity or carbon cycle feedbacks are higher than the best estimate. {3.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': '23 RCP-based scenarios are referred to as RCPy, where ‘y’ refers to the level of radiative forcing (in watts per square metre, or W m-2) resulting from the \\nscenario in the year 2100. The SSP scenarios cover a broader range of greenhouse gas and air pollutant futures than the RCPs. They are similar but not \\nidentical, with differences in concentration trajectories. The overall effective radiative forcing tends to be higher for the SSPs compared to the RCPs with the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 24,\n", " 'content': 'same label ( medium confidence ). {Cross-Section Box.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': '10\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nCategory \\nin WGIIICategory descriptionGHG emissions scenarios(SSPx-y*) in WGI & WGII RCPy** in WGI & WGII\\nC1limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%)with no or limited overshoot***Very low (SSP1-1.9)\\nLow (SSP1-2.6) RCP2.6C2return warming to 1.5°C (>50%)after a high overshoot***\\nC3 limit warming to 2°C (>67%)\\nC4 limit warming to 2°C (>50%)\\nC5 limit warming to 2.5°C (>50%)\\nC6 limit warming to 3°C (>50%) Intermediate (SSP2-4.5) RCP 4.5'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'RCP 8.5C7 limit warming to 4°C (>50%) High (SSP3-7.0)\\nC8 exceed warming of 4°C (>50%) Very high (SSP5-8.5)Box SPM.1, Table 1: Description and relationship of scenarios and modelled pathways considered across AR6 Working Group \\nreports. { Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1 }\\n* See footnote 21 for the SSPx-y terminology. \\n** See footnote 23 for the RCPy terminology.\\n*** Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C global warming by up to about 0.1°C, high overshoot by 0.1°C-0.3°C, in both'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'cases for up to several decades.\\nCurrent Mitigation Progress, Gaps and Challenges\\nA.4 Policies and laws addressing mitigation have consistently expanded since AR5. Global GHG \\nemissions in 2030 implied by nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced by October \\n2021 make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century and make it harder \\nto limit warming below 2°C. There are gaps between projected emissions from implemented'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'policies and those from NDCs and finance flows fall short of the levels needed to meet climate \\ngoals across all sectors and regions. ( high confidence ) {2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Table 2.2 }\\nA.4.1 The UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement are supporting rising levels of national ambition. The Paris Agreement, \\nadopted under the UNFCCC, with near universal participation, has led to policy development and target-setting at national'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'and sub- national levels, in particular in relation to mitigation, as well as enhanced transparency of climate \\naction and support ( medium confidence ). Many regulatory and economic instruments have already been deployed \\nsuccessfully ( high confidence ). In many countries, policies have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation \\nand accelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some cases reduced or removed emissions ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to several24 Gt CO 2-eq yr-1 of avoided \\nglobal emissions (medium confidence ). At least 18 countries have sustained absolute production-based GHG and \\nconsumption-based CO 2 reductions25 for longer than 10 years. These reductions have only partly offset global emissions \\ngrowth ( high confidence ). {2.2.1, 2.2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': 'A.4.2 Several mitigation options, notably solar energy, wind energy, electrification of urban systems, urban green infrastructure, \\nenergy efficiency, demand-side management, improved forest and crop / grassland management, and reduced food \\nwaste and loss, are technically viable, are becoming increasingly cost effective and are generally supported by the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': '24 At least 1.8 GtCO 2-eq yr–1 can be accounted for by aggregating separate estimates for the effects of economic and regulatory instruments. Growing \\nnumbers of laws and executive orders have impacted global emissions and were estimated to result in 5.9 GtCO 2-eq yr–1 less emissions in 2016 than they \\notherwise would have been. (medium confidence ) {2.2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 25,\n", " 'content': '25 Reductions were linked to energy supply decarbonisation, energy efficiency gains, and energy demand reduction, which resulted from both policies and \\nchanges in economic structure ( high confidence ). {2.2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': '11\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for Policymakerspublic. From 2010 to 2019 there have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (85%), wind energy \\n(55%), and lithium-ion batteries (85%), and large increases in their deployment, e.g., >10× for solar and >100× for \\nelectric vehicles (EVs), varying widely across regions. The mix of policy instruments that reduced costs and stimulated'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'adoption includes public R&D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and demand-pull instruments such as \\ndeployment subsidies to attain scale. Maintaining emission-intensive systems may, in some regions and sectors, be \\nmore expensive than transitioning to low emission systems. (high confidence ) {2.2.2, Figure 2.4 }\\nA.4.3 A substantial ‘ emissions gap’ exists between global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'NDCs announced prior to COP2626 and those associated with modelled mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C \\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot or limit warming to 2°C (>67%) assuming immediate action (high confidence ). This \\nwould make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century (high confidence ). Global modelled mitigation \\npathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot or limit warming to 2°C (>67%) assuming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'immediate action imply deep global GHG emissions reductions this decade (high confidence ) (see SPM Box 1, Table 1, B.6)27. \\nModelled pathways that are consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030 and assume no increase in \\nambition thereafter have higher emissions, leading to a median global warming of 2.8 [2.1 to 3.4] °C by 2100 (medium \\nconfidence ). Many countries have signalled an intention to achieve net zero GHG or net zero CO 2 by around mid-century'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'but pledges differ across countries in terms of scope and specificity, and limited policies are to date in place to deliver \\non them. {2.3.1, Table 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 3.1, 4.1 }\\nA.4.4 Policy coverage is uneven across sectors (high confidence ). Policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to \\nresult in higher global GHG emissions in 2030 than emissions implied by NDCs, indicating an ‘implementation gap’'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). Without a strengthening of policies, global warming of 3.2 [2.2 to 3.5]°C is projected by 2100 \\n(medium confidence ). {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 3.1.1, Figure 2.5 } (Box SPM.1, Figure SPM.5 )\\nA.4.5 The adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most developing countries, particularly least developed ones, due \\nin part to limited finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity ( medium confidence ). The magnitude'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'of climate finance flows has increased over the last decade and financing channels have broadened but growth has \\nslowed since 2018 (high confidence ). Financial flows have developed heterogeneously across regions and sectors \\n(high confidence ). Public and private finance flows for fossil fuels are still greater than those for climate adaptation \\nand mitigation (high confidence ). The overwhelming majority of tracked climate finance is directed towards mitigation,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': 'but nevertheless falls short of the levels needed to limit warming to below 2°C or to 1.5°C across all sectors and \\nregions (see C7.2) (very high confidence ). In 2018, public and publicly mobilised private climate finance flows from \\ndeveloped to developing countries were below the collective goal under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to mobilise \\nUSD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 26,\n", " 'content': '(medium confidence ). {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.3 }\\n26 Due to the literature cutoff date of WGIII, the additional NDCs submitted after 11 October 2021 are not assessed here. {Footnote 32 in the Longer Report }\\n27 Projected 2030 GHG emissions are 50 (47–55) GtCO 2-eq if all conditional NDC elements are taken into account. Without conditional elements, the global \\nemissions are projected to be approximately similar to modelled 2019 levels at 53 (50–57) GtCO 2-eq. {2.3.1, Table 2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': '12\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersB. Future Climate Change, Risks, and Long-Term Responses\\nFuture Climate Change \\nB.1 Continued greenhouse gas emissions will lead to increasing global warming, with the best \\nestimate of reaching 1.5°C in the near term in considered scenarios and modelled pathways. \\nEvery increment of global warming will intensify multiple and concurrent hazards ( high \\nconfidence ). Deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'lead to a discernible slowdown in global warming within around two decades, and also \\nto discernible changes in atmospheric composition within a few years (high confidence ). \\n{Cross-Section Boxes 1 and 2, 3.1, 3.3, Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, 4.3 } (Figure SPM.2, Box SPM.1 )\\nB.1.1 Global warming28 will continue to increase in the near term (2021–2040) mainly due to increased cumulative'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2 emissions in nearly all considered scenarios and modelled pathways. In the near term, global warming is more \\nlikely than not to reach 1.5°C even under the very low GHG emission scenario (SSP1-1.9) and likely or very likely to \\nexceed 1.5°C under higher emissions scenarios. In the considered scenarios and modelled pathways, the best estimates \\nof the time when the level of global warming of 1.5°C is reached lie in the near term29. Global warming declines back'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'to below 1.5°C by the end of the 21st century in some scenarios and modelled pathways (see B.7). The assessed \\nclimate response to GHG emissions scenarios results in a best estimate of warming for 2081–2100 that spans a range \\nfrom 1.4°C for a very low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9) to 2.7°C for an intermediate GHG emissions scenario \\n(SSP2-4.5) and 4.4°C for a very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5)30, with narrower uncertainty ranges31 than for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'corresponding scenarios in AR5. { Cross-Section Boxes 1 and 2, 3.1.1, 3.3.4, Table 3.1, 4.3 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nB.1.2 Discernible differences in trends of global surface temperature between contrasting GHG emissions scenarios ( SSP1-1.9 \\nand SSP1-2.6 vs. SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5) would begin to emerge from natural variability32 within around 20 years. Under \\nthese contrasting scenarios, discernible effects would emerge within years for GHG concentrations, and sooner for air'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'quality improvements, due to the combined targeted air pollution controls and strong and sustained methane emissions \\nreductions. Targeted reductions of air pollutant emissions lead to more rapid improvements in air quality within years \\ncompared to reductions in GHG emissions only, but in the long term, further improvements are projected in scenarios \\nthat combine efforts to reduce air pollutants as well as GHG emissions33. (high confidence ) {3.1.1 } (Box SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'B.1.3 Continued emissions will further affect all major climate system components. With every additional increment of global \\nwarming, changes in extremes continue to become larger. Continued global warming is projected to further intensify \\nthe global water cycle, including its variability, global monsoon precipitation, and very wet and very dry weather and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': '28 Global warming (see Annex I: Glossary) is here reported as running 20-year averages, unless stated otherwise, relative to 1850–1900. Global surface \\ntemperature in any single year can vary above or below the long-term human-caused trend, due to natural variability. The internal variability of global \\nsurface temperature in a single year is estimated to be about ±0.25°C (5–95% range, high confidence ). The occurrence of individual years with global'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'surface temperature change above a certain level does not imply that this global warming level has been reached. {4.3, Cross-Section Box.2 }\\n29 Median five-year interval at which a 1.5°C global warming level is reached (50% probability) in categories of modelled pathways considered in WGIII is \\n2030–2035. By 2030, global surface temperature in any individual year could exceed 1.5°C relative to 1850–1900 with a probability between 40% and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': '60%, across the five scenarios assessed in WGI ( medium confidence ). In all scenarios considered in WGI except the very high emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5), \\nthe midpoint of the first 20-year running average period during which the assessed average global surface temperature change reaches 1.5°C lies in the \\nfirst half of the 2030s. In the very high GHG emissions scenario, the midpoint is in the late 2020s. {3.1.1, 3.3.1, 4.3 } (Box SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': '30 The best estimates [and very likely ranges] for the different scenarios are: 1.4 [1.0 to 1.8 ]°C (SSP1-1.9); 1.8 [1.3 to 2.4]°C (SSP1-2.6); 2.7 [2.1 to 3.5]°C \\n(SSP2-4.5); 3.6 [2.8 to 4.6]°C (SSP3-7.0); and 4.4 [3.3 to 5.7 ]°C (SSP5-8.5). {3.1.1 } (Box SPM.1 )\\n31 Assessed future changes in global surface temperature have been constructed, for the first time, by combining multi-model projections with observational'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'constraints and the assessed equilibrium climate sensitivity and transient climate response. The uncertainty range is narrower than in the AR5 thanks to \\nimproved knowledge of climate processes, paleoclimate evidence and model-based emergent constraints. {3.1.1 }\\n32 See Annex I: Glossary. Natural variability includes natural drivers and internal variability. The main internal variability phenomena include El Niño-Southern'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 27,\n", " 'content': 'Oscillation, Pacific Decadal Variability and Atlantic Multi-decadal Variability. {4.3}\\n33 Based on additional scenarios.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 28,\n", " 'content': '13\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for Policymakersclimate events and seasons (high confidence ). In scenarios with increasing CO 2 emissions, natural land and ocean \\ncarbon sinks are projected to take up a decreasing proportion of these emissions (high confidence ). Other projected \\nchanges include further reduced extents and/or volumes of almost all cryospheric elements34 (high confidence) , further'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 28,\n", " 'content': 'global mean sea level rise (virtually certain) , and increased ocean acidification (virtually certain) and deoxygenation \\n(high confidence ). {3.1.1, 3.3.1, Figure 3.4 } (Figure SPM.2 )\\nB.1.4 With further warming, every region is projected to increasingly experience concurrent and multiple changes in climatic \\nimpact-drivers. Compound heatwaves and droughts are projected to become more frequent, including concurrent'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 28,\n", " 'content': 'events across multiple locations (high confidence ). Due to relative sea level rise, current 1-in-100 year extreme sea \\nlevel events are projected to occur at least annually in more than half of all tide gauge locations by 2100 under all \\nconsidered scenarios (high confidence ). Other projected regional changes include intensification of tropical cyclones \\nand/or extratropical storms (medium confidence ), and increases in aridity and fire weather (medium to high confidence ). \\n{3.1.1, 3.1.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 28,\n", " 'content': '{3.1.1, 3.1.3 }\\nB.1.5 Natural variability will continue to modulate human-caused climate changes, either attenuating or amplifying projected \\nchanges, with little effect on centennial-scale global warming (high confidence ). These modulations are important to \\nconsider in adaptation planning, especially at the regional scale and in the near term. If a large explosive volcanic \\neruption were to occur35, it would temporarily and partially mask human-caused climate change by reducing global'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 28,\n", " 'content': 'surface temperature and precipitation for one to three years (medium confidence ). {4.3}\\n34 Permafrost, seasonal snow cover, glaciers, the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets, and Arctic sea ice.\\n35 Based on 2500-year reconstructions, eruptions with a radiative forcing more negative than –1 W m-2, related to the radiative effect of volcanic stratospheric \\naerosols in the literature assessed in this report, occur on average twice per century. {4.3}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': '14\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakers\\n2011-2020 was \\naround 1.1°C warmer than 1850-1900the last time global surface temperature was sustained at or above 2.5°C was over 3 million years ago\\n4°CThe world at\\n2°CThe world at\\n1.5°C+ +1 0The world at\\n3°CThe world at\\nsmall absolute changes may appear large as % or σ changes \\nin dry regionsurbanisation \\nfurther intensifies \\nheat extremes\\nc) Annual wettest-day precipitation changeGlobal warming level (GWL) above 1850-1900'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'a) Annual hottest-day temperature change\\nb) Annual mean total column soil moisture change°C\\nAnnual wettest day precipitation is projected to increase \\nin almost all continental regions, even in regions where projected annual mean soil moisture declines.Annual hottest day temperature is projected to increase most (1.5-2 times the GWL) in some mid-latitude and semi-arid regions, and in the South American Monsoon region.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'Projections of annual mean soil moisture largely follow projections in annual mean precipitation but also show some differences due to the influence of evapotranspiration.\\nchange (%)\\n-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40+ +\\nchange (°C)\\n0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7\\n-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5change (σ )With every increment of global warming, regional changes in mean \\nclimate and extremes become more widespread and pronounced'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'Figure SPM.2: Projected changes of annual maximum daily maximum temperature, annual mean total column soil moisture and annual \\nmaximum 1-day precipitation at global warming levels of 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C, and 4°C relative to 1850–1900. Projected (a) annual maximum \\ndaily temperature change (°C), (b) annual mean total column soil moisture change (standard deviation), (c) annual maximum 1-day precipitation change (%).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'The panels show CMIP6 multi-model median changes. In panels (b) and (c), large positive relative changes in dry regions may correspond to small absolute \\nchanges. In panel (b), the unit is the standard deviation of interannual variability in soil moisture during 1850–1900. Standard deviation is a widely used \\nmetric in characterising drought severity. A projected reduction in mean soil moisture by one standard deviation corresponds to soil moisture conditions typical'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'of droughts that occurred about once every six years during 1850–1900. The WGI Interactive Atlas ( https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/ ) can be used to explore \\nadditional changes in the climate system across the range of global warming levels presented in this figure. {Figure 3.1, Cross-Section Box.2 }\\nClimate Change Impacts and Climate-Related Risks\\nB.2 For any given future warming level, many climate- related risks are higher than assessed in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': 'AR5, and projected long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than currently observed \\n(high confidence ). Risks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from \\nclimate change escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence ). \\nClimatic and non-climatic risks will increasingly interact, creating compound and cascading \\nrisks that are more complex and difficult to manage ( high confidence ). {Cross-Section Box.2,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 29,\n", " 'content': '3.1, 4.3, Figure 3.3, Figure 4.3 } (Figure SPM.3, Figure SPM.4 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': '15\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersB.2.1 In the near term, every region in the world is projected to face further increases in climate hazards ( medium to \\nhigh confidence , depending on region and hazard), increasing multiple risks to ecosystems and humans ( very high \\nconfidence ). Hazards and associated risks expected in the near term include an increase in heat-related human mortality'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'and morbidity ( high confidence ), food-borne, water-borne, and vector-borne diseases ( high confidence ), and mental \\nhealth challenges36 (very high confidence ), flooding in coastal and other low-lying cities and regions ( high confidence ), \\nbiodiversity loss in land, freshwater and ocean ecosystems ( medium to very high confidence , depending on ecosystem), \\nand a decrease in food production in some regions ( high confidence ). Cryosphere-related changes in floods, landslides,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'and water availability have the potential to lead to severe consequences for people, infrastructure and the economy in \\nmost mountain regions ( high confidence ). The projected increase in frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation ( high \\nconfidence ) will increase rain-generated local flooding ( medium confidence ). {Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3, 4.3, Figure 4.3 } \\n(Figure SPM.3, Figure SPM.4 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'B.2.2 Risks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from climate change will escalate with every \\nincrement of global warming (very high confidence ). They are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, and \\neven higher at 2°C ( high confidence ). Compared to the AR5, global aggregated risk levels37 (Reasons for Concern38) are \\nassessed to become high to very high at lower levels of global warming due to recent evidence of observed impacts,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'improved process understanding, and new knowledge on exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems, \\nincluding limits to adaptation ( high confidence ). Due to unavoidable sea level rise (see also B.3), risks for coastal \\necosystems, people and infrastructure will continue to increase beyond 2100 ( high confidence ). {3.1.2, 3.1.3, Figure 3.4, \\nFigure 4.3 } (Figure SPM.3, Figure SPM.4 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'B.2.3 With further warming, climate change risks will become increasingly complex and more difficult to manage. Multiple \\nclimatic and non-climatic risk drivers will interact, resulting in compounding overall risk and risks cascading across \\nsectors and regions. Climate-driven food insecurity and supply instability, for example, are projected to increase with \\nincreasing global warming, interacting with non-climatic risk drivers such as competition for land between urban'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'expansion and food production, pandemics and conflict. ( high confidence ) {3.1.2, 4.3, Figure 4.3 }\\nB.2.4 For any given warming level, the level of risk will also depend on trends in vulnerability and exposure of humans and \\necosystems. Future exposure to climatic hazards is increasing globally due to socio-economic development trends \\nincluding migration, growing inequality and urbanisation. Human vulnerability will concentrate in informal settlements'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'and rapidly growing smaller settlements. In rural areas vulnerability will be heightened by high reliance on climate-\\nsensitive livelihoods. Vulnerability of ecosystems will be strongly influenced by past, present, and future patterns of \\nunsustainable consumption and production, increasing demographic pressures, and persistent unsustainable use and \\nmanagement of land, ocean, and water. Loss of ecosystems and their services has cascading and long-term impacts on'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'people globally, especially for Indigenous Peoples and local communities who are directly dependent on ecosystems to \\nmeet basic needs. ( high confidence ) {Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1c, 3.1.2, 4.3 }\\n36 In all assessed regions.\\n37 Undetectable risk level indicates no associated impacts are detectable and attributable to climate change; moderate risk indicates associated impacts are'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'both detectable and attributable to climate change with at least medium confidence , also accounting for the other specific criteria for key risks; high risk \\nindicates severe and widespread impacts that are judged to be high on one or more criteria for assessing key risks; and very high risk level indicates very \\nhigh risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant irreversibility or the persistence of climate-related hazards, combined with limited ability to adapt'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'due to the nature of the hazard or impacts/ risks. {3.1.2 }\\n38 The Reasons for Concern (RFC) framework communicates scientific understanding about accrual of risk for five broad categories. RFC1: Unique and \\nthreatened systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate-related conditions and have high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'endemism or other distinctive properties. RFC2: Extreme weather events: risks/ impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets and ecosystems from extreme \\nweather events. RFC3: Distribution of impacts: risks/ impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate \\nchange hazards, exposure or vulnerability. RFC4: Global aggregate impacts: impacts to socio-ecological systems that can be aggregated globally into a'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 30,\n", " 'content': 'single metric. RFC5: Large-scale singular events: relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems caused by global warming. See also \\nAnnex I: Glossary. {3.1.2, Cross-Section Box.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': '16\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nc1) Maize yield4\\nc2) Fisheries yield5\\nChanges (%) in \\nmaximum catch potentialChanges (%) in yield\\n -20 -10 -3 -30 -25 -15 -35% +20 +30 +35% +10 +3 +25 +151 0 days 300 100 200 10 150 250 50 365 days0.1 0% 80 10 40 1 20 60 5 100%\\nAreas with model disagreementExamples of impacts without additional adaptation\\n2.4 – 3.1°C 4.2 – 5.4°C1.5°C\\n3.0°C\\n1.7 – 2.3°C\\n0.9 – 2.0°C 3.4 – 5.2°C1.6 – 2.4°C 3.3 – 4.8°C 3.9 – 6.0°C2.0°C'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': '4.0°CPercentage of animal species and seagrasses\\n \\nexposed to potentially dangerous temperature conditions\\n1, 2\\nDays per year where combined temperature and humidity conditions pose a risk of mortality to individuals\\n3\\n5Projected regional impacts reflect fisheries and marine ecosystem responses to ocean physical and biogeochemical conditions such as \\ntemperature, oxygen level and net primary production. Models do not represent changes in fishing activities and some extreme climatic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'conditions. Projected changes in the Arctic regions have low confidence due to uncertainties associated with modelling multiple interacting \\ndrivers and ecosystem responses.4Projected regional impacts reflect biophysical responses to changing temperature, precipitation, solar radiation, humidity, wind, and CO 2'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'enhancement of growth and water retention in currently cultivated areas. Models assume that irrigated areas are not water-limited. Models do not represent pests, diseases, future agro-technological changes and some extreme climate responses.Future climate change is projected to increase the severity of impacts \\nacross natural and human systems and will increase regional differences\\nAreas with little or no \\nproduction, or not assessed\\n1Projected temperature conditions above'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'the estimated historical (1850-2005) \\nmaximum mean annual temperature experienced by each species, assuming no species relocation. \\n2Includes 30,652 species of birds, \\nmammals, reptiles, amphibians, marine fish, benthic marine invertebrates, krill, cephalopods, corals, and seagrasses.a) Risk of \\nspecies losses\\nb) Heat-humidity \\nrisks to \\nhuman health\\nc) Food production'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'c) Food production \\nimpacts3Projected regional impacts utilize a global threshold beyond which daily mean surface air temperature and relative humidity may induce \\nhyperthermia that poses a risk of mortality. The duration and intensity of heatwaves are not presented here. Heat-related health outcomes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'vary by location and are highly moderated by socio-economic, occupational and other non-climatic determinants of individual health and socio-economic vulnerability. The threshold used in these maps is based on a single study that synthesized data from 783 cases to determine the relationship between heat-humidity conditions and mortality drawn largely from observations in temperate climates.\\nHistorical 1991–2005'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'Figure SPM.3: Projected risks and impacts of climate change on natural and human systems at different global warming levels (GWLs) relative to 1850 –1900 \\nlevels. Projected risks and impacts shown on the maps are based on outputs from different subsets of Earth system and impact models that were used to project \\neach impact indicator without additional adaptation. WGII provides further assessment of the impacts on human and natural systems using these projections'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'and additional lines of evidence. (a) Risks of species losses as indicated by the percentage of assessed species exposed to potentially dangerous temperature \\nconditions, as defined by conditions beyond the estimated historical (1850–2005) maximum mean annual temperature experienced by each species, at GWLs \\nof 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C and 4°C. Underpinning projections of temperature are from 21 Earth system models and do not consider extreme events impacting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'ecosystems such as the Arctic. (b) Risks to human health as indicated by the days per year of population exposure to hyperthermic conditions that pose a risk \\nof mortality from surface air temperature and humidity conditions for historical period (1991–2005) and at GWLs of 1.7°C–2.3°C (mean = 1.9°C; 13 climate \\nmodels), 2.4°C–3.1°C (2.7°C; 16 climate models) and 4.2°C–5.4°C (4.7°C; 15 climate models). Interquartile ranges of GWLs by 2081–2100 under RCP2.6,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'RCP4.5 and RCP8.5. The presented index is consistent with common features found in many indices included within WGI and WGII assessments. (c) Impacts \\non food production: (c1) Changes in maize yield by 2080–2099 relative to 1986–2005 at projected GWLs of 1.6°C–2.4°C (2.0°C), 3.3°C–4.8°C (4.1°C) and \\n3.9°C–6.0°C (4.9°C). Median yield changes from an ensemble of 12 crop models, each driven by bias-adjusted outputs from 5 Earth system models, from'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 31,\n", " 'content': 'the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) and the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP). Maps depict'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': '17\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for Policymakers2080–2099 compared to 1986–2005 for current growing regions (>10 ha), with the corresponding range of future global warming levels shown under SSP1-\\n2.6, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5, respectively. Hatching indicates areas where <70% of the climate-crop model combinations agree on the sign of impact. (c2) \\nChange in maximum fisheries catch potential by 2081–2099 relative to 1986–2005 at projected GWLs of 0.9°C–2.0°C (1.5°C) and 3.4°C–5.2°C (4.3°C).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': 'GWLs by 2081–2100 under RCP2.6 and RCP8.5. Hatching indicates where the two climate- fisheries models disagree in the direction of change. Large relative \\nchanges in low yielding regions may correspond to small absolute changes. Biodiversity and fisheries in Antarctica were not analysed due to data limitations. \\nFood security is also affected by crop and fishery failures not presented here. {3.1.2, Figure 3.2, Cross-Section Box.2 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nSalt\\nmarshesRocky\\nshoresSeagrass'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': 'shoresSeagrass\\nmeadowsEpipelagic Warm-water\\ncoralsKelp\\nforestsAR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6Global surface temperature change\\nrelative to 1850–1900Global Reasons for Concern (RFCs) in AR5 (2014) vs. AR6 (2022)\\n°C\\n011.52345\\n011.52345°C0\\n–1\\n2000 2015 2050 210012345\\nvery lowlowintermediatehighvery high•••••••• ••••••• ••• ••••• •• ••••• •• ••• •• ••\\ndamageWildfire••• •• ••\\nDryland\\nwater \\nscarcity••• •• ••\\n0234\\n1.5\\n1\\nIncomplete\\nadaptationProactive\\nadaptationLimited\\nadaptation•• ••'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation•• ••\\n•• •• ••Heat-related morbidity and mortality\\nhigh\\nChallenges to Adaptationlow•••••••••••••• ••• ••••••• ••• •••••• •• •••• •• •••• •• ••Confidence level\\nassigned to transition range\\nmidpoint of transitionRisk/impact\\nLow Very highVery high\\nHighModerateUndetectable•\\n•••••\\n••••Transition range\\n°C°C\\nPermafrost \\ndegradation••• ••• ••\\ne.g. increase in the \\nlength of fire seasone.g. over 100 million additional people exposed0\\n–1\\n1950 2000 2015 20501234\\n50100\\n075\\n25\\nResource-rich'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': '25\\nResource-rich\\ncoastal citiesLarge tropical\\nagricultural\\ndeltasArctic\\ncommunitiesUrban\\natoll islandsr\\nR\\nMaximum potential\\nresponseNo-to-moderateresponserR rR rR rR\\nGlobal mean sea level rise relative to 1900\\n50100\\n0\\n1950 2000 2050 210075\\n25cm cm\\nvery high\\nhighintermediatelowvery lowc) Risks to coastal geographies increase with sea level rise and depend on responses\\n1986-2005\\nbaselinelow-likelihood, high impact \\nstoryline, including ice-sheet instability processes\\n•••• ••• ••••••'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': '•••• ••• ••••••\\n•••• •••d) Adaptation and \\nsocio-economic pathways \\naffect levels of climate related risksb) Risks differ by system\\nSSP1 SSP3Risks are increasing with every increment of warming\\nGlobal\\naggregate\\nimpactsUnique &\\nthreatened\\nsystemsExtreme\\nweather\\neventsDistribution\\nof impactsLarge scale\\nsingular\\neventsrisk is the potential for \\nadverse consequences\\n••• •• ••\\nTree\\nmortality\\ne.g. coral \\nreefs decline >99%\\ne.g. coral \\nreefs decline by 70–90%Land-based systems Ocean/coastal ecosystems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': 'Food insecurity\\n(availability, access)\\na) High risks are now assessed to occur at lower global warming levels\\nThe SSP1 pathway illustrates a world with low population growth, high income, and reduced inequalities, food produced in low GHG emission systems, effective land use regulation and high adaptive capacity (i.e., low challenges to adaptation). The SSP3 pathway has the opposite trends.shading represents the \\nuncertainty ranges for the low and high emissions scenarios\\n2011-2020 was'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 32,\n", " 'content': '2011-2020 was \\naround 1.1°C warmer than 1850-1900\\nCarbon\\nloss•• • ••\\n•••• •••\\nBiodiversity\\nloss\\nRisks are \\nassessed with medium confidence\\nLimited adaptation (failure to proactively \\nadapt; low investment in health systems); incomplete adaptation (incomplete adaptation planning; moderate investment in health systems); proactive adaptation (proactive adaptation management; higher investment in health systems)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': '18\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersFigure SPM.4: Subset of assessed climate outcomes and associated global and regional climate risks. The burning embers result from a literature \\nbased expert elicitation. Panel (a): Left – Global surface temperature changes in °C relative to 1850–1900. These changes were obtained by combining CMIP6'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'model simulations with observational constraints based on past simulated warming, as well as an updated assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity. Very \\nlikely ranges are shown for the low and high GHG emissions scenarios ( SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0) (Cross-Section Box.2). Right – Global Reasons for Concern \\n(RFC), comparing AR6 (thick embers) and AR5 (thin embers) assessments. Risk transitions have generally shifted towards lower temperatures with updated'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'scientific understanding. Diagrams are shown for each RFC, assuming low to no adaptation. Lines connect the midpoints of the transitions from moderate to high \\nrisk across AR5 and AR6. Panel (b) : Selected global risks for land and ocean ecosystems, illustrating general increase of risk with global warming levels with low \\nto no adaptation. Panel (c): Left - Global mean sea level change in centimetres, relative to 1900. The historical changes (black) are observed by tide gauges'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'before 1992 and altimeters afterwards. The future changes to 2100 (coloured lines and shading) are assessed consistently with observational constraints based \\non emulation of CMIP , ice-sheet, and glacier models, and likely ranges are shown for SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0. Right - Assessment of the combined risk of coastal \\nflooding, erosion and salinization for four illustrative coastal geographies in 2100, due to changing mean and extreme sea levels, under two response scenarios,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'with respect to the SROCC baseline period (1986–2005). The assessment does not account for changes in extreme sea level beyond those directly induced by \\nmean sea level rise; risk levels could increase if other changes in extreme sea levels were considered (e.g., due to changes in cyclone intensity). “No-to-moderate \\nresponse” describes efforts as of today (i.e., no further significant action or new types of actions). “Maximum potential response” represent a combination of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'responses implemented to their full extent and thus significant additional efforts compared to today, assuming minimal financial, social and political barriers. \\n(In this context, ‘today’ refers to 2019.) The assessment criteria include exposure and vulnerability, coastal hazards, in-situ responses and planned relocation. \\nPlanned relocation refers to managed retreat or resettlements. The term response is used here instead of adaptation because some responses, such as retreat,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'may or may not be considered to be adaptation. Panel (d) : Selected risks under different socio-economic pathways, illustrating how development strategies \\nand challenges to adaptation influence risk. Left - Heat-sensitive human health outcomes under three scenarios of adaptation effectiveness. The diagrams are \\ntruncated at the nearest whole ºC within the range of temperature change in 2100 under three SSP scenarios. Right - Risks associated with food security due to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'climate change and patterns of socio-economic development. Risks to food security include availability and access to food, including population at risk of hunger, \\nfood price increases and increases in disability adjusted life years attributable to childhood underweight. Risks are assessed for two contrasted socio-economic \\npathways (SSP1 and SSP3) excluding the effects of targeted mitigation and adaptation policies. {Figure 3.3 } (Box SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'Likelihood and Risks of Unavoidable, Irreversible or Abrupt \\nChanges\\nB.3 Some future changes are unavoidable and/or irreversible but can be limited by deep, rapid, \\nand sustained global greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The likelihood of abrupt and/or \\nirreversible changes increases with higher global warming levels. Similarly, the probability \\nof low- likelihood outcomes associated with potentially very large adverse impacts increases'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'with higher global warming levels. ( high confidence ) {3.1}\\nB.3.1 Limiting global surface temperature does not prevent continued changes in climate system components that have \\nmulti-decadal or longer timescales of response (high confidence ). Sea level rise is unavoidable for centuries to millennia \\ndue to continuing deep ocean warming and ice sheet melt, and sea levels will remain elevated for thousands of years'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). However, deep, rapid, and sustained GHG emissions reductions would limit further sea level rise \\nacceleration and projected long-term sea level rise commitment. Relative to 1995–2014, the likely global mean sea \\nlevel rise under the SSP1-1.9 GHG emissions scenario is 0.15–0.23 m by 2050 and 0.28–0.55 m by 2100; while for the \\nSSP5-8.5 GHG emissions scenario it is 0.20–0.29 m by 2050 and 0.63–1.01 m by 2100 (medium confidence) . Over the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'next 2000 years, global mean sea level will rise by about 2–3 m if warming is limited to 1.5°C and 2–6 m if limited to \\n2°C ( low confidence ). {3.1.3, Figure 3.4 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nB.3.2 The likelihood and impacts of abrupt and/or irreversible changes in the climate system, including changes triggered \\nwhen tipping points are reached, increase with further global warming (high confidence ). As warming levels increase, so'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'do the risks of species extinction or irreversible loss of biodiversity in ecosystems including forests (medium confidence) , \\ncoral reefs (very high confidence ) and in Arctic regions (high confidence ). At sustained warming levels between 2°C and \\n3°C, the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets will be lost almost completely and irreversibly over multiple millennia, \\ncausing several metres of sea level rise (limited evidence ). The probability and rate of ice mass loss increase with higher'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'global surface temperatures (high confidence ). {3.1.2, 3.1.3 }\\nB.3.3 The probability of low- likelihood outcomes associated with potentially very large impacts increases with higher global \\nwarming levels (high confidence ). Due to deep uncertainty linked to ice-sheet processes, global mean sea level rise \\nabove the likely range – approaching 2 m by 2100 and in excess of 15 m by 2300 under the very high GHG emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 33,\n", " 'content': 'scenario (SSP5-8.5) (low confidence ) – cannot be excluded. There is medium confidence that the Atlantic Meridional \\nOverturning Circulation will not collapse abruptly before 2100, but if it were to occur, it would very likely cause abrupt \\nshifts in regional weather patterns, and large impacts on ecosystems and human activities. {3.1.3 } (Box SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': '19\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersAdaptation Options and their Limits in a Warmer World\\nB.4 Adaptation options that are feasible and effective today will become constrained and \\nless effective with increasing global warming. With increasing global warming, losses and \\ndamages will increase and additional human and natural systems will reach adaptation \\nlimits. Maladaptation can be avoided by flexible, multi- sectoral, inclusive, long-term'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'planning and implementation of adaptation actions, with co-benefits to many sectors and \\nsystems. ( high confidence ) {3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 }\\nB.4.1 The effectiveness of adaptation, including ecosystem-based and most water-related options, will decrease with \\nincreasing warming. The feasibility and effectiveness of options increase with integrated, multi- sectoral solutions that \\ndifferentiate responses based on climate risk, cut across systems and address social inequities. As adaptation options'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'often have long implementation times, long-term planning increases their efficiency. (high confidence ) {3.2, Figure 3.4, \\n4.1, 4.2 } \\nB.4.2 With additional global warming, limits to adaptation and losses and damages, strongly concentrated among vulnerable \\npopulations, will become increasingly difficult to avoid (high confidence ). Above 1.5°C of global warming, limited \\nfreshwater resources pose potential hard adaptation limits for small islands and for regions dependent on glacier'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'and snow melt (medium confidence ). Above that level, ecosystems such as some warm- water coral reefs, coastal \\nwetlands, rainforests, and polar and mountain ecosystems will have reached or surpassed hard adaptation limits and as \\na consequence, some Ecosystem-based Adaptation measures will also lose their effectiveness (high confidence ). {2.3.2, \\n3.2, 4.3 }\\nB.4.3 Actions that focus on sectors and risks in isolation and on short-term gains often lead to maladaptation over the long'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'term, creating lock-ins of vulnerability, exposure and risks that are difficult to change. For example, seawalls effectively \\nreduce impacts to people and assets in the short term but can also result in lock-ins and increase exposure to climate \\nrisks in the long term unless they are integrated into a long-term adaptive plan. Maladaptive responses can worsen \\nexisting inequities especially for Indigenous Peoples and marginalised groups and decrease ecosystem and biodiversity'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'resilience. Maladaptation can be avoided by flexible, multi- sectoral, inclusive, long-term planning and implementation \\nof adaptation actions, with co-benefits to many sectors and systems. (high confidence ) {2.3.2, 3.2 }\\nCarbon Budgets and Net Zero Emissions\\nB.5 Limiting human-caused global warming requires net zero CO 2 emissions. Cumulative carbon \\nemissions until the time of reaching net zero CO 2 emissions and the level of greenhouse'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'gas emission reductions this decade largely determine whether warming can be limited to \\n1.5°C or 2°C ( high confidence ). Projected CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure \\nwithout additional abatement would exceed the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C (50%) \\n(high confidence ). {2.3, 3.1, 3.3, Table 3.1 }\\nB.5.1 From a physical science perspective, limiting human-caused global warming to a specific level requires limiting cumulative'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2 emissions, reaching at least net zero CO 2 emissions, along with strong reductions in other greenhouse gas emissions. \\nReaching net zero GHG emissions primarily requires deep reductions in CO 2, methane, and other GHG emissions, and \\nimplies net negative CO 2 emissions39. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) will be necessary to achieve net negative CO 2 \\nemissions ( see B.6). Net zero GHG emissions, if sustained, are projected to result in a gradual decline in global surface'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'temperatures after an earlier peak. ( high confidence ) {3.1.1, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, Table 3.1, Cross-Section Box.1 }\\nB.5.2 For every 1000 GtCO 2 emitted by human activity, global surface temperature rises by 0.45°C (best estimate, with a likely \\nrange from 0.27°C to 0.63°C). The best estimates of the remaining carbon budgets from the beginning of 2020 are \\n500 GtCO 2 for a 50% likelihood of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and 1150 GtCO 2 for a 67% likelihood of limiting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'warming to 2°C40. The stronger the reductions in non-CO 2 emissions, the lower the resulting temperatures are for a given \\nremaining carbon budget or the larger remaining carbon budget for the same level of temperature change41. {3.3.1 }\\n39 Net zero GHG emissions defined by the 100-year global warming potential. See footnote 9.\\n40 Global databases make different choices about which emissions and removals occurring on land are considered anthropogenic. Most countries report their'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 34,\n", " 'content': 'anthropogenic land CO 2 fluxes including fluxes due to human-caused environmental change (e.g., CO 2 fertilisation) on ‘managed’ land in their national \\nGHG inventories. Using emissions estimates based on these inventories, the remaining carbon budgets must be correspondingly reduced. {3.3.1 }\\n41 For example, remaining carbon budgets could be 300 or 600 GtCO 2 for 1.5°C (50%), respectively for high and low non-CO 2 emissions, compared to \\n500 GtCO 2 in the central case. {3.3.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': '20\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersB.5.3 If the annual CO 2 emissions between 2020–2030 stayed, on average, at the same level as 2019, the resulting cumulative \\nemissions would almost exhaust the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C (50%), and deplete more than a third of the \\nremaining carbon budget for 2°C (67%). Estimates of future CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructures'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': 'without additional abatement42 already exceed the remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C (50%) \\n(high confidence ). Projected cumulative future CO 2 emissions over the lifetime of existing and planned fossil fuel \\ninfrastructure, if historical operating patterns are maintained and without additional abatement43, are approximately \\nequal to the remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 2°C with a likelihood of 83%44 (high confidence ). {2.3.1, \\n3.3.1, Figure 3.5 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': '3.3.1, Figure 3.5 }\\nB.5.4 Based on central estimates only, historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions between 1850 and 2019 amount to about \\nfour fifths45 of the total carbon budget for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (central estimate about \\n2900 GtCO 2), and to about two thirds46 of the total carbon budget for a 67% probability to limit global warming to 2°C \\n(central estimate about 3550 GtCO 2). {3.3.1, Figure 3.5 }\\nMitigation Pathways'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': 'Mitigation Pathways\\nB.6 All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, \\nand those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), involve rapid and deep and, in most cases, \\nimmediate greenhouse gas emissions reductions in all sectors this decade. Global net zero CO 2 \\nemissions are reached for these pathway categories, in the early 2050s and around the early \\n2070s, respectively. (high confidence ) {3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.5, Table 3.1 } (Figure SPM.5, Box SPM.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': 'B.6.1 Global modelled pathways provide information on limiting warming to different levels; these pathways, particularly \\ntheir sectoral and regional aspects, depend on the assumptions described in Box SPM.1. Global modelled pathways that \\nlimit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot or limit warming to 2°C (>67%) are characterized by deep, \\nrapid, and, in most cases, immediate GHG emissions reductions. Pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': 'or limited overshoot reach net zero CO 2 in the early 2050s, followed by net negative CO 2 emissions. Those pathways that \\nreach net zero GHG emissions do so around the 2070s. Pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) reach net zero CO 2 \\nemissions in the early 2070s. Global GHG emissions are projected to peak between 2020 and at the latest before 2025 \\nin global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and in those that limit'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': 'warming to 2°C (>67%) and assume immediate action. ( high confidence ) {3.3.2, 3.3.4, 4.1, Table 3.1, Figure 3.6 } (Table \\nSPM.1 )\\n42 Abatement here refers to human interventions that reduce the amount of greenhouse gases that are released from fossil fuel infrastructure to the \\natmosphere.\\n43 Ibid.\\n44 WGI provides carbon budgets that are in line with limiting global warming to temperature limits with different likelihoods, such as 50%, 67% or 83%. \\n{3.3.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 35,\n", " 'content': '{3.3.1 }\\n45 Uncertainties for total carbon budgets have not been assessed and could affect the specific calculated fractions.\\n46 Ibid.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': '21\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersTable SPM.1: Greenhouse gas and CO 2 emission reductions from 2019, median and 5-95 percentiles. {3.3.1, 4.1, Table 3.1, Figure 2.5, Box SPM.1 }\\nReductions from 2019 emission levels (%)\\n2030 2035 2040 2050\\nLimit warming to1.5°C (>50%) with no or \\nlimited overshootGHG 43 [34-60] 60 [49-77] 69 [58-90] 84 [73-98]\\nCO 2 48 [36-69] 65 [50-96] 80 [61-109] 99 [79-119]\\nLimit warming to 2°C (>67%) GHG 21 [1-42] 35 [22-55] 46 [34-63] 64 [53-77]'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2 22 [1-44] 37 [21-59] 51 [36-70] 73 [55-90]\\nB.6.2 Reaching net zero CO 2 or GHG emissions primarily requires deep and rapid reductions in gross emissions of CO 2, as well \\nas substantial reductions of non-CO 2 GHG emissions ( high confidence ). For example, in modelled pathways that limit \\nwarming to 1. 5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, global methane emissions are reduced by 34 [21–57]% by 2030'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'relative to 2019. However, some hard-to-abate residual GHG emissions (e.g., some emissions from agriculture, aviation, \\nshipping, and industrial processes) remain and would need to be counterbalanced by deployment of CDR methods to \\nachieve net zero CO 2 or GHG emissions (high confidence) . As a result, net zero CO 2 is reached earlier than net zero GHGs \\n(high confidence ). {3.3.2, 3.3.3, Table 3.1, Figure 3.5 } (Figure SPM.5 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'B.6.3 Global modelled mitigation pathways reaching net zero CO 2 and GHG emissions include transitioning from fossil fuels \\nwithout carbon capture and storage (CCS) to very low- or zero-carbon energy sources, such as renewables or fossil fuels \\nwith CCS, demand-side measures and improving efficiency, reducing non-CO 2 GHG emissions, and CDR47. In most global \\nmodelled pathways, land-use change and forestry (via reforestation and reduced deforestation) and the energy supply'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'sector reach net zero CO 2 emissions earlier than the buildings, industry and transport sectors. ( high confidence ) {3.3.3, \\n4.1, 4.5, Figure 4.1 } (Figure SPM.5, Box SPM.1 )\\nB.6.4 Mitigation options often have synergies with other aspects of sustainable development, but some options can also \\nhave trade-offs. There are potential synergies between sustainable development and, for instance, energy efficiency'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'and renewable energy. Similarly, depending on the context48, biological CDR methods like reforestation, improved \\nforest management, soil carbon sequestration, peatland restoration and coastal blue carbon management can enhance \\nbiodiversity and ecosystem functions, employment and local livelihoods. However, afforestation or production of \\nbiomass crops can have adverse socio-economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity, food and water'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'security, local livelihoods and the rights of Indigenous Peoples, especially if implemented at large scales and where land \\ntenure is insecure. Modelled pathways that assume using resources more efficiently or that shift global development \\ntowards sustainability include fewer challenges, such as less dependence on CDR and pressure on land and biodiversity. \\n(high confidence ) {3.4.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': '47 CCS is an option to reduce emissions from large-scale fossil-based energy and industry sources provided geological storage is available. When CO 2 is \\ncaptured directly from the atmosphere (DACCS), or from biomass (BECCS), CCS provides the storage component of these CDR methods. CO 2 capture and \\nsubsurface injection is a mature technology for gas processing and enhanced oil recovery. In contrast to the oil and gas sector, CCS is less mature in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'power sector, as well as in cement and chemicals production, where it is a critical mitigation option. The technical geological storage capacity is estimated \\nto be on the order of 1000 GtCO 2, which is more than the CO 2 storage requirements through 2100 to limit global warming to 1.5°C, although the regional \\navailability of geological storage could be a limiting factor. If the geological storage site is appropriately selected and managed, it is estimated that the CO 2'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': 'can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere. Implementation of CCS currently faces technological, economic, institutional, ecological-environmental \\nand socio-cultural barriers. Currently, global rates of CCS deployment are far below those in modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C to 2°C. \\nEnabling conditions such as policy instruments, greater public support and technological innovation could reduce these barriers. ( high confidence ) {3.3.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 36,\n", " 'content': '48 The impacts, risks, and co-benefits of CDR deployment for ecosystems, biodiversity and people will be highly variable depending on the method, site-specific \\ncontext, implementation and scale ( high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 37,\n", " 'content': '22\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakers\\n0/uni00A0\\n40/uni00A0\\n20/uni00A0\\n-20/uni00A0\\n60/uni00A0\\n80/uni00A0\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\n0/uni00A0\\n200/uni00A0\\n400/uni00A0\\nMtCH 4/yr GtCO 2/yr \\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\n−20/uni00A0\\n20/uni00A0\\n40/uni00A0\\n60/uni00A0\\n2019\\ncomparison\\nIMP-Neg\\nIMP-GS\\nIMP-Ren\\nIMP-LD\\nIMP-SP\\nSources\\nSinks\\n0net zero\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100a) Net global greenhouse \\ngas (GHG) emissions\\nLimit warming to 2°CImplemented policies'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 37,\n", " 'content': 'Limit warming to 1.5°CGigatons of CO 2-equivalent emissions (GtCO 2-eq/yr)\\nGtCO 2-eq/yr \\n−20/uni00A0\\n0/uni00A0\\n20/uni00A0\\n40/uni00A0\\n60/uni00A0\\n80/uni00A0\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\nGHGCO 2\\nCO 2GHG\\nYear of net zero emissionsd) Net zero CO2 will be reached \\nbefore net zero GHG emissions\\n1.5°C2°C\\nLimit warming to 2°CImplemented policies\\nLimit warming to 1.5°C\\nc) Global methane (CH4) emissions\\nnet zeronet zeroNationally Determined \\nContributions (NDCs) range in 2030'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 37,\n", " 'content': 'net zeroa) Net global greenhouse \\ngas (GHG) emissions\\nKey\\nPast emissions (2000–2015)\\nModel range for 2015 emissions\\nPast GHG emissions and uncertainty for \\n2015 and 2019 (dot indicates the median) Implemented policies (median, with\\n percentiles 25-75% and 5-95%)\\nLimit warming to 2°C (>67%)\\nLimit warming to 1.5°C (>50%)with no or limited overshoot\\nKey\\nTransport, industry and buildingsNon-CO 2 emissions \\nLand-use change and forestry'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 37,\n", " 'content': 'Energy supply (including electricity)these are different ways to achieve net-zero CO\\n2b) Net global CO 2 emissionse) Greenhouse gas emissions by \\nsector at the time of net zero CO\\n2, compared to 2019Limiting warming to 1.5°C and 2°C involves rapid, deep and \\nin most cases immediate greenhouse gas emission reductions\\nNet zero CO2 and net zero GHG emissions can be achieved through strong reductions across all sectors\\nImplemented policies result in projected'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 37,\n", " 'content': 'emissions that lead to warming of 3.2°C, with a range of 2.2°C to 3.5°C (medium confidence)2019 emissions were 12% higher than 2010\\nIllustrative Mitigation \\nPathways (IMPs)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': '23\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersFigure SPM.5: Global emissions pathways consistent with implemented policies and mitigation strategies. Panels (a), (b) and (c) show the \\ndevelopment of global GHG, CO 2 and methane emissions in modelled pathways, while panel (d) shows the associated timing of when GHG and CO 2 emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'reach net zero. Coloured ranges denote the 5th to 95th percentile across the global modelled pathways falling within a given category as described in Box SPM.1. \\nThe red ranges depict emissions pathways assuming policies that were implemented by the end of 2020. Ranges of modelled pathways that limit warming to \\n1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are shown in light blue (category C1) and pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) are shown in green (category'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'C3). Global emission pathways that would limit warming to 1. 5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and also reach net zero GHG in the second half of the \\ncentury do so between 2070–2075. Panel (e) shows the sectoral contributions of CO 2 and non-CO 2 emissions sources and sinks at the time when net zero \\nCO 2 emissions are reached in illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs) consistent with limiting warming to 1. 5°C with a high reliance on net negative emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': '(IMP- Neg) (“high overshoot ”), high resource efficiency (IMP-LD), a focus on sustainable development (IMP-SP), renewables (IMP-Ren) and limiting warming to \\n2°C with less rapid mitigation initially followed by a gradual strengthening (IMP-GS). Positive and negative emissions for different IMPs are compared to GHG \\nemissions from the year 2019. Energy supply (including electricity) includes bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage and direct air carbon dioxide'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'capture and storage. CO 2 emissions from land-use change and forestry can only be shown as a net number as many models do not report emissions and sinks \\nof this category separately . {Figure 3.6, 4.1 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nOvershoot: Exceeding a Warming Level and Returning\\nB.7 If warming exceeds a specified level such as 1.5°C, it could gradually be reduced again by \\nachieving and sustaining net negative global CO 2 emissions. This would require additional'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'deployment of carbon dioxide removal, compared to pathways without overshoot, leading \\nto greater feasibility and sustainability concerns. Overshoot entails adverse impacts, some \\nirreversible, and additional risks for human and natural systems, all growing with the \\nmagnitude and duration of overshoot. ( high confidence ) {3.1, 3.3, 3.4, Table 3.1, Figure 3.6 }\\nB.7.1 Only a small number of the most ambitious global modelled pathways limit global warming to 1. 5°C (>50%) by 2100'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'without exceeding this level temporarily. Achieving and sustaining net negative global CO 2 emissions, with annual rates \\nof CDR greater than residual CO 2 emissions, would gradually reduce the warming level again ( high confidence ). Adverse \\nimpacts that occur during this period of overshoot and cause additional warming via feedback mechanisms, such as \\nincreased wildfires, mass mortality of trees, drying of peatlands, and permafrost thawing, weakening natural land'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'carbon sinks and increasing releases of GHGs would make the return more challenging ( medium confidence ). {3.3.2, \\n3.3.4, Table 3.1, Figure 3.6 } (Box SPM.1 )\\nB.7.2 The higher the magnitude and the longer the duration of overshoot, the more ecosystems and societies are exposed \\nto greater and more widespread changes in climatic impact-drivers, increasing risks for many natural and human'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'systems. Compared to pathways without overshoot, societies would face higher risks to infrastructure, low-lying \\ncoastal settlements, and associated livelihoods. Overshooting 1.5°C will result in irreversible adverse impacts on certain \\necosystems with low resilience, such as polar, mountain, and coastal ecosystems, impacted by ice-sheet melt, glacier \\nmelt, or by accelerating and higher committed sea level rise. ( high confidence ) {3.1.2, 3.3.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'B.7.3 The larger the overshoot, the more net negative CO 2 emissions would be needed to return to 1.5°C by 2100. Transitioning \\ntowards net zero CO 2 emissions faster and reducing non-CO 2 emissions such as methane more rapidly would limit \\npeak warming levels and reduce the requirement for net negative CO 2 emissions, thereby reducing feasibility and \\nsustainability concerns, and social and environmental risks associated with CDR deployment at large scales. ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 38,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ) {3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.4.1, Table 3.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': '24\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersC. Responses in the Near Term \\nUrgency of Near-Term Integrated Climate Action \\nC.1 Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health ( very high confidence ). \\nThere is a rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for \\nall (very high confidence ). Climate resilient development integrates adaptation and mitigation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'to advance sustainable development for all, and is enabled by increased international \\ncooperation including improved access to adequate financial resources, particularly for \\nvulnerable regions, sectors and groups, and inclusive governance and coordinated policies \\n(high confidence ). The choices and actions implemented in this decade will have impacts now \\nand for thousands of years ( high confidence ). {3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, Figure 3.1,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 3.3, Figure 4.2 } (Figure SPM.1, Figure SPM.6 )\\nC.1.1 Evidence of observed adverse impacts and related losses and damages, projected risks, levels and trends in vulnerability \\nand adaptation limits, demonstrate that worldwide climate resilient development action is more urgent than previously \\nassessed in AR5. Climate resilient development integrates adaptation and GHG mitigation to advance sustainable'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'development for all. Climate resilient development pathways have been constrained by past development, emissions \\nand climate change and are progressively constrained by every increment of warming, in particular beyond 1.5°C. \\n(very high confidence ) {3.4, 3.4.2, 4.1 }\\nC.1.2 Government actions at sub- national, national and international levels, with civil society and the private sector, play a'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'crucial role in enabling and accelerating shifts in development pathways towards sustainability and climate resilient \\ndevelopment ( very high confidence ). Climate resilient development is enabled when governments, civil society and \\nthe private sector make inclusive development choices that prioritize risk reduction, equity and justice, and when \\ndecision-making processes, finance and actions are integrated across governance levels, sectors, and timeframes ( very'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'high confidence ). Enabling conditions are differentiated by national, regional and local circumstances and geographies, \\naccording to capabilities, and include: political commitment and follow-through, coordinated policies, social and \\ninternational cooperation, ecosystem stewardship, inclusive governance, knowledge diversity, technological innovation, \\nmonitoring and evaluation, and improved access to adequate financial resources, especially for vulnerable regions,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'sectors and communities ( high confidence ). {3.4, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8 } (Figure SPM.6 )\\nC.1.3 Continued emissions will further affect all major climate system components, and many changes will be irreversible on \\ncentennial to millennial time scales and become larger with increasing global warming. Without urgent, effective, and \\nequitable mitigation and adaptation actions, climate change increasingly threatens ecosystems, biodiversity, and the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 39,\n", " 'content': 'livelihoods, health and well-being of current and future generations. (high confidence ) {3.1.3, 3.3.3, 3.4.1, Figure 3.4, \\n4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 } (Figure SPM.1, Figure SPM.6 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': '25\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersFigure SPM.6: The illustrative development pathways (red to green) and associated outcomes (right panel) show that there is a rapidly narrowing window \\nof opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. Climate resilient development is the process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation measures to support sustainable development. Diverging pathways illustrate that interacting choices and actions made by diverse government, \\nprivate sector and civil society actors can advance climate resilient development, shift pathways towards sustainability, and enable lower emissions and \\nadaptation. Diverse knowledge and values include cultural values, Indigenous Knowledge, local knowledge, and scientific knowledge. Climatic and non-climatic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'events, such as droughts, floods or pandemics, pose more severe shocks to pathways with lower climate resilient development (red to yellow) than to pathways \\nwith higher climate resilient development (green). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming \\nof 1.5°C, and with every increment of warming, losses and damages will increase. The development pathways taken by countries at all stages of economic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'development impact GHG emissions and mitigation challenges and opportunities, which vary across countries and regions. Pathways and opportunities for \\naction are shaped by previous actions (or inactions and opportunities missed; dashed pathway) and enabling and constraining conditions (left panel), and \\ntake place in the context of climate risks, adaptation limits and development gaps. The longer emissions reductions are delayed, the fewer effective adaptation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'options. {Figure 4.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.9 }\\nThe Benefits of Near-Term Action\\nC.2 Deep, rapid, and sustained mitigation and accelerated implementation of adaptation actions \\nin this decade would reduce projected losses and damages for humans and ecosystems \\n(very high confidence ), and deliver many co-benefits, especially for air quality and health \\n(high confidence ). Delayed mitigation and adaptation action would lock in high-emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'infrastructure, raise risks of stranded assets and cost-escalation, reduce feasibility, and \\nincrease losses and damages ( high confidence ). Near-term actions involve high up-front \\ninvestments and potentially disruptive changes that can be lessened by a range of enabling \\npolicies ( high confidence ). {2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 }\\nC.2.1 Deep, rapid, and sustained mitigation and accelerated implementation of adaptation actions in this decade would'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'reduce future losses and damages related to climate change for humans and ecosystems ( very high confidence ). As \\nadaptation options often have long implementation times, accelerated implementation of adaptation in this decade is \\nimportant to close adaptation gaps ( high confidence ). Comprehensive, effective, and innovative responses integrating \\nadaptation and mitigation can harness synergies and reduce trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation ( high \\nconfidence ). {4.1, 4.2, 4.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'Climate Resilient Development\\nEmissions reductions\\nAdaptation\\nSustainable DevelopmentMultiple interacting choices and actions can shift \\ndevelopment pathways towards sustainability\\nSustainable Development \\nGoal (SDG) achievement\\nIPCC AR62030 Present\\nworldPast \\nconditionsThere is a rapidly narrowing window of opportunity \\nto enable climate resilient development\\nProspects for climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'resilient development will be further limited if global warming exceeds 1.5°C and if progress towards the SDGs is inadequate\\nEarly action and enabling conditions create future opportunities for climate resilient development\\nPast conditions (emissions, climate change, development) have increased warming and development gaps persistopportunities missed\\nIllustrative ‘shock’ that disrupts development\\nwarming limited to below 1.5°C \\nLow emissions\\nSystem transitions\\nTransformation\\nLow climate risk'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': 'Low climate risk\\nEquity and justice\\nSDG achievement\\nHigh emissions\\nEntrenched systems\\nAdaptation limits\\nMaladaptation\\nIncreasing climate risk\\nReduced options \\nfor development\\nEcosystem \\ndegradationOutcomes characterising development pathways\\nCivil \\nsocietyGovernments\\nPrivate \\nsectorConditions that enable \\nindividual and collective actions\\n•Inclusive governance \\n•Diverse knowledges and values\\n•Finance and innovation\\n•Integration across sectors \\nand time scales\\n•Ecosystem stewardship'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 40,\n", " 'content': '•Synergies between climate and development actions\\n•Behavioural change supported by policy, infrastructure and socio-cultural factors\\nConditions that constrain \\nindividual and collective actions\\n•Poverty, inequity and injustice\\n•Economic, institutional, social \\nand capacity barriers\\n•Siloed responses\\n•Lack of finance, and barriers to finance and technology\\n•Tradeoffs with SDGs2100 \\n& beyond'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': '26\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersC.2.2 Delayed mitigation action will further increase global warming and losses and damages will rise and additional human \\nand natural systems will reach adaptation limits. Challenges from delayed adaptation and mitigation actions include the \\nrisk of cost escalation, lock-in of infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced feasibility and effectiveness of adaptation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'and mitigation options. Without rapid, deep and sustained mitigation and accelerated adaptation actions, losses \\nand damages will continue to increase, including projected adverse impacts in Africa, LDCs, SIDS, Central and South \\nAmerica49, Asia and the Arctic, and will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations. ( high confidence ) \\n{2.1.2, 3.1.2, 3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 } (Figure SPM.3, Figure SPM.4 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'C.2.3 Accelerated climate action can also provide co-benefits (see also C.4) ( high confidence ). Many mitigation actions would \\nhave benefits for health through lower air pollution, active mobility (e.g., walking, cycling), and shifts to sustainable \\nhealthy diets ( high confidence ). Strong, rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions can limit near-term \\nwarming and improve air quality by reducing global surface ozone ( high confidence ). Adaptation can generate multiple'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'additional benefits such as improving agricultural productivity, innovation, health and well-being, food security, \\nlivelihood, and biodiversity conservation ( very high confidence ). {4.2, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.6 }\\nC.2.4 Cost-benefit analysis remains limited in its ability to represent all avoided damages from climate change ( high \\nconfidence ). The economic benefits for human health from air quality improvement arising from mitigation action can'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'be of the same order of magnitude as mitigation costs, and potentially even larger ( medium confidence ). Even without \\naccounting for all the benefits of avoiding potential damages, the global economic and social benefit of limiting global \\nwarming to 2°C exceeds the cost of mitigation in most of the assessed literature ( medium confidence )50. More rapid \\nclimate change mitigation, with emissions peaking earlier, increases co-benefits and reduces feasibility risks and costs'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'in the long-term, but requires higher up-front investments ( high confidence ). {3.4.1, 4.2 }\\nC.2.5 Ambitious mitigation pathways imply large and sometimes disruptive changes in existing economic structures, with \\nsignificant distributional consequences within and between countries. To accelerate climate action, the adverse \\nconsequences of these changes can be moderated by fiscal, financial, institutional and regulatory reforms and by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': 'integrating climate actions with macroeconomic policies through (i) economy-wide packages, consistent with national \\ncircumstances, supporting sustainable low-emission growth paths; (ii) climate resilient safety nets and social protection; \\nand (iii) improved access to finance for low-emissions infrastructure and technologies, especially in developing countries. \\n(high confidence ) {4.2, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': '49 The southern part of Mexico is included in the climatic subregion South Central America (SCA) for WGI. Mexico is assessed as part of North America for \\nWGII. The climate change literature for the SCA region occasionally includes Mexico, and in those cases WGII assessment makes reference to Latin America. \\nMexico is considered part of Latin America and the Caribbean for WGIII.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 41,\n", " 'content': '50 The evidence is too limited to make a similar robust conclusion for limiting warming to 1.5°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C would \\nincrease the costs of mitigation, but also increase the benefits in terms of reduced impacts and related risks, and reduced adaptation needs ( high \\nconfidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': '27\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersFigure SPM.7: Multiple Opportunities for scaling up climate action. Panel (a) presents selected mitigation and adaptation options across different \\nsystems. The left-hand side of panel a shows climate responses and adaptation options assessed for their multidimensional feasibility at global scale, in the near'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'term and up to 1.5°C global warming. As literature above 1.5°C is limited, feasibility at higher levels of warming may change, which is currently not possible \\nto assess robustly. The term response is used here in addition to adaptation because some responses, such as migration, relocation and resettlement may or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'may not be considered to be adaptation. Forest based adaptation includes sustainable forest management, forest conservation and restoration, reforestation There are multiple opportunities for scaling up climate action\\nCosts are lower than the reference\\n0–20 (USD per tCO 2-eq)\\n20–50 (USD per tCO 2-eq)50–100 (USD per tCO 2-eq)\\n100–200 (USD per tCO 2-eq)\\nCost not allocated due to high \\nvariability or lack of dataNet lifetime cost of options: Feasibility level and synergies \\nwith mitigation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'with mitigation\\nInsufficient evidenceConfidence level in potential feasibilityand in synergies with mitigation\\nMedium High Lowa) Feasibility of climate responses and adaptation, and potential of mitigation options in the near term\\nHigh Medium LowSynergies \\nwithmitigation\\nnot \\nassessed0 1 2 3 4 5Potential contribution to \\nnet emission reduction, 2030\\nCarbon capture with \\nutilisation (CCU) and CCSMaterial efficiency\\nEnhanced recyclingConstruction materials substitutionEnergy efficiencyWindSolar'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'Reduce methane and N2O in agriculture\\nReduce food loss and food wasteGeothermal and hydropower\\nCarbon sequestration in agricultureReduce conversion of natural ecosystemsNuclearReduce methane from coal, oil and gas\\nBioelectricity (includes BECCS)\\nFossil Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)\\nEcosystem restoration,\\nafforestation, reforestation\\nFuel switching\\nReduce emission of fluorinated gas\\nReduce methane from\\nwaste/wastewaterImproved sustainable forest managementClimate responses and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation optionsMitigation options\\nGtCO 2-eq/yr\\nEnhanced health services\\n(e.g. WASH, nutrition and diets)Green infrastructure and\\necosystem servicesSustainable land use and urban planningSustainable urban water management\\nClimate services, including\\nEarly Warning Systems\\nLivelihood diversificationDisaster risk managementSocial safety netsRisk spreading and sharing\\nPlanned relocation and resettlementHuman migrationAgroforestry\\nSustainable aquaculture and fisheriesEfficient livestock systems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'Biodiversity management and\\necosystem connectivity\\nIntegrated coastal zone managementWater use efficiency and water\\nresource managementImproved cropland management\\nCoastal defence and hardeningForest-based adaptationResilient power systemsEnergy reliability (e.g.\\ndiversification, access, stability)\\nImprove water use efficiency\\nPotential\\nfeasibilityup to 1.5°CENERGY SUPPLY LAND, WATER, FOOD HEALTH SETTLEMENTS AND\\nINFRASTRUCTURESOCIETY, LIVELIHOOD\\nAND ECONOMY\\nINDUSTRY AND WASTE\\n20 10 020 10 0'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': '20 10 020 10 0\\nElectricityLand transport\\nBuildings\\nIndustryFood\\n67% \\n66% \\n29% \\n44% \\n73% reduction (before \\nadditional electrification) Additional electrification (+60%)\\nGtCO 2-eq/yr \\nGtCO 2/yr \\nKeyTotal emissions (2050)\\nPercentage of possible reduction Demand-side mitigation potentialPotential range% \\nEfficient lighting, appliances\\nand equipment\\nEfficient shipping and aviation\\nAvoid demand for energy servicesEfficient buildings\\nElectric vehicles\\nPublic transport and bicycling\\nBiofuels for transport'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 42,\n", " 'content': 'Onsite renewablesFuel efficient vehiclesShift to sustainable healthy dietsoptions costing 100 USD tCO 2-eq-1 or \\nless could reduce global emissions by \\nat least half of the 2019 level by 2030\\nb) Potential of demand-side \\nmitigation options by 2050\\nthe range of GHG emissions reduction potential is 40-70% in these end-use sectors'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': '28\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakersand afforestation. WASH refers to water, sanitation and hygiene. Six feasibility dimensions (economic, technological, institutional, social, environmental and \\ngeophysical) were used to calculate the potential feasibility of climate responses and adaptation options, along with their synergies with mitigation. For'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'potential feasibility and feasibility dimensions, the figure shows high, medium, or low feasibility. Synergies with mitigation are identified as high, medium, and \\nlow. The right-hand side of Panel a provides an overview of selected mitigation options and their estimated costs and potentials in 2030. Costs are net lifetime \\ndiscounted monetary costs of avoided GHG emissions calculated relative to a reference technology. Relative potentials and costs will vary by place, context and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'time and in the longer term compared to 2030. The potential (horizontal axis) is the net GHG emission reduction (sum of reduced emissions and/or enhanced \\nsinks) broken down into cost categories (coloured bar segments) relative to an emission baseline consisting of current policy (around 2019) reference scenarios \\nfrom the AR6 scenarios database. The potentials are assessed independently for each option and are not additive. Health system mitigation options are included'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'mostly in settlement and infrastructure (e.g., efficient healthcare buildings) and cannot be identified separately. Fuel switching in industry refers to switching \\nto electricity, hydrogen, bioenergy and natural gas. Gradual colour transitions indicate uncertain breakdown into cost categories due to uncertainty or heavy \\ncontext dependency. The uncertainty in the total potential is typically 25–50%. Panel (b) displays the indicative potential of demand-side mitigation options'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'for 2050. Potentials are estimated based on approximately 500 bottom-up studies representing all global regions. The baseline (white bar) is provided by the \\nsectoral mean GHG emissions in 2050 of the two scenarios (IEA -STEPS and IP_ModAct) consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. \\nThe green arrow represents the demand-side emissions reductions potentials. The range in potential is shown by a line connecting dots displaying the highest'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'and the lowest potentials reported in the literature. Food shows demand-side potential of socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use, and changes in land-use \\npatterns enabled by change in food demand. Demand-side measures and new ways of end-use service provision can reduce global GHG emissions in end- use \\nsectors ( buildings, land transport, food) by 40–70% by 2050 compared to baseline scenarios, while some regions and socioeconomic groups require additional'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'energy and resources. The last row shows how demand-side mitigation options in other sectors can influence overall electricity demand. The dark grey bar shows \\nthe projected increase in electricity demand above the 2050 baseline due to increasing electrification in the other sectors. Based on a bottom-up assessment, \\nthis projected increase in electricity demand can be avoided through demand-side mitigation options in the domains of infrastructure use and socio-cultural'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'factors that influence electricity usage in industry, land transport, and buildings (green arrow). {Figure 4.4 } \\nMitigati on and Adaptation Options across Systems \\nC.3 Rapid and far-reaching transitions across all sectors and systems are necessary to achieve \\ndeep and sustained emissions reductions and secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. \\nThese system transitions involve a significant upscaling of a wide portfolio of mitigation and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation options. Feasible, effective, and low-cost options for mitigation and adaptation \\nare already available, with differences across systems and regions. ( high confidence ) {4.1, 4.5, \\n4.6} (Figure SPM.7 )\\nC.3.1 The systemic change required to achieve rapid and deep emissions reductions and transformative adaptation to climate \\nchange is unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed ( medium confidence ). Systems transitions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'include: deployment of low- or zero-emission technologies; reducing and changing demand through infrastructure \\ndesign and access, socio-cultural and behavioural changes, and increased technological efficiency and adoption; social \\nprotection, climate services or other services; and protecting and restoring ecosystems ( high confidence ). Feasible, \\neffective, and low-cost options for mitigation and adaptation are already available ( high confidence ). The availability,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'feasibility and potential of mitigation and adaptation options in the near term differs across systems and regions ( very \\nhigh confidence ). {4.1, 4.5.1 to 4.5.6 } (Figure SPM.7 )\\nEnergy Systems \\nC.3.2 Net zero CO 2 energy systems entail: a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, minimal use of unabated fossil \\nfuels51, and use of carbon capture and storage in the remaining fossil fuel systems; electricity systems that emit no'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'net CO 2; widespread electrification; alternative energy carriers in applications less amenable to electrification; energy \\nconservation and efficiency; and greater integration across the energy system ( high confidence ). Large contributions \\nto emissions reductions with costs less than USD 20 tCO 2-eq-1 come from solar and wind energy, energy efficiency \\nimprovements, and methane emissions reductions (coal mining, oil and gas, waste) ( medium confidence ). There are'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'feasible adaptation options that support infrastructure resilience, reliable power systems and efficient water use for \\nexisting and new energy generation systems ( very high confidence ). Energy generation diversification (e.g., via wind, \\nsolar, small scale hydropower) and demand-side management (e.g., storage and energy efficiency improvements) can \\nincrease energy reliability and reduce vulnerabilities to climate change ( high confidence ). Climate responsive energy'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'markets, updated design standards on energy assets according to current and projected climate change, smart-grid \\ntechnologies, robust transmission systems and improved capacity to respond to supply deficits have high feasibility in \\nthe medium to long term, with mitigation co-benefits ( very high confidence ). {4.5.1 } (Figure SPM.7 )\\n51 In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 43,\n", " 'content': 'throughout the life cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO 2 from power plants, or 50–80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': '29\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersIndustry and Transport\\nC.3.3 Reducing industry GHG emissions entails coordinated action throughout value chains to promote all mitigation \\noptions, including demand management, energy and materials efficiency, circular material flows, as well as abatement \\ntechnologies and transformational changes in production processes ( high confidence ). In transport, sustainable'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'biofuels, low-emissions hydrogen, and derivatives (including ammonia and synthetic fuels) can support mitigation of \\nCO 2 emissions from shipping, aviation, and heavy-duty land transport but require production process improvements \\nand cost reductions ( medium confidence ). Sustainable biofuels can offer additional mitigation benefits in land-based \\ntransport in the short and medium term ( medium confidence ). Electric vehicles powered by low-GHG emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'electricity have large potential to reduce land-based transport GHG emissions, on a life cycle basis ( high confidence ). \\nAdvances in battery technologies could facilitate the electrification of heavy-duty trucks and compliment conventional \\nelectric rail systems ( medium confidence ). The environmental footprint of battery production and growing concerns \\nabout critical minerals can be addressed by material and supply diversification strategies, energy and material efficiency'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'improvements, and circular material flows (medium confidence ). {4.5.2, 4.5.3 } (Figure SPM.7 )\\nCities, Settlements and Infrastructure \\nC.3.4 Urban systems are critical for achieving deep emissions reductions and advancing climate resilient development ( high \\nconfidence ). Key adaptation and mitigation elements in cities include considering climate change impacts and risks \\n(e.g., through climate services) in the design and planning of settlements and infrastructure; land use planning to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'achieve compact urban form, co-location of jobs and housing; supporting public transport and active mobility (e.g., \\nwalking and cycling); the efficient design, construction, retrofit, and use of buildings; reducing and changing energy \\nand material consumption; sufficiency52; material substitution; and electrification in combination with low emissions \\nsources ( high confidence ). Urban transitions that offer benefits for mitigation, adaptation, human health and well-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'being, ecosystem services, and vulnerability reduction for low-income communities are fostered by inclusive long-term \\nplanning that takes an integrated approach to physical, natural and social infrastructure ( high confidence ). Green/\\nnatural and blue infrastructure supports carbon uptake and storage and either singly or when combined with grey \\ninfrastructure can reduce energy use and risk from extreme events such as heatwaves, flooding, heavy precipitation and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'droughts, while generating co-benefits for health, well-being and livelihoods ( medium confidence ). {4.5.3 }\\nLand, Ocean, Food, and Water\\nC.3.5 Many agriculture, forestry, and other land use ( AFOLU) options provide adaptation and mitigation benefits that could \\nbe upscaled in the near term across most regions. Conservation, improved management, and restoration of forests \\nand other ecosystems offer the largest share of economic mitigation potential, with reduced deforestation in tropical'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'regions having the highest total mitigation potential. Ecosystem restoration, reforestation, and afforestation can lead to \\ntrade-offs due to competing demands on land. Minimizing trade-offs requires integrated approaches to meet multiple \\nobjectives including food security. Demand-side measures (shifting to sustainable healthy diets53 and reducing food loss/\\nwaste) and sustainable agricultural intensification can reduce ecosystem conversion, and methane and nitrous oxide'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'emissions, and free up land for reforestation and ecosystem restoration. Sustainably sourced agricultural and forest \\nproducts, including long-lived wood products, can be used instead of more GHG-intensive products in other sectors. \\nEffective adaptation options include cultivar improvements, agroforestry, community-based adaptation, farm and \\nlandscape diversification, and urban agriculture. These AFOLU response options require integration of biophysical,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'socioeconomic and other enabling factors. Some options, such as conservation of high-carbon ecosystems (e.g., peatlands, \\nwetlands, rangelands, mangroves and forests), deliver immediate benefits, while others, such as restoration of high-carbon \\necosystems, take decades to deliver measurable results. ( high confidence ) {4.5.4 } (Figure SPM.7 )\\nC.3.6 Maintaining the resilience of biodiversity and ecosystem services at a global scale depends on effective and equitable'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'conservation of approximately 30% to 50% of Earth’s land, freshwater and ocean areas, including currently near-\\nnatural ecosystems ( high confidence ). Conservation, protection and restoration of terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and \\n52 A set of measures and daily practices that avoid demand for energy, materials, land, and water while delivering human well-being for all within planetary \\nboundaries. {4.5.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': '53 ‘Sustainable healthy diets’ promote all dimensions of individuals’ health and well-being; have low environmental pressure and impact; are accessible, \\naffordable, safe and equitable; and are culturally acceptable, as described in FAO and WHO. The related concept of ‘balanced diets’ refers to diets that \\nfeature plant-based foods, such as those based on coarse grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal-sourced food produced in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 44,\n", " 'content': 'resilient, sustainable and low-GHG emission systems, as described in SRCCL.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': '30\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakersocean ecosystems, together with targeted management to adapt to unavoidable impacts of climate change reduces \\nthe vulnerability of biodiversity and ecosystem services to climate change ( high confidence ), reduces coastal erosion \\nand flooding ( high confidence ), and could increase carbon uptake and storage if global warming is limited ( medium'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). Rebuilding overexploited or depleted fisheries reduces negative climate change impacts on fisheries \\n(medium confidence) and supports food security, biodiversity, human health and well-being ( high confidence ). Land \\nrestoration contributes to climate change mitigation and adaptation with synergies via enhanced ecosystem services \\nand with economically positive returns and co-benefits for poverty reduction and improved livelihoods ( high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'Cooperation, and inclusive decision making, with Indigenous Peoples and local communities, as well as recognition of \\ninherent rights of Indigenous Peoples, is integral to successful adaptation and mitigation across forests and other \\necosystems ( high confidence ). {4.5.4, 4.6 } (Figure SPM.7 )\\nHealth and Nutrition\\nC.3.7 Human health will benefit from integrated mitigation and adaptation options that mainstream health into food,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'infrastructure, social protection, and water policies ( very high confidence ). Effective adaptation options exist to help \\nprotect human health and well-being, including: strengthening public health programs related to climate-sensitive \\ndiseases, increasing health systems resilience, improving ecosystem health, improving access to potable water, \\nreducing exposure of water and sanitation systems to flooding, improving surveillance and early warning systems,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'vaccine development ( very high confidence ), improving access to mental healthcare, and Heat Health Action Plans that \\ninclude early warning and response systems ( high confidence ). Adaptation strategies which reduce food loss and waste \\nor support balanced, sustainable healthy diets contribute to nutrition, health, biodiversity and other environmental \\nbenefits ( high confidence ). {4.5.5 } (Figure SPM.7 ) \\nSociety, Livelihoods, and Economies'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'C.3.8 Policy mixes that include weather and health insurance, social protection and adaptive social safety nets, contingent \\nfinance and reserve funds, and universal access to early warning systems combined with effective contingency plans, can \\nreduce vulnerability and exposure of human systems. Disaster risk management, early warning systems, climate services \\nand risk spreading and sharing approaches have broad applicability across sectors. Increasing education including'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'capacity building, climate literacy, and information provided through climate services and community approaches can \\nfacilitate heightened risk perception and accelerate behavioural changes and planning. ( high confidence ) {4.5.6 }\\nSynergies and Trade-Offs with Sustainable Development \\nC.4 Accelerated and equitable action in mitigating and adapting to climate change impacts is \\ncritical to sustainable development. Mitigation and adaptation actions have more synergies'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'than trade-offs with Sustainable Development Goals. Synergies and trade-offs depend on \\ncontext and scale of implementation. (high confidence ) {3.4, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.9, Figure 4.5 }\\nC.4.1 Mitigation efforts embedded within the wider development context can increase the pace, depth and breadth of emission \\nreductions ( medium confidence ). Countries at all stages of economic development seek to improve the well-being of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'people, and their development priorities reflect different starting points and contexts. Different contexts include but \\nare not limited to social, economic, environmental, cultural, political circumstances, resource endowment, capabilities, \\ninternational environment, and prior development ( high confidence ). In regions with high dependency on fossil fuels for, \\namong other things, revenue and employment generation, mitigating risk for sustainable development requires policies'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'that promote economic and energy sector diversification and considerations of just transitions principles, processes \\nand practices ( high confidence ). Eradicating extreme poverty, energy poverty, and providing decent living standards in \\nlow-emitting countries / regions in the context of achieving sustainable development objectives, in the near term, can \\nbe achieved without significant global emissions growth ( high confidence ). {4.4, 4.6, Annex I: Glossary }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'C.4.2 Many mitigation and adaptation actions have multiple synergies with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and \\nsustainable development generally, but some actions can also have trade-offs. Potential synergies with SDGs exceed \\npotential trade-offs; synergies and trade-offs depend on the pace and magnitude of change and the development \\ncontext including inequalities with consideration of climate justice. Trade-offs can be evaluated and minimised by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 45,\n", " 'content': 'giving emphasis to capacity building, finance, governance, technology transfer, investments, development, context \\nspecific gender-based and other social equity considerations with meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples, local \\ncommunities and vulnerable populations. (high confidence ) {3.4.1, 4.6, Figure 4.5, 4.9 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': '31\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersC.4.3 Implementing both mitigation and adaptation actions together and taking trade-offs into account supports co-benefits \\nand synergies for human health and well-being. For example, improved access to clean energy sources and technologies \\ngenerates health benefits especially for women and children; electrification combined with low-GHG energy, and shifts'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'to active mobility and public transport can enhance air quality, health, employment, and can elicit energy security and \\ndeliver equity. (high confidence ) {4.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.5, 4.6, 4.9 }\\nEquity and Inclusion\\nC.5 Prioritising equity, climate justice, social justice, inclusion and just transition processes can \\nenable adaptation and ambitious mitigation actions and climate resilient development. \\nAdaptation outcomes are enhanced by increased support to regions and people with the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'highest vulnerability to climatic hazards. Integrating climate adaptation into social protection \\nprograms improves resilience. Many options are available for reducing emission-intensive \\nconsumption, including through behavioural and lifestyle changes, with co-benefits for \\nsocietal well-being. ( high confidence ) {4.4, 4.5 }\\nC.5.1 Equity remains a central element in the UN climate regime, notwithstanding shifts in differentiation between states'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'over time and challenges in assessing fair shares. Ambitious mitigation pathways imply large and sometimes disruptive \\nchanges in economic structure, with significant distributional consequences, within and between countries. Distributional \\nconsequences within and between countries include shifting of income and employment during the transition from \\nhigh- to low- emissions activities. ( high confidence ) {4.4}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'C.5.2 Adaptation and mitigation actions that prioritise equity, social justice, climate justice, rights-based approaches, and \\ninclusivity, lead to more sustainable outcomes, reduce trade-offs, support transformative change and advance climate \\nresilient development. Redistributive policies across sectors and regions that shield the poor and vulnerable, social \\nsafety nets, equity, inclusion and just transitions, at all scales can enable deeper societal ambitions and resolve trade-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'offs with sustainable development goals. Attention to equity and broad and meaningful participation of all relevant \\nactors in decision making at all scales can build social trust which builds on equitable sharing of benefits and burdens \\nof mitigation that deepen and widen support for transformative changes. (high confidence ) {4.4}\\nC.5.3 Regions and people (3.3 to 3.6 billion in number) with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'climatic hazards (see A.2.2). Adaptation outcomes for the most vulnerable within and across countries and regions are \\nenhanced through approaches focusing on equity, inclusivity and rights-based approaches. Vulnerability is exacerbated \\nby inequity and marginalisation linked to e.g., gender, ethnicity, low incomes, informal settlements, disability, age, \\nand historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, especially for many Indigenous Peoples and local'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'communities. Integrating climate adaptation into social protection programs, including cash transfers and public works \\nprograms, is highly feasible and increases resilience to climate change, especially when supported by basic services \\nand infrastructure. The greatest gains in well-being in urban areas can be achieved by prioritising access to finance to \\nreduce climate risk for low-income and marginalised communities including people living in informal settlements. ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ) {4.4, 4.5.3, 4.5.5, 4.5.6 }\\nC.5.4 The design of regulatory instruments and economic instruments and consumption-based approaches, can advance equity. \\nIndividuals with high socio- economic status contribute disproportionately to emissions, and have the highest potential \\nfor emissions reductions. Many options are available for reducing emission-intensive consumption while improving'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'societal well-being. Socio-cultural options, behaviour and lifestyle changes supported by policies, infrastructure, and \\ntechnology can help end-users shift to low-emissions- intensive consumption, with multiple co-benefits. A substantial \\nshare of the population in low-emitting countries lack access to modern energy services. Technology development, \\ntransfer, capacity building and financing can support developing countries / regions leapfrogging or transitioning to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 46,\n", " 'content': 'low-emissions transport systems thereby providing multiple co-benefits. Climate resilient development is advanced \\nwhen actors work in equitable, just and inclusive ways to reconcile divergent interests, values and worldviews, toward \\nequitable and just outcomes. ( high confidence ) {2.1, 4.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': '32\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for PolicymakersGovernance and Policies \\nC.6 Effective climate action is enabled by political commitment, well-aligned multilevel \\ngovernance, institutional frameworks, laws, policies and strategies and enhanced access \\nto finance and technology. Clear goals, coordination across multiple policy domains, and \\ninclusive governance processes facilitate effective climate action. Regulatory and economic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'instruments can support deep emissions reductions and climate resilience if scaled up and \\napplied widely. Climate resilient development benefits from drawing on diverse knowledge. \\n(high confidence ) {2.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 }\\nC.6.1 Effective climate governance enables mitigation and adaptation. Effective governance provides overall direction on \\nsetting targets and priorities and mainstreaming climate action across policy domains and levels, based on national'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'circumstances and in the context of international cooperation. It enhances monitoring and evaluation and regulatory \\ncertainty, prioritising inclusive, transparent and equitable decision-making, and improves access to finance and \\ntechnology (see C.7). (high confidence ) {2.2.2, 4.7 }\\nC.6.2 Effective local, municipal, national and subnational institutions build consensus for climate action among diverse'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'interests, enable coordination and inform strategy setting but require adequate institutional capacity. Policy support is \\ninfluenced by actors in civil society, including businesses, youth, women, labour, media, Indigenous Peoples, and local \\ncommunities. Effectiveness is enhanced by political commitment and partnerships between different groups in society. \\n(high confidence ) {2.2, 4.7 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'C.6.3 Effective multilevel governance for mitigation, adaptation, risk management, and climate resilient development is \\nenabled by inclusive decision processes that prioritise equity and justice in planning and implementation, allocation of \\nappropriate resources, institutional review, and monitoring and evaluation. Vulnerabilities and climate risks are often \\nreduced through carefully designed and implemented laws, policies, participatory processes, and interventions that'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'address context specific inequities such as those based on gender, ethnicity, disability, age, location and income. ( high \\nconfidence ) {4.4, 4.7 }\\nC.6.4 Regulatory and economic instruments could support deep emissions reductions if scaled up and applied more widely \\n(high confidence ). Scaling up and enhancing the use of regulatory instruments can improve mitigation outcomes in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'sectoral applications, consistent with national circumstances ( high confidence ). Where implemented, carbon pricing \\ninstruments have incentivized low-cost emissions reduction measures but have been less effective, on their own and \\nat prevailing prices during the assessment period, to promote higher-cost measures necessary for further reductions \\n(medium confidence ). Equity and distributional impacts of such carbon pricing instruments, e.g., carbon taxes and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'emissions trading, can be addressed by using revenue to support low-income households, among other approaches. \\nRemoving fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions54 and yield benefits such as improved public revenue, \\nmacroeconomic and sustainability performance; subsidy removal can have adverse distributional impacts, especially \\non the most economically vulnerable groups which, in some cases can be mitigated by measures such as redistributing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'revenue saved, all of which depend on national circumstances ( high confidence ). Economy-wide policy packages, such \\nas public spending commitments and pricing reforms, can meet short-term economic goals while reducing emissions and \\nshifting development pathways towards sustainability ( medium confidence ). Effective policy packages would be comprehensive, \\nconsistent, balanced across objectives, and tailored to national circumstances ( high confidence ). {2.2.2, 4.7 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': 'C.6.5 Drawing on diverse knowledges and cultural values, meaningful participation and inclusive engagement processes—\\nincluding Indigenous Knowledge, local knowledge, and scientific knowledge—facilitates climate resilient development, \\nbuilds capacity and allows locally appropriate and socially acceptable solutions. (high confidence ) {4.4, 4.5.6, 4.7 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 47,\n", " 'content': '54 Fossil fuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies to reduce global CO 2 emission by 1 to 4%, and GHG emissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying \\nacross regions ( medium confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': '33\\nSummary for PolicymakersSummary for PolicymakersFinance, Technology and International Cooperation\\nC.7 Finance, technology and international cooperation are critical enablers for accelerated climate \\naction. If climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing would \\nneed to increase many-fold. There is sufficient global capital to close the global investment \\ngaps but there are barriers to redirect capital to climate action. Enhancing technology'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'innovation systems is key to accelerate the widespread adoption of technologies and \\npractices. Enhancing international cooperation is possible through multiple channels. ( high \\nconfidence ) {2.3, 4.8 }\\nC.7.1 Improved availability of and access to finance55 would enable accelerated climate action ( very high confidence ). \\nAddressing needs and gaps and broadening equitable access to domestic and international finance, when combined'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'with other supportive actions, can act as a catalyst for accelerating adaptation and mitigation, and enabling climate \\nresilient development ( high confidence ). If climate goals are to be achieved, and to address rising risks and accelerate \\ninvestments in emissions reductions , both adaptation and mitigation finance would need to increase many-fold (high \\nconfidence ). {4.8.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'C.7.2 Increased access to finance can build capacity and address soft limits to adaptation and avert rising risks, especially for \\ndeveloping countries, vulnerable groups, regions and sectors ( high confidence ). Public finance is an important enabler \\nof adaptation and mitigation, and can also leverage private finance (high confidence ). Average annual modelled \\nmitigation investment requirements for 2020 to 2030 in scenarios that limit warming to 2°C or 1.5°C are a factor of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'three to six greater than current levels56, and total mitigation investments ( public, private, domestic and international) \\nwould need to increase across all sectors and regions ( medium confidence ). Even if extensive global mitigation efforts \\nare implemented, there will be a need for financial, technical, and human resources for adaptation ( high confidence ). \\n{4.3, 4.8.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': '{4.3, 4.8.1 }\\nC.7.3 There is sufficient global capital and liquidity to close global investment gaps, given the size of the global financial \\nsystem, but there are barriers to redirect capital to climate action both within and outside the global financial sector and \\nin the context of economic vulnerabilities and indebtedness facing developing countries. Reducing financing barriers for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'scaling up financial flows would require clear signalling and support by governments, including a stronger alignment \\nof public finances in order to lower real and perceived regulatory, cost and market barriers and risks and improving \\nthe risk- return profile of investments. At the same time, depending on national contexts, financial actors, including \\ninvestors, financial intermediaries, central banks and financial regulators can shift the systemic underpricing of climate-'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'related risks, and reduce sectoral and regional mismatches between available capital and investment needs. (high \\nconfidence ) {4.8.1 }\\nC.7.4 Tracked financial flows fall short of the levels needed for adaptation and to achieve mitigation goals across all sectors \\nand regions. These gaps create many opportunities and the challenge of closing gaps is largest in developing countries.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'Accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler \\nto enhance adaptation and mitigation actions and address inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms \\nand conditions, and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries. Scaled-up public grants for \\nmitigation and adaptation funding for vulnerable regions, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost- effective and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy. Options for scaling up mitigation in developing countries \\ninclude: increased levels of public finance and publicly mobilised private finance flows from developed to developing \\ncountries in the context of the USD 100 billion-a-year goal; increased use of public guarantees to reduce risks and \\nleverage private flows at lower cost; local capital markets development; and building greater trust in international'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'cooperation processes. A coordinated effort to make the post-pandemic recovery sustainable over the longer-term \\ncan accelerate climate action, including in developing regions and countries facing high debt costs, debt distress and \\nmacroeconomic uncertainty. ( high confidence ) {4.8.1 }\\nC.7.5 Enhancing technology innovation systems can provide opportunities to lower emissions growth, create social and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'environmental co-benefits, and achieve other SDGs. Policy packages tailored to national contexts and technological \\ncharacteristics have been effective in supporting low-emission innovation and technology diffusion. Public policies can \\n55 Finance originates from diverse sources: public or private, local, national or international, bilateral or multilateral, and alternative sources. It can take the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 48,\n", " 'content': 'form of grants, technical assistance, loans (concessional and non-concessional), bonds, equity, risk insurance and financial guarantees (of different types).\\n56 These estimates rely on scenario assumptions.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 49,\n", " 'content': '34\\nSummary for Policymakers\\nSummary for Policymakerssupport training and R&D, complemented by both regulatory and market-based instruments that create incentives and \\nmarket opportunities. Technological innovation can have trade-offs such as new and greater environmental impacts, \\nsocial inequalities, overdependence on foreign knowledge and providers, distributional impacts and rebound effects57,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 49,\n", " 'content': 'requiring appropriate governance and policies to enhance potential and reduce trade-offs. Innovation and adoption of \\nlow-emission technologies lags in most developing countries, particularly least developed ones, due in part to weaker \\nenabling conditions, including limited finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building. (high \\nconfidence ) {4.8.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 49,\n", " 'content': 'C.7.6 International cooperation is a critical enabler for achieving ambitious climate change mitigation, adaptation, and climate \\nresilient development ( high confidence ). Climate resilient development is enabled by increased international cooperation \\nincluding mobilising and enhancing access to finance, particularly for developing countries, vulnerable regions, sectors \\nand groups and aligning finance flows for climate action to be consistent with ambition levels and funding needs ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 49,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). Enhancing international cooperation on finance, technology and capacity building can enable greater \\nambition and can act as a catalyst for accelerating mitigation and adaptation, and shifting development pathways \\ntowards sustainability (high confidence ). This includes support to NDCs and accelerating technology development and \\ndeployment (high confidence ). Transnational partnerships can stimulate policy development, technology diffusion,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 49,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation and mitigation, though uncertainties remain over their costs, feasibility and effectiveness ( medium \\nconfidence ). International environmental and sectoral agreements, institutions and initiatives are helping, and in some \\ncases may help, to stimulate low GHG emissions investments and reduce emissions ( medium confidence ). {2.2.2, 4.8.2 }\\n57 Leading to lower net emission reductions or even emission increases.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 50,\n", " 'content': '35Climate Change 2023\\nSynthesis Report\\nIPCC, 2023: Sections. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth \\nAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, \\nGeneva, Switzerland, pp. 35-115, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647These Sections should be cited as:'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 52,\n", " 'content': '37Section 1\\nIntroduction'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': '38\\nSection 1 \\nSection 1This Synthesis Report (SYR) of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) \\nsummarises the state of knowledge of climate change, its widespread \\nimpacts and risks, and climate change mitigation and adaptation, based \\non the peer-reviewed scientific, technical and socio-economic literature \\nsince the publication of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in \\n2014.\\nThe assessment is undertaken within the context of the evolving'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'international landscape, in particular, developments in the UN \\nFramework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC) process, \\nincluding the outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol and the adoption of the \\nParis Agreement. It reflects the increasing diversity of those involved in \\nclimate action. \\nThis report integrates the main findings of the AR6 Working Group \\nreports58 and the three AR6 Special Reports59. It recognizes the \\ninterdependence of climate, ecosystems and biodiversity, and human'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'societies; the value of diverse forms of knowledge; and the close \\nlinkages between climate change adaptation, mitigation, ecosystem \\nhealth, human well-being and sustainable development. Building on \\nmultiple analytical frameworks, including those from the physical and \\nsocial sciences, this report identifies opportunities for transformative \\naction which are effective, feasible, just and equitable using concepts \\nof systems transitions and resilient development pathways60. Different'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'regional classification schemes61 are used for physical, social and \\neconomic aspects, reflecting the underlying literature.\\nAfter this introduction, Section 2, ‘ Current Status and Trends’ , opens \\nwith the assessment of observational evidence for our changing \\nclimate, historical and current drivers of human-induced climate \\nchange, and its impacts. It assesses the current implementation of \\nadaptation and mitigation response options. Section 3, ‘ Long-Term'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'Climate and Development Futures ’, provides a long-term assessment of \\nclimate change to 2100 and beyond in a broad range of socio-economic \\n58 The three Working Group contributions to AR6 are: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis; Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; and Climate \\nChange 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, respectively. Their assessments cover scientific literature accepted for publication respectively by 31 January 2021, 1 September'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': '2021 and 11 October 2021.\\n59 The three Special Reports are : Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018): an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related \\nglobal greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'poverty (SR1.5); Climate Change and Land (2019): an IPCC Special Report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and \\ngreenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems (SRCCL); and The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (2019) (SROCC). The Special Reports cover scientific literature \\naccepted for publication respectively by 15 May 2018, 7 April 2019 and 15 May 2019.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': '60 The Glossary (Annex I) includes definitions of these, and other terms and concepts used in this report drawn from the AR6 joint Working Group Glossary.\\n61 Depending on the climate information context, geographical regions in AR6 may refer to larger areas, such as sub-continents and oceanic regions, or to typological regions, such'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'as monsoon regions, coastlines, mountain ranges or cities. A new set of standard AR6 WGI reference land and ocean regions have been defined. WGIII allocates countries to \\ngeographical regions, based on the UN Statistics Division Classification { WGI 1.4.5, WGI 10.1, WGI 11.9, WGI 12.1–12.4, WGI Atlas.1.3.3–1.3.4 }.\\n62 Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'high, and typeset in italics, for example, medium confidence . The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or result: virtually certain \\n99–100% probability; very likely 90–100%; likely 66–100%; more likely than not >50-100%; about as likely as not 33–66%; unlikely 0–33%; very unlikely 0–10%; and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100% and extremely unlikely 0–5%) are also used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood also is typeset in \\nitalics: for example, very likely. This is consistent with AR5. In this Report, unless stated otherwise, square brackets [x to y] are used to provide the assessed very likely range, or \\n90% interval.futures. It considers long-term characteristics, impacts, risks and costs'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'in adaptation and mitigation pathways in the context of sustainable \\ndevelopment. Section 4, ‘ Near- Term Responses in a Changing Climate ’, \\nassesses opportunities for scaling up effective action in the period up \\nto 2040, in the context of climate pledges, and commitments, and the \\npursuit of sustainable development.\\nBased on scientific understanding, key findings can be formulated as \\nstatements of fact or associated with an assessed level of confidence'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 53,\n", " 'content': 'using the IPCC calibrated language62. The scientific findings are \\ndrawn from the underlying reports and arise from their Summary for \\nPolicymakers (hereafter SPM), Technical Summary (hereafter TS), and \\nunderlying chapters and are indicated by {} brackets. Figure 1.1 shows \\nthe Synthesis Report Figures Key, a guide to visual icons that are used \\nacross multiple figures within this report.1. Introduction'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 54,\n", " 'content': '39\\nIntroduction Section 1Figure 1.1: The Synthesis Report figures key.Italicized ‘annotations’\\nSimple explanations written \\nin non-technical language Axis labels Synthesis Report\\nfigures key these help non-experts \\nnavigate complex contentGHG emissions\\nTemperatureCost or budgetNet zero°C\\nnet zero'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf', 'page': 55, 'content': '40'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 56,\n", " 'content': '41Section 2\\nCurrent Status and Trends'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '42\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 22.1 Observed Changes, Impacts and Attribution\\nHuman activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, \\nwith global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850 –1900 in 2011 –2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions \\nhave continued to increase over 2010 –2019, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production \\nacross regions, between and within countries, and between individuals ( high confidence ). Human-caused climate \\nchange is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to \\nwidespread adverse impacts on food and water security, human health and on economies and society and related'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'losses and damages63 to nature and people ( high confidence ). Vulnerable communities who have historically \\ncontributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected ( high confidence ).\\n63 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic. (See Annex I: Glossary)Section 2: Current Status and Trends\\n2.1.1. Observed Warming and its Causes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'Global surface temperature was around 1.1°C above 1850–1900 in \\n2011–2020 (1.09 [0.95 to 1.20]°C)64, with larger increases \\nover land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83]°C) than over the ocean \\n(0.88 [0.68 to 1.01]°C)65. Observed warming is human- caused, with \\nwarming from greenhouse gases (GHG), dominated by CO 2 and \\nmethane (CH 4), partly masked by aerosol cooling (Figure 2.1) . \\nGlobal surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '(2001 –2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10]°C higher than 1850 –1900. Global \\nsurface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other \\n50-year period over at least the last 2000 years ( high confidence ). The \\nlikely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase \\nfrom 1850–1900 to 2010–201966 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate \\nof 1.07°C. It is likely that well-mixed GHGs67 contributed a warming \\nof 1.0°C to 2. 0°C, and other human drivers (principally aerosols)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural (solar and volcanic) \\ndrivers changed global surface temperature by ±0.1°C and internal \\nvariability changed it by ±0.2°C. {WGI SPM A.1, WGI SPM A.1.2, \\nWGI SPM A.1.3, WGI SPM A.2.2, WGI Figure SPM.2; SRCCL TS.2 }\\nObserved increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around \\n1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions from human activities. \\nLand and ocean sinks have taken up a near-constant proportion'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '(globally about 56% per year) of CO 2 emissions from human activities over \\n63 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic. (See Annex I: Glossary)\\n64 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003 –2012 (+0.19 [0.16 to 0.22]°C). Additionally, methodological'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements \\nhave also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5 \\n{WGI SPM A1.2 and footnote 10 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '65 For 1850–1900 to 2013–2022 the updated calculations are 1.15 [1.00 to 1.25]°C for global surface temperature, 1.65 [1.36 to 1.90]°C for land temperatures and \\n0.93 [0.73 to 1.04]°C for ocean temperatures above 1850 –1900 using the exact same datasets (updated by 2 years) and methods as employed in WGI. \\n66 The period distinction with the observed assessment arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010 –2019 is'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C. {WGI SPM footnote 11 }\\n67 Contributions from emissions to the 2010 –2019 warming relative to 1850 –1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO 2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; \\nnitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C.\\n68 For 2021 (the most recent year for which final numbers are available) concentrations using the same observational products and methods as in AR6 WGI are: 415 ppm CO 2;'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': '1896 ppb CH 4; and 335 ppb N 2O. Note that the CO 2 is reported here using the WMO-CO 2-X2007 scale to be consistent with WGI. Operational CO 2 reporting has since been \\nupdated to use the WMO-CO 2-X2019 scale.the past six decades, with regional differences ( high confidence ). In 2019, \\natmospheric CO 2 concentrations reached 410 parts per million (ppm), CH 4 \\nreached 1866 parts per billion (ppb) and nitrous oxide ( N2O) reached 332 ppb68.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'Other major contributors to warming are tropospheric ozone (O 3) and \\nhalogenated gases. Concentrations of CH 4 and N2O have increased to \\nlevels unprecedented in at least 800,000 years ( very high confidence ), \\nand there is high confidence that current CO 2 concentrations are \\nhigher than at any time over at least the past two million years. Since \\n1750, increases in CO 2 (47%) and CH 4 (156%) concentrations far \\nexceed – and increases in N2O (23%) are similar to – the natural'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 57,\n", " 'content': 'multi-millennial changes between glacial and interglacial periods over at \\nleast the past 800,000 years ( very high confidence ). The net cooling effect \\nwhich arises from anthropogenic aerosols peaked in the late 20th century \\n(high confidence ). {WGI SPM A1.1, WGI SPM A1.3, WGI SPM A.2.1, \\nWGI Figure SPM.2, WGI TS 2.2, WGI 2ES, WGI Figure 6.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': '43\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2Increased concentrations \\nof GHGs in the atmosphereIncreased emissions of \\ngreenhouse gases (GHGs)b)\\na)c) Changes in global surface temperature\\nCarbon dioxide\\nMethaned) Humans are responsible\\n015304560400\\n350\\n300\\n10001500\\n500 –0.5\\n–1.00.00.51.01.52.0\\nObserved\\n–0.5\\n–1.00.00.51.01.52.0\\nTotal human influenceObserved warming\\nWell-mixed GHGOther human drivers*\\nSolar and volcanic drivers\\nInternal variabilityObserved warming is driven by emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'from human activities with GHG warming partly masked by aerosol cooling 2010–2019 (change from 1850–1900) \\n1.0\\n0.2Global surface temperature has increased by 1.1°C by 2011-2020 compared to 1850-1900\\nConcentrations of GHGs have increased rapidly since 1850(scaled to match their assessed contributions to warming over 1850–1900 to 2010–2019)\\nGreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from human activities continue to increaseHuman activities are responsible for global warming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': '1850 1900 1950 2000 2020\\n1850 1900 1950 2000 2019\\nNon-CO 2 \\nemissions\\nCO 2 from \\nfossil fuels \\nand industry Parts per million (ppm)GHG Emissions (GtCO 2-eq/yr)Parts per billion (ppb)°C\\n1850 1900 1950 2000 2019°C\\nCO 2 from Land \\nUse, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)warmest multi-century period in more than 100,000 years\\n410 ppm CO 2\\n1866 ppb CH 4\\n332 ppb N2O\\n200400Parts per billion (ppb)\\n Nitrous oxide\\n°C 0 0.5 1 1.5Key\\n*Other human drivers are predominantly cooling aerosols, but also'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'warming aerosols, land-use change (land-use reflectance) and ozone.\\nFigure 2.1: The causal chain from emissions to resulting \\nwarming of the climate system. Emissions of GHG have \\nincreased rapidly over recent decades (panel (a)) . Global net \\nanthropogenic GHG emissions include CO 2 from fossil fuel \\ncombustion and industrial processes (CO 2-FFI) (dark green); \\nnet CO 2 from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO 2-LULUCF)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': '(green); CH 4; N 2O; and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF 6, NF 3) \\n(light blue). These emissions have led to increases in the atmospheric \\nconcentrations of several GHGs including the three major well-mixed \\nGHGs CO 2, CH 4 and N 2O (panel (b) , annual values). To indicate their \\nrelative importance each subpanel’s vertical extent for CO 2, CH 4 and \\nN2O is scaled to match the assessed individual direct effect (and, \\nin the case of CH 4 indirect effect via atmospheric chemistry impacts'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'on tropospheric ozone) of historical emissions on temperature \\nchange from 1850–1900 to 2010–2019. This estimate arises from \\nan assessment of effective radiative forcing and climate sensitivity. \\nThe global surface temperature (shown as annual anomalies from \\na 1850–1900 baseline) has increased by around 1.1°C since \\n1850–1900 (panel (c)) . The vertical bar on the right shows the \\nestimated temperature (very likely range) during the warmest'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'multi-century period in at least the last 100,000 years, which \\noccurred around 6500 years ago during the current interglacial \\nperiod (Holocene). Prior to that, the next most recent warm period \\nwas about 125,000 years ago, when the assessed multi-century \\ntemperature range [0.5°C to 1.5°C] overlaps the observations of \\nthe most recent decade. These past warm periods were caused \\nby slow (multi-millennial) orbital variations. Formal detection and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'attribution studies synthesise information from climate models \\nand observations and show that the best estimate is that all the \\nwarming observed between 1850–1900 and 2010–2019 is caused \\nby humans (panel (d)) . The panel shows temperature change \\nattributed to: total human influence; its decomposition into changes \\nin GHG concentrations and other human drivers (aerosols, ozone \\nand land-use change (land-use reflectance)); solar and volcanic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 58,\n", " 'content': 'drivers; and internal climate variability. Whiskers show likely ranges. \\n{WGI SPM A.2.2, WGI Figure SPM.1, WGI Figure SPM.2, WGI TS2.2, \\nWGI 2.1; WGIII Figure SPM.1, WGIII A.III.II.2.5.1}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': '44\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Average annual GHG emissions during 2010 –2019 were higher \\nthan in any previous decade, but the rate of growth between \\n2010 and 2019 (1.3% yr-1) was lower than that between 2000 \\nand 2009 (2.1% yr-1)69. Historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions from \\n1850 to 2019 were 2400 ±240 GtCO 2. Of these, more than half (58%) \\noccurred between 1850 and 1989 [1400 ±195 GtCO 2], and about 42% \\nbetween 1990 and 2019 [1000 ±90 GtCO 2]. Global net anthropogenic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59±6.6 GtCO 2-eq in 2019, \\nabout 12% (6.5 GtCO 2-eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO 2-eq) \\nhigher than in 1990. By 2019, the largest growth in gross emissions \\noccurred in CO 2 from fossil fuels and industry (CO 2-FFI) followed by \\nCH 4, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated \\ngases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. ( high confidence ) \\n{WGIII SPM B1.1, WGIII SPM B.1.2, WGIII SPM B.1.3, WGIII Figure SPM.1,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII Figure SPM.2 }\\nRegional contributions to global human-caused GHG emissions \\ncontinue to differ widely. Historical contributions of CO 2 emissions \\nvary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also \\nin terms of contributions to CO 2-FFI (1650 ± 73 GtCO 2-eq) and net \\nCO 2-LULUCF (760 ± 220 GtCO 2-eq) emissions (Figure 2.2). Variations \\nin regional and national per capita emissions partly reflect different'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'development stages, but they also vary widely at similar income \\nlevels. Average per capita net anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2019 \\nranged from 2.6 tCO 2-eq to 19 tCO 2-eq across regions (Figure 2.2). \\nLeast Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) \\nhave much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO 2-eq and 4.6 tCO 2-eq, \\nrespectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO 2-eq), excluding \\nCO 2-LULUCF . Around 48% of the global population in 2019 lives in countries'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'emitting on average more than 6 tCO 2-eq per capita, 35% of the global \\npopulation live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO 2-eq per capita70 \\n(excluding CO 2-LULUCF) while another 41% live in countries emitting less \\nthan 3 tCO 2-eq per capita. A substantial share of the population in these \\nlow-emitting countries lack access to modern energy services. ( high confidence )\\n{WGIII SPM B.3, WGIII SPM B3.1, WGIII SPM B.3.2, WGIII SPM B.3.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'Net GHG emissions have increased since 2010 across all major \\nsectors ( high confidence ). In 2019, approximately 34% (20 GtCO 2-eq) \\nof net global GHG emissions came from the energy sector, 24% \\n(14 GtCO 2-eq) from industry, 22% (13 GtCO 2-eq) from AFOLU, 15% \\n(8.7 GtCO 2-eq) from transport and 6% (3.3 GtCO 2-eq) from buildings71 \\n(high confidence ). Average annual GHG emissions growth between'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': '69 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different GHGs in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO 2-equivalents (CO 2-eq) using \\nthe Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of \\nmetric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate \\nsystem and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {WGI SPM D.1.8, WGI 7.6; WGIII SPM B.1, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 2.2 } (Annex I: Glossary )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': '70 Territorial emissions\\n71 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {WGIII SPM footnote 8 }\\n72 Comprising a gross sink of -12.5 (±3.2) GtCO 2 yr-1 resulting from responses of all land to both anthropogenic environmental change and natural climate variability, and \\nnet anthropogenic CO 2-LULUCF emissions +5.9 (±4.1) GtCO 2 yr-1 based on book-keeping models. {WGIII SPM Footnote 14 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': '73 This estimate is based on consumption-based accounting, including both direct emissions from within urban areas, and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to \\nthe production of electricity, goods and services consumed in cities. These estimates include all CO 2 and CH 4 emission categories except for aviation and marine bunker fuels, \\nland-use change, forestry and agriculture. {WGIII SPM footnote 15 }2010 and 2019 slowed compared to the previous decade in energy'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'supply (from 2.3% to 1.0%) and industry (from 3.4% to 1.4%) but \\nremained roughly constant at about 2% yr–1 in the transport sector \\n(high confidence ). About half of total net AFOLU emissions are from \\nCO 2 LULUCF , predominantly from deforestation ( medium confidence ). \\nLand overall constituted a net sink of –6.6 (±4.6) GtCO 2 yr–1 for the period \\n2010–201972 (medium confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.2, WGIII SPM B.2.1, \\nWGIII SPM B.2.2, WGIII TS 5.6.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'Human-caused climate change is a consequence of more than \\na century of net GHG emissions from energy use, land-use and \\nland use change, lifestyle and patterns of consumption, and \\nproduction. Emissions reductions in CO 2 from fossil fuels and industrial \\nprocesses (CO 2-FFI), due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP \\nand carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases \\nfrom rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'agriculture and buildings. The 10% of households with the highest per \\ncapita emissions contribute 34– 45% of global consumption-based \\nhousehold GHG emissions, while the middle 40% contribute 40–53%, \\nand the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. An increasing share of \\nemissions can be attributed to urban areas (a rise from about 62% \\nto 67–72% of the global share between 2015 and 2020). The drivers \\nof urban GHG emissions73 are complex and include population size,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 59,\n", " 'content': 'income, state of urbanisation and urban form. ( high confidence ) \\n{WGIII SPM B.2, WGIII SPM B.2.3, WGIII SPM B.3.4, WGIII SPM D.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': '45\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2KeyPopulation (millions)0 2000 4000 6000 800005101520\\nMiddle East \\nAfrica Eastern Asia\\nSouth-East Asia and Pacific Latin America and Caribbean\\nEurope\\nSouthern AsiaNorth America \\nAustralia, Japan and New Zealand \\nEastern Europe and West-Central Asia\\nAfrica\\nAustralia, Japan and New ZealandEastern Asia\\nEastern Europe and West-Central AsiaEurope\\nInternational \\nshipping and aviationLatin America and Caribbean\\nMiddle EastNorth America\\nSouth-East Asia and Pacific'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': 'Southern Asia\\n0200400600\\n5060\\n30\\n2010\\n04%16%\\n4%\\n2%8%12%11%10%\\n7%\\n2%23%CO 2 GHG\\nGHG2019 1990 1850Timeframes represented in these graphs\\nd) Regional indicators (2019) and regional production vs consumption accounting (2018)\\nProduction-based emissions (tCO 2FFI per person, based on 2018 data) 1.2 10 8.4 9.2 6.5 2.8 8.7 16 2.6 1.6'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': 'Consumption-based emissions (tCO 2FFI per person, based on 2018 data) 0.84 11 6.7 6.2 7.8 2.8 7.6 17 2.5 1.5Population (million persons, 2019) 1292 157 1471 291 620 646 252 366 674 1836\\nGHG per capita (tCO 2-eq per person) 3.9 13 11 13 7.8 9.2 13 19 7.9 2.6GDP per capita (USD1000PPP 2017 per person) 1 5.0 43 17 20 43 15 20 61 12 6.2\\nNet GHG 2019 2 (production basis)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2FFI, 2018, per personGHG emissions intensity (tCO 2-eq / USD1000PPP 2017) 0.78 0.30 0.62 0.64 0.18 0.61 0.64 0.31 0.65 0.42Africa Australia, \\nJapan, New ZealandEastern AsiaEastern Europe, West-Central AsiaEurope Latin America and CaribbeanMiddle EastNorth AmericaSouth-East Asia and Paci/f_icSouthern Asia\\n1 GDP per capita in 2019 in USD2017 currency purchasing power basis.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': '2 Includes CO 2FFI, CO 2LULUCF and Other GHGs, excluding international aviation and shipping.The regional groupings used in this figure are for statistical \\npurposes only and are described in WGIII Annex II, Part I.c) Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (1990–2019)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': '2000 1990 2010 2019Eastern AsiaNorth AmericaLatin America and CaribbeanSouth-East Asia and PacificAfricaSouthern AsiaEuropeEastern Europe and West-Central AsiaMiddle EastAustralia, Japan and New ZealandInternational shipping and aviation\\n13%18%10%7%7%7%16%14%3%5%2%\\n16%19%11%7%8%8%2%\\n5%\\n8%4%\\n13%\\n27% 24%12%14%10%\\n11%9%7%9%\\n8%8%\\n8%2%2%\\n7%5%4%5%3%\\n6%\\n10%8%Total:\\n38 GtCO 2-eq42 GtCO 2-eq53 GtCO 2-eq59 GtCO 2-eqEmissions have grown in most regions but are distributed unevenly,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 60,\n", " 'content': 'both in the present day and cumulatively since 1850\\nb) Net anthropogenic GHG emissions per capita \\nand for total population, per region (2019)a) Historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO\\n2 emissions per region (1850–2019)\\nGHG emissions (tCO 2-eq per capita) /CO 2 emissions (GtCO 2)\\nNet CO 2 from land use, land use change, forestry (CO 2LULUCF)\\nOther GHG emissions\\nFossil fuel and industry (CO 2FFI)\\nAll GHG emissions\\nGHG emissions per year (GtCO 2-eq/yr)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': '46\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Figure 2.2: Regional GHG emissions, and the regional proportion of total cumulative production-based CO 2 emissions from 1850 to 2019. Panel (a) shows the \\nshare of historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO 2 emissions per region from 1850 to 2019 in GtCO 2. This includes CO 2-FFI and CO 2-LULUCF . Other GHG emissions are not included.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2-LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of ±70% (90% confidence interval). Panel (b) shows the distribution of regional \\nGHG emissions in tonnes CO 2-eq per capita by region in 2019. GHG emissions are categorised into: CO 2-FFI; net CO 2-LULUCF; and other GHG emissions (CH 4, N2O, fluorinated gases,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'expressed in CO 2-eq using GWP100-AR6). The height of each rectangle shows per capita emissions, the width shows the population of the region, so that the area of the rectangles \\nrefers to the total emissions for each region. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. In the case of two regions, the area for CO 2-LULUCF is below the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'axis, indicating net CO 2 removals rather than emissions. Panel (c) shows global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (in GtCO 2-eq yr–1 (GWP100-AR6)) for the time period \\n1990–2019. Percentage values refer to the contribution of each region to total GHG emissions in each respective time period. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'higher CO 2-LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Regions are as grouped in Annex II of WGIII. Panel (d) shows population, gross domestic product \\n(GDP) per person, emission indicators by region in 2019 for total GHG per person, and total GHG emissions intensity, together with production-based and consumption-based CO 2-FFI data,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'which is assessed in this report up to 2018. Consumption-based emissions are emissions released to the atmosphere in order to generate the goods and services consumed by a \\ncertain entity (e.g., region). Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. {WGIII Figure SPM.2}\\n2.1.2. Observed Climate System Changes and Impacts to \\nDate\\nIt is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the \\natmosphere, ocean and land. Widespread and rapid changes in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred \\n(Table 2.1). The scale of recent changes across the climate system as \\na whole and the present state of many aspects of the climate system \\nare unprecedented over many centuries to many thousands of years. It \\nis very likely that GHG emissions were the main driver74 of tropospheric \\nwarming and extremely likely that human-caused stratospheric ozone \\ndepletion was the main driver of stratospheric cooling between 1979'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'and the mid-1990s. It is virtually certain that the global upper ocean \\n(0-700m) has warmed since the 1970s and extremely likely that \\nhuman influence is the main driver. Ocean warming accounted for \\n91% of the heating in the climate system, with land warming, ice loss \\nand atmospheric warming accounting for about 5%, 3% and 1%, \\nrespectively ( high confidence ). Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 \\n[0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1]mm yr-1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to \\n1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr-1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing \\nto 3.7 [3.2 to –4.2] mm yr-1 between 2006 and 2018 ( high confidence ). \\nHuman influence was very likely the main driver of these increases \\nsince at least 1971 (Figure 3.4). Human influence is very likely the main \\ndriver of the global retreat of glaciers since the 1990s and the decrease \\nin Arctic sea ice area between 1979–1988 and 2010–2019. Human'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'influence has also very likely contributed to decreased Northern Hemisphere \\nspring snow cover and surface melting of the Greenland ice sheet. It is \\nvirtually certain that human-caused CO 2 emissions are the main driver \\nof current global acidification of the surface open ocean. { WGI SPM A.1, \\nWGI SPM A.1.3, WGI SPM A.1.5, WGI SPM A.1.6, WG1 SPM A1.7, \\nWGI SPM A.2, WG1.SPM A.4.2; SROCC SPM.A.1, SROCC SPM A.2 }\\nHuman-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'climate extremes in every region across the globe. Evidence of observed \\nchanges in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, \\nand tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human \\ninfluence, has strengthened since AR5 (Figure 2.3). It is virtually certain \\nthat hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and \\nmore intense across most land regions since the 1950s (Figure 2.3), while cold'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, \\nwith high confidence that human-caused climate change is the main \\ndriver of these changes. Marine heatwaves have approximately doubled \\n74 ‘Main driver’ means responsible for more than 50% of the change. {WGI SPM footnote 12 }\\n75 See Annex I: Glossary.in frequency since the 1980s ( high confidence ), and human influence \\nhas very likely contributed to most of them since at least 2006. The'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events have increased \\nsince the 1950s over most land areas for which observational data \\nare sufficient for trend analysis ( high confidence ), and human-caused \\nclimate change is likely the main driver (Figure 2.3). Human-caused \\nclimate change has contributed to increases in agricultural and ecological \\ndroughts in some regions due to increased land evapotranspiration \\n(medium confidence ) (Figure 2.3). It is likely that the global proportion'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'of major (Category 3–5) tropical cyclone occurrence has increased over \\nthe last four decades. { WGI SPM A.3, WGI SPM A3.1, WGI SPM A3.2; \\nWGI SPM A3.4; SRCCL SPM.A.2.2; SROCC SPM. A.2 }\\nClimate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly \\nirreversible75 losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric and \\ncoastal and open ocean ecosystems (high confidence ). The extent \\nand magnitude of climate change impacts are larger than estimated'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'in previous assessments ( high confidence ). Approximately half of the \\nspecies assessed globally have shifted polewards or, on land, also to \\nhigher elevations (very high confidence ). Biological responses including \\nchanges in geographic placement and shifting seasonal timing are often \\nnot sufficient to cope with recent climate change (very high confidence ). \\nHundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'the magnitude of heat extremes ( high confidence ) and mass mortality \\nevents on land and in the ocean ( very high confidence ). Impacts on \\nsome ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts \\nof hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the \\nchanges in some mountain (medium confidence ) and Arctic ecosystems \\ndriven by permafrost thaw ( high confidence ). Impacts in ecosystems \\nfrom slow-onset processes such as ocean acidification, sea level rise'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'or regional decreases in precipitation have also been attributed to \\nhuman-caused climate change ( high confidence ). Climate change \\nhas contributed to desertification and exacerbated land degradation, \\nparticularly in low lying coastal areas, river deltas, drylands and in \\npermafrost areas ( high confidence ). Nearly 50% of coastal wetlands \\nhave been lost over the last 100 years, as a result of the combined \\neffects of localised human pressures, sea level rise, warming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 61,\n", " 'content': 'and extreme climate events ( high confidence ). {WGII SPM B.1.1, \\nWGII SPM B.1.2, WGII Figure SPM.2.A, WGII TS.B.1; SRCCL SPM A.1.5, \\nSRCCL SPM A.2, SRCCL SPM A.2.6, SRCCL Figure SPM.1; SROCC SPM A.6.1, \\nSROCC SPM, A.6.4, SROCC SPM A.7 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 62,\n", " 'content': '47\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2Table 2.1: Assessment of observed changes in large-scale indicators of mean climate across climate system components, and their attribution to human \\ninfluence. The colour coding indicates the assessed confidence in / likelihood76 of the observed change and the human contribution as a driver or main driver (specified in that case) \\nwhere available (see colour key). Otherwise, explanatory text is provided. {WGI Table TS.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 62,\n", " 'content': '76 Based on scientific understanding, key findings can be formulated as statements of fact or associated with an assessed level of confidence indicated using the IPCC calibrated language.likely range of human contribution \\n([0.8-1.3°C]) encompasses the very likely range of observed warming ([0.9-1.2°C])Observed change\\nassessment Human contribution\\nassessment \\nMain driver\\nMain driver 1979 - mid-1990s\\nSouthern Hemisphere\\nMain driver\\nMain driver\\nMain driver\\nLimited evidence & medium agreement'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 62,\n", " 'content': 'Main driver\\nMain driver\\nMain driver\\nMain driverChange in indicator\\nWarming of global mean surface air temperature since 1850-1900\\nWarming of the troposphere since 1979\\nCooling of the lower stratosphere since the mid-20th century\\nLarge-scale precipitation and upper troposphere humidity changes since 1979\\nExpansion of the zonal mean Hadley Circulation since the 1980s\\nOcean heat content increase since the 1970s\\nSalinity changes since the mid-20th century\\nGlobal mean sea level rise since 1970'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 62,\n", " 'content': 'Arctic sea ice loss since 1979\\nReduction in Northern Hemisphere springtime snow cover since 1950\\nGreenland ice sheet mass loss since 1990s\\nAntarctic ice sheet mass loss since 1990s\\nRetreat of glaciers\\nIncreased amplitude of the seasonal cycle of\\natmospheric CO 2 since the early 1960s\\nAcidification of the global surface ocean\\nMean surface air temperature over land\\n(about 40% larger than global mean warming)\\nWarming of the global climate system since preindustrial times\\nmedium'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 62,\n", " 'content': 'medium\\nconfidencelikely / high\\nconfidencevery likely extremely\\nlikelyvirtually\\ncertainfactAtmosphere \\nand water cycle\\nOcean\\nCryosphere\\nCarbon cycle\\nLand climate\\nSynthesis\\nKey'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': '48\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Climate change has impacted human and natural systems across the \\nworld with those who have generally least contributed to climate \\nchange being most vulnerable\\na) Synthesis of assessment of observed change in hot extremes, heavy precipitation and \\ndrought, and confidence in human contribution to the observed changes in the world’s regions \\nIncrease\\nDecreaseLimited data and/or literatureLow agreement in the type of changeKey\\nType of observed change since the 1950s'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'High\\nMedium\\nLow due to limited agreement\\nLow due to limited evidenceConfidence in human contribution \\nto the observed change\\nNWNEach hexagon corresponds to a region\\nNorth-WesternNorth America\\nIPCC AR6 WGI reference regions: \\nNorth America: NWN (North-Western North'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'America, NEN (North-Eastern North America), WNA (Western North America), CNA (Central North America), ENA (Eastern North America), Central America: NCA (Northern Central America), SCA (Southern Central America), CAR (Caribbean), South America: NWS (North-Western South America), NSA (Northern South America), NES (North-Eastern South America), SAM (South American Monsoon), SWS (South-Western South America), SES (South-Eastern South America), SSA (Southern South America), Europe: GIC'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'Europe: GIC (Greenland/Iceland), NEU (Northern Europe), WCE (Western and Central Europe), EEU (Eastern Europe), MED (Mediterranean), Africa: MED (Mediterranean), SAH (Sahara), WAF (Western Africa), CAF (Central Africa), NEAF (North Eastern Africa), SEAF (South Eastern Africa), WSAF (West Southern Africa), ESAF (East Southern Africa), MDG (Madagascar), Asia: RAR (Russian Arctic), WSB (West Siberia), ESB (East Siberia), RFE (Russian Far East), WCA (West Central Asia), ECA (East Central Asia), TIB'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'Central Asia), TIB (Tibetan Plateau), EAS (East Asia), ARP (Arabian Peninsula), SAS (South Asia), SEA (South East Asia), Australasia: NAU (Northern Australia), CAU (Central Australia), EAU (Eastern Australia), SAU (Southern Australia), NZ (New Zealand), Small Islands: CAR (Caribbean), PAC (Pacific Small Islands)NWN NENGICNEU RAR'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'WNA CNA ENA WCE EEU WSB ESB RFE\\nNCA MED WCA ECA TIB EAS\\nSCA CAR SAH ARP SAS SEA\\nNWS NSA WAF CAF NEAF\\nNAU\\nSAM NES WSAF SEAF\\nCAU EAU\\nSWS SES ESAF\\nSAUNZ\\nSSAMDGPAC\\nAfricaAsia\\nAustralasiaNorth\\nAmerica\\nCentralAmerica\\nSouthAmericaEurope\\nSmallIslands\\nSmallIslandsNWN NENGICNEU RAR\\nWNA CNA ENA WCE EEU WSB ESB RFE\\nNCA MED WCA ECA TIB EAS\\nSCA CAR SAH ARP SAS SEA\\nNWS NSA WAF CAF NEAF\\nNAU\\nSAM NES WSAF SEAF\\nCAU EAU\\nSWS SES ESAF\\nSAUNZ\\nSSAMDGPAC\\nAfricaAsia\\nAustralasiaNorthAmerica\\nCentralAmerica'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 63,\n", " 'content': 'CentralAmerica\\nSouthAmericaEurope\\nSmallIslands\\nSmallIslands\\nNWN NENGICNEU RAR\\nWNA CNA ENA WCE EEU WSB ESB RFE\\nNCA MED WCA ECA TIB EAS\\nSCA CAR SAH ARP SAS SEA\\nNWS NSA WAF CAF NEAF\\nNAU\\nSAM NES WSAF SEAF\\nCAU EAU\\nSWS SES ESAF\\nSAUNZ\\nSSAMDGPAC\\nAfricaAsia\\nAustralasiaNorthAmerica\\nCentralAmerica\\nSouthAmericaEurope\\nSmallIslands\\nSmallIslandsHot extremes\\nHeavy precipitation\\nAgricultural and ecological drought including heatwaves Hazard Dimension of Risk:'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 64,\n", " 'content': '49\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2Terrestrial\\nFreshwater\\nOceanChanges in \\necosystem structure\\nTerrestrial\\nFreshwater\\nOceanSpecies range shifts\\nTerrestrial\\nFreshwater\\nOceanChanges in seasonal timing (phenology)Water availability and food production\\nHealth and wellbeing\\nCities, settlements and infrastructure\\nAsiaAfricaGlobal\\nAustralasia\\nEuropeCentral & \\nSouth America\\nNorth America\\nSmall Islands\\nPhysical water availability\\nAgriculture/crop production'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 64,\n", " 'content': 'Fisheries yields and aquaculture productionAnimal and livestockhealth and productivity\\nInfectious diseases\\nDisplacementMental healthHeat, malnutrition and harm from wildfire\\nInland flooding andassociated damages\\nFlood/storm induceddamages in coastal areas\\nDamages to key economic sectorsDamages to infrastructurec) Observed impacts and related losses'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 64,\n", " 'content': 'and damages of climate change2019 emissions per capita of 180 nations in tons of CO 2b) Vulnerability of population & per capita emissions per country in 2019\\nmore vulnerable \\ncountries generally have lower emissions per capita\\nIncreased climate impacts \\nHUMAN SYSTEMS \\nECOSYSTEMS Adverse impacts\\nAdverse and positive impacts\\nClimate-driven changes observed, \\nno assessment of impact direction/1020\\n030405060708090100\\n10 0 30 20 40 70 80high\\nlow\\nECOSYSTEMS HUMAN SYSTEMSKey'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 64,\n", " 'content': 'Confidence in attributionto climate change\\nHigh or very high\\nMediumLow\\nEvidence limited, insufficientNot assessedVulnerabilityDimension \\nof Risk:\\nImpactDimension of Risk:Vulnerability assessed on national data. \\nVulnerability differs between and within countries and is exacerbated by inequity and marginalisation. Relative average national \\nvulnerability per capita by global indices INFORM and WRI (2019)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': '50\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Climate change has reduced food security and affected water \\nsecurity due to warming, changing precipitation patterns, \\nreduction and loss of cryospheric elements, and greater frequency \\nand intensity of climatic extremes, thereby hindering efforts to \\nmeet Sustainable Development Goals ( high confidence ). Although \\noverall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed \\nthis growth in agricultural productivity over the past 50 years globally'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': '(medium confidence ), with related negative crop yield impacts mainly \\nrecorded in mid- and low latitude regions, and some positive impacts \\nin some high latitude regions (high confidence ). Ocean warming in \\nthe 20th century and beyond has contributed to an overall decrease \\nin maximum catch potential ( medium confidence ), compounding the \\nimpacts from overfishing for some fish stocks ( high confidence ). Ocean \\nwarming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'from shellfish aquaculture and fisheries in some oceanic regions (high \\nconfidence ). Current levels of global warming are associated with \\nmoderate risks from increased dryland water scarcity ( high confidence ). \\nRoughly half of the world’s population currently experiences severe water \\nscarcity for at least some part of the year due to a combination of climatic \\nand non-climatic drivers ( medium confidence ) (Figure 2.3). Unsustainable'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'agricultural expansion, driven in part by unbalanced diets77, increases \\necosystem and human vulnerability and leads to competition for land \\nand/or water resources ( high confidence ). Increasing weather and climate \\nextreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity78 \\nand reduced water security, with the largest impacts observed in many \\nlocations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and for small-scale food producers, \\nlow-income households and Indigenous Peoples globally ( high confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM B.1.3, WGII SPM.B.2.3, WGII Figure SPM.2, WGII TS B.2.3, \\nWGII TS Figure TS. 6; SRCCL SPM A.2.8, SRCCL SPM A.5.3; SROCC SPM A.5.4., \\nSROCC SPM A.7.1, SROCC SPM A.8.1, SROCC Figure SPM.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': '77 Balanced diets feature plant-based foods, such as those based on coarse grains, legumes fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal- source foods produced in resilient, \\nsustainable and low-GHG emissions systems, as described in SRCCL. {WGII SPM Footnote 32 }\\n78 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {WGII SPM, footnote 30 }\\n79 Slow-onset events are described among the climatic-impact drivers of the AR6 WGI and refer to the risks and impacts associated with e.g., increasing temperature means, \\ndesertification, decreasing precipitation, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean acidification, sea level rise and salinization.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': '{WGII SPM footnote 29 }In urban settings, climate change has caused adverse impacts on \\nhuman health, livelihoods and key infrastructure ( high confidence ). \\nHot extremes including heatwaves have intensified in cities ( high \\nconfidence ), where they have also worsened air pollution events \\n(medium confidence ) and limited functioning of key infrastructure \\n(high confidence ). Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme \\nand slow-onset events79, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of \\nservices and impacts to well- being (high confidence ). Observed impacts \\nare concentrated amongst economically and socially marginalised urban \\nresidents, e.g., those living in informal settlements (high confidence ). \\nCities intensify human-caused warming locally ( very high confidence ),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'while urbanisation also increases mean and heavy precipitation over and/or \\ndownwind of cities ( medium confidence ) and resulting runoff intensity \\n(high confidence ). {WGI SPM C.2.6; WGII SPM B.1.5, WGII Figure TS.9, \\nWGII 6 ES }\\nClimate change has adversely affected human physical health globally \\nand mental health in assessed regions (very high confidence ), and is \\ncontributing to humanitarian crises where climate hazards interact'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'with high vulnerability (high confidence ). In all regions increases in \\nextreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity \\n(very high confidence ). The occurrence of climate-related food- borne and \\nwater-borne diseases has increased ( very high confidence ). The incidence \\nof vector-borne diseases has increased from range expansion and/or \\nincreased reproduction of disease vectors ( high confidence ). Animal and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'human diseases, including zoonoses, are emerging in new areas ( high \\nconfidence ). In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are \\nassociated with increasing temperatures ( high confidence ), trauma from \\nextreme events ( very high confidence ), and loss of livelihoods and culture Figure 2.3: Both vulnerability to current climate extremes and historical contribution to climate change are highly heterogeneous with many of those who have'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'least contributed to climate change to date being most vulnerable to its impacts. Panel (a) The IPCC AR6 WGI inhabited regions are displayed as hexagons with identical size \\nin their approximate geographical location (see legend for regional acronyms). All assessments are made for each region as a whole and for the 1950s to the present. Assessments made'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'on different time scales or more local spatial scales might differ from what is shown in the figure. The colours in each panel represent the four outcomes of the assessment on observed \\nchanges. Striped hexagons (white and light-grey) are used where there is low agreement in the type of change for the region as a whole, and grey hexagons are used when there is limited'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'data and/or literature that prevents an assessment of the region as a whole. Other colours indicate at least medium confidence in the observed change. The confidence level for the human \\ninfluence on these observed changes is based on assessing trend detection and attribution and event attribution literature, and it is indicated by the number of dots: three dots for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'high confidence , two dots for medium confidence and one dot for low confidence (single, filled dot: limited agreemen t; single, empty dot: limited evidence ). For hot extremes, the evidence \\nis mostly drawn from changes in metrics based on daily maximum temperatures; regional studies using other indices (heatwave duration, frequency and intensity) are used in addition. For'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'heavy precipitation, the evidence is mostly drawn from changes in indices based on one-day or five-day precipitation amounts using global and regional studies. Agricultural and \\necological droughts are assessed based on observed and simulated changes in total column soil moisture, complemented by evidence on changes in surface soil moisture, water'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'balance ( precipitation minus evapotranspiration) and indices driven by precipitation and atmospheric evaporative demand. Panel (b) shows the average level of vulnerability amongst a \\ncountry’s population against 2019 CO 2-FFI emissions per- capita per country for the 180 countries for which both sets of metrics are available. Vulnerability information is based on two'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'global indicator systems, namely INFORM and World Risk Index. Countries with a relatively low average vulnerability often have groups with high vulnerability within their population and \\nvice versa. The underlying data includes, for example, information on poverty, inequality, health care infrastructure or insurance coverage. Panel (c) Observed impacts on ecosystems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'and human systems attributed to climate change at global and regional scales. Global assessments focus on large studies, multi-species, meta-analyses and large reviews. Regional \\nassessments consider evidence on impacts across an entire region and do not focus on any country in particular. For human systems, the direction of impacts is assessed and both'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'adverse and positive impacts have been observed e.g., adverse impacts in one area or food item may occur with positive impacts in another area or food item (for more details and \\nmethodology see WGII SMTS.1). Physical water availability includes balance of water available from various sources including ground water, water quality and demand for water.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 65,\n", " 'content': 'Global mental health and displacement assessments reflect only assessed regions. Confidence levels reflect the assessment of attribution of the observed impact to climate change. \\n{WGI Figure SPM.3, Table TS.5, Interactive Atlas; WGII Figure SPM.2, WGII SMTS.1, WGII 8.3.1, Figure 8.5; ; WGIII 2.2.3}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': '51\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2(high confidence ) (Figure 2.3). Climate change impacts on health are \\nmediated through natural and human systems, including economic \\nand social conditions and disruptions (high confidence ). Climate and \\nweather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, \\nAsia, North America ( high confidence ), and Central and South America \\n(medium confidence ) (Figure 2.3), with small island states in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative \\nto their small population size ( high confidence ). Through displacement \\nand involuntary migration from extreme weather and climate \\nevents, climate change has generated and perpetuated vulnerability \\n(medium confidence ). {WGII SPM B.1.4, WGII SPM B.1.7 }\\nHuman influence has likely increased the chance of compound \\nextreme events80 since the 1950s. Concurrent and repeated climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'hazards have occurred in all regions, increasing impacts and \\nrisks to health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods and food \\n(high confidence ). Compound extreme events include increases in the \\nfrequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts ( high confidence ); fire \\nweather in some regions (medium confidence ); and compound flooding in \\nsome locations ( medium confidence ). Multiple risks interact, generating \\nnew sources of vulnerability to climate hazards, and compounding'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'overall risk ( high confidence ). Compound climate hazards can overwhelm \\nadaptive capacity and substantially increase damage ( high confidence )). \\n{WGI SPM A.3.5; WGII SPM. B.5.1, WGII TS.C.11.3 }\\nEconomic impacts attributable to climate change are increasingly \\naffecting peoples’ livelihoods and are causing economic and \\nsocietal impacts across national boundaries ( high confidence ). \\nEconomic damages from climate change have been detected in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'climate-exposed sectors, with regional effects to agriculture, forestry, \\nfishery, energy, and tourism, and through outdoor labour productivity \\n(high confidence ) with some exceptions of positive impacts in regions \\nwith low energy demand and comparative advantages in agricultural \\nmarkets and tourism (high confidence ). Individual livelihoods have been \\naffected through changes in agricultural productivity, impacts on human'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'health and food security, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss \\nof property and income, with adverse effects on gender and social equity \\n(high confidence ). Tropical cyclones have reduced economic growth in \\nthe short-term (high confidence ). Event attribution studies and physical \\nunderstanding indicate that human-caused climate change increases \\nheavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones ( high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'Wildfires in many regions have affected built assets, economic activity, \\nand health ( medium to high confidence ). In cities and settlements, climate \\nimpacts to key infrastructure are leading to losses and damages across water \\nand food systems, and affect economic activity, with impacts extending \\nbeyond the area directly impacted by the climate hazard (high confidence ). \\n{WGI SPM A.3.4; WGII SPM B.1.6, WGII SPM B.5.2, WGII SPM B.5.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts \\nand related losses and damages to nature and people ( high \\nconfidence ). Losses and damages are unequally distributed across \\nsystems, regions and sectors ( high confidence ). Cultural losses, related \\n80 See Annex 1: Glossary. \\n81 Governance: The structures, processes and actions through which private and public actors interact to address societal goals. This includes formal and informal institutions and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'the associated norms, rules, laws and procedures for deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring policies and measures at any geographic or political scale, from global \\nto local. {WGII SPM Footnote 31 }to tangible and intangible heritage, threaten adaptive capacity and may \\nresult in irrevocable losses of sense of belonging, valued cultural practices, \\nidentity and home, particularly for Indigenous Peoples and those more'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'directly reliant on the environment for subsistence (medium confidence ). \\nFor example, changes in snow cover, lake and river ice, and permafrost \\nin many Arctic regions, are harming the livelihoods and cultural identity \\nof Arctic residents including Indigenous populations ( high confidence ). \\nInfrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy \\nsystems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and impacts \\nto well-being (high confidence ). {WGII SPM B.1, WGII SPM B.1.2, \\nWGII SPM.B.1.5, WGII SPM C.3.5, WGII TS.B.1.6; SROCC SPM A.7.1 }\\nAcross sectors and regions, the most vulnerable people and \\nsystems have been disproportionately affected by the impacts \\nof climate change (high confidence ). LDCs and SIDS who have much \\nlower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO 2-eq, 4.6 tCO 2-eq, respectively) than'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'the global average (6.9 tCO 2-eq) excluding CO 2-LULUCF , also have high \\nvulnerability to climatic hazards, with global hotspots of high human \\nvulnerability observed in West-, Central- and East Africa, South Asia, \\nCentral and South America, SIDS and the Arctic ( high confidence ). \\nRegions and people with considerable development constraints have \\nhigh vulnerability to climatic hazards ( high confidence ). Vulnerability is \\nhigher in locations with poverty, governance challenges and limited'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'access to basic services and resources, violent conflict and high levels \\nof climate-sensitive livelihoods (e.g., smallholder farmers, pastoralists, \\nfishing communities) ( high confidence ). Vulnerability at different spatial \\nlevels is exacerbated by inequity and marginalisation linked to gender, \\nethnicity, low income or combinations thereof ( high confidence ), especially \\nfor many Indigenous Peoples and local communities ( high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly \\nvulnerable to climate change ( high confidence ). Between 2010 and \\n2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times \\nhigher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low \\nvulnerability ( high confidence ). In the Arctic and in some high mountain \\nregions, negative impacts of cryosphere change have been especially felt'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'among Indigenous Peoples ( high confidence ). Human and ecosystem \\nvulnerability are interdependent ( high confidence ). Vulnerability of \\necosystems and people to climate change differs substantially among and \\nwithin regions (very high confidence ), driven by patterns of intersecting \\nsocio-economic development, unsustainable ocean and land use, \\ninequity, marginalisation, historical and ongoing patterns of inequity \\nsuch as colonialism, and governance81 (high confidence ). {WGII SPM B.1,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 66,\n", " 'content': 'WGII SPM B.2, WGII SPM B.2.4; WGIII SPM B.3.1; SROCC SPM A.7.1, \\nSROCC SPM A.7.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': '52\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2International climate agreements, rising national ambitions for climate action, along with rising public awareness \\nare accelerating efforts to address climate change at multiple levels of governance. Mitigation policies have \\ncontributed to a decrease in global energy and carbon intensity, with several countries achieving GHG emission \\nreductions for over a decade. Low-emission technologies are becoming more affordable, with many low or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'zero emissions options now available for energy, buildings, transport, and industry. Adaptation planning and \\nimplementation progress has generated multiple benefits, with effective adaptation options having the potential \\nto reduce climate risks and contribute to sustainable development. Global tracked finance for mitigation and \\nadaptation has seen an upward trend since AR5, but falls short of needs. ( high confidence )\\n2.2.1. Global Policy Setting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC), \\nKyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement are supporting rising levels of \\nnational ambition and encouraging the development and implementation \\nof climate policies at multiple levels of governance ( high confidence ). \\nThe Kyoto Protocol led to reduced emissions in some countries and \\nwas instrumental in building national and international capacity \\nfor GHG reporting, accounting and emissions markets ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). The Paris Agreement, adopted under the UNFCCC, with \\nnear universal participation, has led to policy development and \\ntarget-setting at national and sub- national levels, particularly in \\nrelation to mitigation but also for adaptation, as well as enhanced \\ntransparency of climate action and support ( medium confidence ). \\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), required under \\nthe Paris Agreement, have required countries to articulate their'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'priorities and ambition with respect to climate action. {WGII 17.4, \\nWGII TS D.1.1; WGIII SPM B.5.1, WGIII SPM E.6 }\\nLoss & Damage82 was formally recognized in 2013 through establishment \\nof the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM), \\nand in 2015, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement provided a legal basis \\nfor the WIM. There is improved understanding of both economic and \\nnon-economic losses and damages, which is informing international'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'climate policy and which has highlighted that losses and damages are \\nnot comprehensively addressed by current financial, governance and \\ninstitutional arrangements, particularly in vulnerable developing countries \\n(high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.3.5, WGII Cross-Chapter Box LOSS }\\nOther recent global agreements that influence responses to climate \\nchange include the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction \\n(2015-2030), the finance-oriented Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'and the New Urban Agenda (2016), and the Kigali Amendment to \\nthe Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer \\n(2016), among others. In addition, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable \\nDevelopment, adopted in 2015 by UN member states, sets out 17 \\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and seeks to align efforts \\nglobally to prioritise ending extreme poverty, protect the planet and \\npromote more peaceful, prosperous and inclusive societies. If achieved,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'these agreements would reduce climate change, and the impacts on \\nhealth, well-being, migration, and conflict, among others ( very high \\nconfidence ). {WGII TS.A.1, WGII 7 ES } \\nSince AR5, rising public awareness and an increasing diversity \\nof actors, have overall helped accelerate political commitment \\nand global efforts to address climate change (medium \\n82 See Annex I: Glossary.confidence ). Mass social movements have emerged as catalysing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'agents in some regions, often building on prior movements including \\nIndigenous Peoples-led movements, youth movements, human \\nrights movements, gender activism, and climate litigation, which is \\nraising awareness and, in some cases, has influenced the outcome \\nand ambition of climate governance (medium confidence ). Engaging \\nIndigenous Peoples and local communities using just- transition and \\nrights-based decision-making approaches, implemented through'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'collective and participatory decision-making processes has enabled \\ndeeper ambition and accelerated action in different ways, and at all \\nscales, depending on national circumstances ( medium confidence ). \\nThe media helps shape the public discourse about climate change. This \\ncan usefully build public support to accelerate climate action ( medium \\nevidence, high agreement ). In some instances, public discourses of \\nmedia and organised counter movements have impeded climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'action, exacerbating helplessness and disinformation and fuelling \\npolarisation, with negative implications for climate action ( medium \\nconfidence ). {WGII SPM C.5.1, WGII SPM D.2, WGII TS.D.9, WGII TS.D.9.7, \\nWGII TS.E.2.1, WGII 18.4; WGIII SPM D.3.3, WGIII SPM E.3.3, WGIII TS.6.1, \\nWGIII 6.7, WGIII 13 ES, WGIII Box.13.7 }\\n2.2.2. Mitigation Actions to Date\\nThere has been a consistent expansion of policies and laws \\naddressing mitigation since AR5 (high confidence ). Climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'governance supports mitigation by providing frameworks through \\nwhich diverse actors interact, and a basis for policy development and \\nimplementation ( medium confidence ). Many regulatory and economic \\ninstruments have already been deployed successfully ( high confidence ). \\nBy 2020, laws primarily focussed on reducing GHG emissions existed in \\n56 countries covering 53% of global emissions ( medium confidence ). \\nThe application of diverse policy instruments for mitigation at the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'national and sub- national levels has grown consistently across a \\nrange of sectors (high confidence ). Policy coverage is uneven across \\nsectors and remains limited for emissions from agriculture, and from \\nindustrial materials and feedstocks ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.5, \\nWGIII SPM B.5.2, WGIII SPM E.3, WGIII SPM E.4 }\\nPractical experience has informed economic instrument design \\nand helped to improve predictability, environmental effectiveness,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 67,\n", " 'content': 'economic efficiency, alignment with distributional goals, and social \\nacceptance ( high confidence ). Low-emission technological innovation \\nis strengthened through the combination of technology-push policies, \\ntogether with policies that create incentives for behaviour change and \\nmarket opportunities (high confidence ) (Section 4.8.3). Comprehensive \\nand consistent policy packages have been found to be more effective 2.2 Responses Undertaken to Date'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': '53\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2than single policies ( high confidence ). Combining mitigation with \\npolicies to shift development pathways , policies that induce lifestyle or \\nbehaviour changes, for example, measures promoting walkable urban \\nareas combined with electrification and renewable energy can create \\nhealth co-benefits from cleaner air and enhanced active mobility ( high \\nconfidence ). Climate governance enables mitigation by providing an'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'overall direction, setting targets, mainstreaming climate action across \\npolicy domains and levels, based on national circumstances and in the \\ncontext of international cooperation. Effective governance enhances \\nregulatory certainty, creating specialised organisations and creating the \\ncontext to mobilise finance (medium confidence ). These functions can \\nbe promoted by climate-relevant laws, which are growing in number, or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'climate strategies, among others, based on national and sub- national \\ncontext (medium confidence ). Effective and equitable climate \\ngovernance builds on engagement with civil society actors, political \\nactors, businesses, youth, labour, media, Indigenous Peoples and local \\ncommunities ( medium confidence ). {WGIII SPM E.2.2, WGIII SPM E.3, \\nWGIII SPM E.3.1, WGIII SPM E.4.2, WGIII SPM E.4.3, WGIII SPM E.4.4 }\\nThe unit costs of several low-emission technologies, including'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries, have fallen consistently \\nsince 2010 (Figure 2.4). Design and process innovations in \\ncombination with the use of digital technologies have led to \\nnear-commercial availability of many low or zero emissions \\noptions in buildings, transport and industry. From 2010-2019, \\nthere have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy \\n(by 85%), wind energy (by 55%), and lithium-ion batteries (by 85%),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'and large increases in their deployment, e.g., >10× for solar and >100× for \\nelectric vehicles (EVs), albeit varying widely across regions (Figure 2.4). \\nElectricity from PV and wind is now cheaper than electricity from \\nfossil sources in many regions, electric vehicles are increasingly \\ncompetitive with internal combustion engines, and large-scale \\nbattery storage on electricity grids is increasingly viable. In \\ncomparison to modular small-unit size technologies, the empirical'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'record shows that multiple large-scale mitigation technologies, with \\nfewer opportunities for learning, have seen minimal cost reductions \\nand their adoption has grown slowly. Maintaining emission-intensive \\nsystems may, in some regions and sectors, be more expensive than \\ntransitioning to low emission systems. ( high confidence ) {WGIII SPM B.4, \\nWGIII SPM B.4.1, WGIII SPM C.4.2, WGIII SPM C.5.2, WGIII SPM C.7.2, \\nWGIII SPM C.8, WGIII Figure SPM.3, WGIII Figure SPM.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'For almost all basic materials – primary metals, building materials and \\nchemicals – many low- to zero-GHG intensity production processes are \\nat the pilot to near-commercial and in some cases commercial stage \\nbut they are not yet established industrial practice. Integrated design \\nin construction and retrofit of buildings has led to increasing examples \\nof zero energy or zero carbon buildings. Technological innovation \\nmade possible the widespread adoption of LED lighting. Digital'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'technologies including sensors, the internet of things, robotics, and \\nartificial intelligence can improve energy management in all sectors; \\nthey can increase energy efficiency, and promote the adoption of many \\nlow-emission technologies, including decentralised renewable energy, \\nwhile creating economic opportunities. However, some of these climate \\nchange mitigation gains can be reduced or counterbalanced by growth in \\ndemand for goods and services due to the use of digital devices. Several'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'mitigation options, notably solar energy, wind energy, electrification of \\nurban systems, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand \\nside management, improved forest- and crop/grassland management, \\nand reduced food waste and loss, are technically viable, are becoming increasingly cost effective and are generally supported by the public, and \\nthis enables expanded deployment in many regions. (high confidence ) \\n{WGIII SPM B.4.3, WGIII SPM C.5.2, WGIII SPM C.7.2, WGIII SPM E.1.1,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII TS.6.5 }\\nThe magnitude of global climate finance flows has increased \\nand financing channels have broadened ( high confidence ). \\nAnnual tracked total financial flows for climate mitigation and \\nadaptation increased by up to 60% between 2013/14 and 2019/20, \\nbut average growth has slowed since 2018 ( medium confidence ) and \\nmost climate finance stays within national borders (high confidence ). \\nMarkets for green bonds, environmental, social and governance and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'sustainable finance products have expanded significantly since AR5 \\n(high confidence ). Investors, central banks, and financial regulators are \\ndriving increased awareness of climate risk to support climate policy \\ndevelopment and implementation ( high confidence ). Accelerated \\ninternational financial cooperation is a critical enabler of low-GHG and \\njust transitions ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.5.4, WGIII SPM E.5, \\nWGIII TS.6.3, WGIII TS.6.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'Economic instruments have been effective in reducing emissions, \\ncomplemented by regulatory instruments mainly at the national \\nand also sub- national and regional level ( high confidence ). By 2020, \\nover 20% of global GHG emissions were covered by carbon taxes or \\nemissions trading systems, although coverage and prices have been \\ninsufficient to achieve deep reductions ( medium confidence ). Equity and \\ndistributional impacts of carbon pricing instruments can be addressed'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'by using revenue from carbon taxes or emissions trading to support \\nlow-income households, among other approaches (high confidence ). \\nThe mix of policy instruments which reduced costs and stimulated \\nadoption of solar energy, wind energy and lithium-ion batteries \\nincludes public R&D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and \\ndemand-pull instruments such as deployment subsidies to attain scale \\n(high confidence ) (Figure 2.4). { WGIII SPM B.4.1, WGIII SPM B.5.2,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII SPM E.4.2, WG III TS.3 } \\nMitigation actions, supported by policies, have contributed \\nto a decrease in global energy and carbon intensity between \\n2010 and 2019, with a growing number of countries achieving \\nabsolute GHG emission reductions for more than a decade ( high \\nconfidence ). While global net GHG emissions have increased since \\n2010, global energy intensity (total primary energy per unit GDP) \\ndecreased by 2% yr–1 between 2010 and 2019. Global carbon'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'intensity ( CO 2-FFI per unit primary energy) also decreased by 0.3% \\nyr–1, mainly due to fuel switching from coal to gas, reduced expansion \\nof coal capacity, and increased use of renewables, and with large \\nregional variations over the same period. In many countries, policies \\nhave enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and \\naccelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some \\ncases reduced or removed emissions ( high confidence ). At least'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': '18 countries have sustained production-based CO 2 and GHG and \\nconsumption-based CO 2 absolute emission reductions for longer than \\n10 years since 2005 through energy supply decarbonization, energy \\nefficiency gains, and energy demand reduction, which resulted from \\nboth policies and changes in economic structure (high confidence ). \\nSome countries have reduced production-based GHG emissions by a \\nthird or more since peaking, and some have achieved reduction rates'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 68,\n", " 'content': 'of around 4% yr–1 for several years consecutively ( high confidence ). \\nMultiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to \\navoided global emissions of several Gt CO 2-eq yr–1 (medium confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': '54\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2\\nMarket cost, with range\\nAdoption (note different scales)Fossil fuel cost (2020)\\nPassenger \\nelectric vehicle Photovoltaics(PV) Onshorewind Offshorewind\\nKeya) Market Cost\\nb) Market AdoptionRenewable electricity generation \\nis increasingly price-competitive \\nand some sectors are electrifying\\nSince AR5, the unit costs of some \\nforms of renewable energy and of batteries for passenger EVs have fallen. \\nSince AR5, the installed capacity'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'of renewable energies has increased multiple times.\\n2000 2020 20102010 2010 2010 2010\\n2010 2010 2010 2010Cost ($2020/MWh)12001600Li-ion battery packs\\n800\\n400\\n0150300450600\\n0Cost ($2020/kWh)\\nAdoption (millions of EVs)\\n02468Adoption (GW) -note differnt scales\\n0200400600800\\n010203040\\nFossil fuel cost (2020)below this point, costs can be less than fossil fuels'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 2.4: Unit cost reductions and use in some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. The top panel (a) shows global costs per unit of energy (USD per MWh) \\nfor some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. Solid blue lines indicate average unit cost in each year. Light blue shaded areas show the range between the 5th and 95th'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'percentiles in each year. Yellow shading indicates the range of unit costs for new fossil fuel (coal and gas) power in 2020 (corresponding to USD 55 to 148 per MWh). \\nIn 2020, the levelised costs of energy (LCOE) of the three renewable energy technologies could compete with fossil fuels in many places. For batteries, costs shown are for 1 kWh'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'of battery storage capacity; for the others, costs are LCOE, which includes installation, capital, operations, and maintenance costs per MWh of electricity produced. The literature uses \\nLCOE because it allows consistent comparisons of cost trends across a diverse set of energy technologies to be made. However, it does not include the costs of grid integration'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'or climate impacts. Further, LCOE does not take into account other environmental and social externalities that may modify the overall (monetary and non-monetary) costs of \\ntechnologies and alter their deployment. The bottom panel (b) shows cumulative global adoption for each technology, in GW of installed capacity for renewable energy and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'in millions of vehicles for battery-electric vehicles. A vertical dashed line is placed in 2010 to indicate the change over the past decade. The electricity production share reflects \\ndifferent capacity factors; for example, for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV . Renewable energy and battery'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 69,\n", " 'content': 'technologies were selected as illustrative examples because they have recently shown rapid changes in costs and adoption, and because consistent data are available. Other \\nmitigation options assessed in the WGIII report are not included as they do not meet these criteria. {WGIII Figure SPM.3 , WGIII 2.5, 6.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '55\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2At least 1.8 GtCO 2-eq yr–1 of avoided emissions can be accounted for \\nby aggregating separate estimates for the effects of economic and \\nregulatory instruments ( medium confidence ). Growing numbers of \\nlaws and executive orders have impacted global emissions and are \\nestimated to have resulted in 5.9 GtCO 2-eq yr–1 of avoided emissions \\nin 2016 (medium confidence) . These reductions have only partly offset'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'global emissions growth ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.1, \\nWGIII SPM B.2.4, WGIII SPM B.3.5, WGIII SPM B.5.1, WGIII SPM B.5.3, \\nWGIII 1.3.2, WGIII 2.2.3 }\\n2.2.3. Adaptation Actions to Date\\nProgress in adaptation planning and implementation has been \\nobserved across all sectors and regions, generating multiple \\nbenefits ( very high confidence ). The ambition, scope and progress \\non adaptation have risen among governments at the local, national and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'international levels, along with businesses, communities and civil society \\n(high confidence ). Various tools, measures and processes are available \\nthat can enable, accelerate and sustain adaptation implementation \\n(high confidence ). Growing public and political awareness of climate \\nimpacts and risks has resulted in at least 170 countries and many cities \\nincluding adaptation in their climate policies and planning processes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). Decision support tools and climate services are \\nincreasingly being used (very high confidence ) and pilot projects and \\nlocal experiments are being implemented in different sectors ( high \\nconfidence ). {WGII SPM C.1, WGII SPM.C.1.1, WGII TS.D.1.3, WGII TS.D.10 }\\nAdaptation to water-related risks and impacts make up the majority (~60%) \\nof all documented83 adaptation (high confidence ). A large number of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'these adaptation responses are in the agriculture sector and these \\ninclude on-farm water management, water storage, soil moisture \\nconservation, and irrigation. Other adaptations in agriculture include \\ncultivar improvements, agroforestry, community-based adaptation and \\nfarm and landscape diversification among others ( high confidence ). \\nFor inland flooding, combinations of non-structural measures like \\nearly warning systems, enhancing natural water retention such as by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'restoring wetlands and rivers, and land use planning such as no build \\nzones or upstream forest management, can reduce flood risk (medium \\nconfidence ). Some land-related adaptation actions such as sustainable \\nfood production, improved and sustainable forest management, \\nsoil organic carbon management, ecosystem conservation and land \\nrestoration, reduced deforestation and degradation, and reduced \\nfood loss and waste are being undertaken, and can have mitigation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'co-benefits ( high confidence ). Adaptation actions that increase the \\nresilience of biodiversity and ecosystem services to climate change \\ninclude responses like minimising additional stresses or disturbances, \\nreducing fragmentation, increasing natural habitat extent, connectivity \\nand heterogeneity, and protecting small-scale refugia where \\nmicroclimate conditions can allow species to persist ( high confidence ). \\nMost innovations in urban adaptation have occurred through advances'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '83 Documented adaptation refers to published literature on adaptation policies, measures and actions that has been implemented and documented in peer reviewed literature, as \\nopposed to adaptation that may have been planned, but not implemented. \\n84 Effectiveness refers here to the extent to which an adaptation option is anticipated or observed to reduce climate-related risk.\\n85 See Annex I: Glossary.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '86 Irrigation is effective in reducing drought risk and climate impacts in many regions and has several livelihood benefits, but needs appropriate management to avoid potential \\nadverse outcomes, which can include accelerated depletion of groundwater and other water sources and increased soil salinization ( medium confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '87 EbA is recognised internationally under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD14/5). A related concept is Nature-based Solutions (NbS), see Annex I: Glossary.in disaster risk management, social safety nets and green/blue \\ninfrastructure ( medium confidence ). Many adaptation measures that \\nbenefit health and well-being are found in other sectors (e.g., food, \\nlivelihoods, social protection, water and sanitation, infrastructure)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.2.1, WGII SPM C.2.2, WGII TS.D.1.2, \\nWGII TS.D.1.4, WGII TS.D.4.2, WGII TS.D.8.3, WGII 4 ES; SRCCL SPM B.1.1 }\\nAdaptation can generate multiple additional benefits such as improving \\nagricultural productivity, innovation, health and well-being, food \\nsecurity, livelihood, and biodiversity conservation as well as reduction \\nof risks and damages (very high confidence ). {WGII SPM C1.1 } \\nGlobally tracked adaptation finance has shown an upward trend'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'since AR5, but represents only a small portion of total climate \\nfinance, is uneven and has developed heterogeneously across \\nregions and sectors ( high confidence ). Adaptation finance has come \\npredominantly from public sources, largely through grants, concessional \\nand non-concessional instruments ( very high confidence ). Globally, \\nprivate-sector financing of adaptation from a variety of sources such \\nas commercial financial institutions, institutional investors, other'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'private equity, non-financial corporations, as well as communities \\nand households has been limited, especially in developing countries \\n(high confidence ). Public mechanisms and finance can leverage \\nprivate sector finance for adaptation by addressing real and perceived \\nregulatory, cost and market barriers, for example via public- private \\npartnerships ( high confidence ). Innovations in adaptation and \\nresilience finance, such as forecast-based/anticipatory financing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'systems and regional risk insurance pools, have been piloted and are \\ngrowing in scale ( high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.3.2, WGII SPM C.5.4; \\nWGII TS.D.1.6, WGII Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE; WGIII SPM E.5.4 }\\nThere are adaptation options which are effective84 in reducing \\nclimate risks85 for specific contexts, sectors and regions and \\ncontribute positively to sustainable development and other \\nsocietal goals. In the agriculture sector, cultivar improvements,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'on-farm water management and storage, soil moisture conservation, \\nirrigation86, agroforestry, community-based adaptation, and farm and \\nlandscape level diversification, and sustainable land management \\napproaches, provide multiple benefits and reduce climate risks. \\nReduction of food loss and waste, and adaptation measures in support \\nof balanced diets contribute to nutrition, health, and biodiversity benefits. \\n(high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.2.1, WGII SPM C.2.2;'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 70,\n", " 'content': 'SRCCL B.2, SRCCL SPM C.2.1 }\\nEcosystem-based Adaptation87 approaches such as urban greening, \\nrestoration of wetlands and upstream forest ecosystems reduce \\na range of climate change risks, including flood risks, urban heat \\nand provide multiple co-benefits. Some land-based adaptation \\noptions provide immediate benefits (e.g., conservation of peatlands,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 71,\n", " 'content': '56\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2wetlands, rangelands, mangroves and forests); while afforestation and \\nreforestation, restoration of high-carbon ecosystems, agroforestry, and \\nthe reclamation of degraded soils take more time to deliver measurable \\nresults. Significant synergies exist between adaptation and mitigation, \\nfor example through sustainable land management approaches. \\nAgroecological principles and practices and other approaches'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 71,\n", " 'content': 'that work with natural processes support food security, nutrition, \\nhealth and well-being, livelihoods and biodiversity, sustainability and \\necosystem services. (high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.2.1, WGII SPM C.2.2, \\nWGII SPM C.2.5, WGII TS.D.4.1; SRCCL SPM B.1.2, SRCCL SPM.B.6.1; \\nSROCC SPM C.2 }\\nCombinations of non-structural measures like early warning systems \\nand structural measures like levees have reduced loss of lives in case'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 71,\n", " 'content': 'of inland flooding ( medium confidence ) and early warning systems \\nalong with flood-proofing of buildings have proven to be cost- effective \\nin the context of coastal flooding under current sea level rise ( high \\nconfidence ). Heat Health Action Plans that include early warning and \\nresponse systems are effective adaptation options for extreme heat \\n(high confidence ). Effective adaptation options for water, food and \\nvector-borne diseases include improving access to potable water,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 71,\n", " 'content': 'reducing exposure of water and sanitation systems to extreme weather \\nevents, and improved early warning systems, surveillance, and vaccine \\ndevelopment ( very high confidence ). Adaptation options such as \\ndisaster risk management, early warning systems, climate services \\nand social safety nets have broad applicability across multiple sectors \\n(high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.2.1, WGII SPM C.2.5, WGII SPM C.2.9, \\nWGII SPM C.2.11, WGII SPM C.2.13; SROCC SPM C.3.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 71,\n", " 'content': 'Integrated, multi- sectoral solutions that address social inequities, \\ndifferentiate responses based on climate risk and cut across systems, \\nincrease the feasibility and effectiveness of adaptation in multiple \\nsectors (high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': '57\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 22.3 Current Mitigation and Adaptation Actions and Policies are not Sufficient\\nAt the time of the present assessment88 there are gaps between global ambitions and the sum of declared \\nnational ambitions. These are further compounded by gaps between declared national ambitions and current \\nimplementation for all aspects of climate action. For mitigation, global GHG emissions in 2030 implied by NDCs'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'announced by October 2021 would make it likely that warming will exceed 1. 5°C during the 21st century and would \\nmake it harder to limit warming below 2°C.89 Despite progress, adaptation gaps90 persist, with many initiatives \\nprioritising short-term risk reduction, hindering transformational adaptation. Hard and soft limits to adaptation \\nare being reached in some sectors and regions, while maladaptation is also increasing and disproportionately'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'affecting vulnerable groups. Systemic barriers such as funding, knowledge, and practice gaps, including lack of \\nclimate literacy and data hinders adaptation progress. Insufficient financing, especially for adaptation, constraints \\nclimate action in particular in developing countries. (high confidence )\\n88 The timing of various cut-offs for assessment differs by WG report and the aspect assessed. See footnote 1 in Section 1.\\n89 See CSB.2 for a discussion of scenarios and pathways.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': '90 See Annex I: Glossary.2.3.1. The Gap Between Mitigation Policies, Pledges and \\nPathways that Limit Warming to 1.5°C or Below 2°C\\nGlobal GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation \\nof NDCs announced prior to COP2691 would make it likely that \\nwarming will exceed 1. 5°C during the 21st century and would \\nmake it harder to limit warming below 2°C – if no additional \\ncommitments are made or actions taken (Figure 2.5, Table 2.2).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'A substantial ‘emissions gap’ exists as global GHG emissions in 2030 \\nassociated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 \\nwould be similar to or only slightly below 2019 emission levels and \\nhigher than those associated with modelled mitigation pathways that \\nlimit warming to 1.5°C (>50 %) with no or limited overshoot or to \\n2°C (>67%), assuming immediate action, which implies deep, rapid, \\nand sustained global GHG emission reductions this decade ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ) (Table 2.2, Table 3.1, 4.1).92 The magnitude of the emissions \\ngap depends on the global warming level considered and whether only \\nunconditional or also conditional elements of NDCs93 are considered \\n(high confidence ) (Table 2.2). Modelled pathways that are consistent \\nwith NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030 and assume no \\nincrease in ambition thereafter have higher emissions, leading'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': '88 The timing of various cut-offs for assessment differs by WG report and the aspect assessed. See footnote 58 in Section 1.\\n89 See CSB.2 for a discussion of scenarios and pathways.\\n90 See Annex I: Glossary.\\n91 NDCs announced prior to COP26 refer to the most recent NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC up to the literature cut-off date of the WGIII report, 11 October 2021, and revised'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'NDCs announced by China, Japan and the Republic of Korea prior to October 2021 but only submitted thereafter. 25 NDC updates were submitted between 12 October 2021 \\nand the start of COP26. {WGIII SPM footnote 24 }\\n92 Immediate action in modelled global pathways refers to the adoption between 2020 and at latest before 2025 of climate policies intended to limit global warming to a given'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'level. Modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) based on immediate action are summarised in category C3a in Table 3.1. All assessed modelled global pathways \\nthat limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot assume immediate action as defined here (Category C1 in Table 3.1). {WGIII SPM footnote 26 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': '93 In this report, ‘unconditional’ elements of NDCs refer to mitigation efforts put forward without any conditions. ‘Conditional’ elements refer to mitigation efforts that are \\ncontingent on international cooperation, for example bilateral and multilateral agreements, financing or monetary and/or technological transfers. This terminology is used in the \\nliterature and the UNFCCC’s NDC Synthesis Reports, not by the Paris Agreement. {WGIII SPM footnote 27 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': '94 Implementation gaps refer to how far currently enacted policies and actions fall short of reaching the pledges. The policy cut-off date in studies used to project GHG emissions \\nof ‘policies implemented by the end of 2020’ varies between July 2019 and November 2020. {WGIII Table 4.2, WGIII SPM footnote 25 } to a median global warming of 2.8 [2.1 to 3. 4]°C by 2100 ( medium \\nconfidence ). If the ‘emission gap’ is not reduced, global GHG emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'in 2030 consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 make it likely \\nthat warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century, while limiting \\nwarming to 2°C (>67%) would imply an unprecedented acceleration of \\nmitigation efforts during 2030 –2050 ( medium confidence ) (see Section 4.1, \\nCross-Section Box.2). {WGIII SPM B.6, WGIII SPM B.6.1, WGIII SPM B.6.3, \\nWGIII SPM B.6.4, WGIII SPM C.1.1 }\\nPolicies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'higher global GHG emissions in 2030 than those implied by NDCs, \\nindicating an ‘implementation gap94’ (high confidence ) (Table 2.2, \\nFigure 2.5). Projected global emissions implied by policies implemented \\nby the end of 2020 are 57 (52–60) Gt CO 2-eq in 2030 (Table 2.2). This \\npoints to an implementation gap compared with the NDCs of 4 to \\n7 GtCO 2-eq in 2030 (Table 2.2); without a strengthening of policies, \\nemissions are projected to rise, leading to a median global warming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 72,\n", " 'content': 'of 2.2°C to 3.5°C (very likely range ) by 2100 ( medium confidence )\\n(see Section 3.1.1). {WGIII SPM B.6.1, WGIII SPM C.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': '58\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Projected cumulative future CO 2 emissions over the lifetime of existing \\nfossil fuel infrastructure without additional abatement95 exceed the \\ntotal cumulative net CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to \\n1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. They are approximately \\nequal to total cumulative net CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit \\nwarming to 2°C with a likelihood of 83%96 (see Figure 3.5). Limiting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': 'warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower will result in stranded assets. \\nAbout 80% of coal, 50% of gas, and 30% of oil reserves cannot be \\nburned and emitted if warming is limited to 2°C. Significantly more \\nreserves are expected to remain unburned if warming is limited to \\n1.5°C. ( high confidence ) {WGIII SPM B.7, WGIII Box 6.3 }\\n95 Abatement here refers to human interventions that reduce the amount of GHGs that are released from fossil fuel infrastructure to the atmosphere. {WGIII SPM footnote 34}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': '96 WGI provides carbon budgets that are in line with limiting global warming to temperature limits with different likelihoods, such as 50%, 67% or 83%. {WGI Table SPM.2}Table 2.2 Projected global emissions in 2030 associated with policies implemented by the end of 2020 and NDCs announced prior to COP26, and associated \\nemissions gaps. Emissions projections for 2030 and gross differences in emissions are based on emissions of 52–56 GtCO 2-eq yr–1 in 2019 as assumed in underlying model'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': 'studies97. (medium confidence ) {WGIII Table SPM.1 } (Table 3.1, Cross-Section Box.2 ) \\n95 Abatement here refers to human interventions that reduce the amount of GHGs that are released from fossil fuel infrastructure to the atmosphere. {WGIII SPM footnote 34 }\\n96 WGI provides carbon budgets that are in line with limiting global warming to temperature limits with different likelihoods, such as 50%, 67% or 83%. {WGI Table SPM.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': '97 The 2019 range of harmonised GHG emissions across the pathways [53–58 GtCO 2-eq] is within the uncertainty ranges of 2019 emissions assessed in WGIII Chapter 2 [53–66 GtCO 2-eq].\\nEmission and implementation gaps associated with projected \\nglobal emissions in 2030 under Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and implemented policies\\nImplied by policies \\nimplemented by the end \\nof 2020 (GtCO 2-eq/yr)Implied by Nationally Determined Contributions \\n(NDCs) announced prior to COP26'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': 'Unconditional \\nelements (GtCO 2-eq/yr)Including conditional \\nelements (GtCO 2-eq/yr)\\nMedian projected global emissions \\n(min–max)*\\nImplementation gap between \\nimplemented policies and NDCs (median)\\nEmissions gap between NDCs and \\npathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action \\nEmissions gap between NDCs and \\npathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot with immediate action 57 [52–60]\\n–\\n–\\n–4 753 [50–57] 50 [47–55]\\n10–16 6–14\\n19–26 16–23\\n*'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 73,\n", " 'content': '19–26 16–23\\n*\\nEmissions projections for 2030 and gross differences in emissions are based on emissions of 52–56 GtCO 2-eq/yr in 2019 as assumed in underlying model studies. ( medium confidence )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': '59\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2\\na) Global GHG emissions b) 2030\\n102030\\n040506070\\n102030\\n040506070GHG emissions (GtCO 2-eq/yr)\\n2020 2025 2015 2010 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050Limit warming to 2 ºC (>67%)\\nor 1.5 (>50%) after high\\novershoot with NDCs until 2030Trend from implemented policies\\n2019\\nLimit warming to1.5ºC (>50%) with \\nno or limited overshootLimit warming to 2ºC (>67%)\\nto be on-track to limit \\nwarming to 1.5°C, we need much more reduction by 2030-4%+5%\\n-26%'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': '-26%\\n-43%Projected global GHG emissions from NDCs announced prior to \\nCOP26 would make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C and \\nalso make it harder after 2030 to limit warming to below 2°C\\nPast GHG emissions and \\nuncertainty for 2015 and 2019(dot indicates the median)Past GHG emissions and uncertainty for 2015 and 2019(dot indicates the median)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 2.5 Global GHG emissions of modelled pathways (funnels in Panel a), and projected emission outcomes from near-term policy assessments for 2030 (Panel b). \\nPanel a shows global GHG emissions over 2015-2050 for four types of assessed modelled global pathways:\\n -Trend from implemented policies: Pathways with projected near-term GHG emissions in line with policies implemented until the end of 2020 and extended with comparable'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': 'ambition levels beyond 2030 (29 scenarios across categories C5–C7, WGIII Table SPM.2).\\n -Limit to 2°C (>67%) or return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot, NDCs until 2030: Pathways with GHG emissions until 2030 associated with the \\nimplementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26, followed by accelerated emissions reductions likely to limit warming to 2°C (C3b, WGIII Table SPM.2) or to return'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': 'warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% or greater after high overshoot (subset of 42 scenarios from C2, WGIII Table SPM.2). \\n -Limit to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action: Pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action after 2020 (C3a, WGIII Table SPM.2). \\n -Limit to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot: Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (C1, WGIII Table SPM.2 C1).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': 'All these pathways assume immediate action after 2020. Past GHG emissions for 2010-2015 used to project global warming outcomes of the modelled pathways are shown by a \\nblack line. Panel b shows a snapshot of the GHG emission ranges of the modelled pathways in 2030 and projected emissions outcomes from near-term policy assessments in 2030'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 74,\n", " 'content': 'from WGIII Chapter 4.2 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3; median and full range). GHG emissions are CO 2-equivalent using GWP100 from AR6 WGI. { WGIII Figure SPM.4, WGIII 3.5, 4.2, Table 4.2, \\nTable 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4 } (Table 3.1, Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': '60\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Cross-Section Box.1: Understanding Net Zero CO 2 and Net Zero GHG Emissions \\nLimiting human-caused global warming to a specific level requires limiting cumulative CO 2 emissions, reaching net zero or net negative \\nCO 2 emissions, along with strong reductions in other GHG emissions (see 3.3.2). Future additional warming will depend on future emissions,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'with total warming dominated by past and future cumulative CO 2 emissions. { WGI SPM D.1.1, WGI Figure SPM.4; SR1.5 SPM A.2.2 } \\nReaching net zero CO 2 emissions is different from reaching net zero GHG emissions. The timing of net zero for a basket of GHGs depends \\non the emissions metric, such as global warming potential over a 100-year period, chosen to convert non-CO 2 emissions into CO 2-equivalent ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). However, for a given emissions pathway, the physical climate response is independent of the metric chosen ( high confidence ). \\n{WGI SPM D.1.8; WGIII Box TS.6, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 2 }\\nAchieving global net zero GHG emissions requires all remaining CO 2 and metric-weighted98 non-CO 2 GHG emissions to be \\ncounterbalanced by durably stored CO 2 removals ( high confidence ). Some non-CO 2 emissions, such as CH 4 and N 2O from agriculture,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'cannot be fully eliminated using existing and anticipated technical measures. { WGIII SPM C.2.4, WGIII SPM C.11.4, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 3 }\\nGlobal net zero CO 2 or GHG emissions can be achieved even if some sectors and regions are net emitters, provided that \\nothers reach net negative emissions (see Figure 4.1). The potential and cost of achieving net zero or even net negative emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'vary by sector and region. If and when net zero emissions for a given sector or region are reached depends on multiple factors, including \\nthe potential to reduce GHG emissions and undertake carbon dioxide removal, the associated costs, and the availability of policy \\nmechanisms to balance emissions and removals between sectors and countries. ( high confidence ) {WGIII Box TS.6, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'The adoption and implementation of net zero emission targets by countries and regions also depend on equity and capacity \\nconsiderations ( high confidence ). The formulation of net zero pathways by countries will benefit from clarity on scope, plans-of-action, and \\nfairness. Achieving net zero emission targets relies on policies, institutions, and milestones against which to track progress. Least-cost global'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'modelled pathways have been shown to distribute the mitigation effort unevenly, and the incorporation of equity principles could change the \\ncountry-level timing of net zero ( high confidence ). The Paris Agreement also recognizes that peaking of emissions will occur later in developing \\ncountries than developed countries (Article 4.1). { WGIII Box TS.6, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 3, WGIII 14.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 75,\n", " 'content': 'More information on country-level net zero pledges is provided in Section 2.3.1, on the timing of global net zero emissions in Section 3.3.2, and \\non sectoral aspects of net zero in Section 4.1.\\n98 See footnote 12 above.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': '61\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2Many countries have signalled an intention to achieve net \\nzero GHG or net zero CO 2 emissions by around mid-century \\n(Cross-Section Box.1). More than 100 countries have either adopted, \\nannounced or are discussing net zero GHG or net zero CO 2 emissions \\ncommitments, covering more than two-thirds of global GHG emissions. \\nA growing number of cities are setting climate targets, including net zero'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'GHG targets. Many companies and institutions have also announced \\nnet zero emissions targets in recent years. The various net zero emission \\npledges differ across countries in terms of scope and specificity, and \\nlimited policies are to date in place to deliver on them. { WGIII SPM C.6.4, \\nWGIII TS.4.1, WGIII Table TS.1, WGIII 13.9, WGIII 14.3, WGIII 14.5 } \\nAll mitigation strategies face implementation challenges, \\nincluding technology risks, scaling, and costs ( high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'Almost all mitigation options also face institutional barriers that \\nneed to be addressed to enable their application at scale ( medium \\nconfidence ). Current development pathways may create behavioural, \\nspatial, economic and social barriers to accelerated mitigation at all \\nscales ( high confidence ). Choices made by policymakers, citizens, the \\nprivate sector and other stakeholders influence societies’ development \\npathways ( high confidence ). Structural factors of national circumstances'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'and capabilities (e.g., economic and natural endowments, political \\nsystems and cultural factors and gender considerations) affect the \\nbreadth and depth of climate governance ( medium confidence ). The \\nextent to which civil society actors, political actors, businesses, youth, \\nlabour, media, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities are engaged \\ninfluences political support for climate change mitigation and eventual \\npolicy outcomes ( medium confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.3.6, WGIII SPM E.1.1,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII SPM E.2.1, WGIII SPM E.3.3 }\\nThe adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most \\ndeveloping countries, particularly least developed ones, \\ndue in part to weaker enabling conditions, including limited \\nfinance, technology development and transfer, and capacity \\n(medium confidence ). In many countries, especially those with \\nlimited institutional capacity, several adverse side-effects have \\nbeen observed as a result of diffusion of low-emission technology,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'e.g., low-value employment, and dependency on foreign knowledge \\nand suppliers ( medium confidence ). Low-emission innovation along \\nwith strengthened enabling conditions can reinforce development \\nbenefits, which can, in turn, create feedbacks towards greater public \\nsupport for policy (medium confidence ). Persistent and region-specific \\nbarriers also continue to hamper the economic and political feasibility \\nof deploying AFOLU mitigation options ( medium confidence ). Barriers to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'implementation of AFOLU mitigation include insufficient institutional and \\nfinancial support, uncertainty over long-term additionality and trade-offs, \\nweak governance, insecure land ownership, low incomes and the lack \\nof access to alternative sources of income, and the risk of reversal ( high \\nconfidence ). {WGIII SPM B.4.2, WGIII SPM C.9.1, WGIII SPM C.9.3 } \\n99 See Annex I: Glossary.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': '100 Adaptation limit: The point at which an actor’s objectives (or system needs) cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions. Hard adaptation limit \\n- No adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks. Soft adaptation limit - Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive action.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': '101 Maladaptation refers to actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, including via increased greenhouse gas emissions, increased or shifted vulnerability \\nto climate change, more inequitable outcomes, or diminished welfare, now or in the future. Most often, maladaptation is an unintended consequence. See Annex I: Glossary.2.3.2. Adaptation Gaps and Barriers \\nDespite progress, adaptation gaps exist between current'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts \\nand reduce climate risks ( high confidence ). While progress in \\nadaptation implementation is observed across all sectors and regions \\n(very high confidence) , many adaptation initiatives prioritise immediate \\nand near-term climate risk reduction, e .g., through hard flood protection, \\nwhich reduces the opportunity for transformational adaptation99 (high \\nconfidence ). Most observed adaptation is fragmented, small in scale,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'incremental, sector-specific, and focused more on planning rather than \\nimplementation (high confidence ). Further, observed adaptation is \\nunequally distributed across regions and the largest adaptation gaps \\nexist among lower population income groups ( high confidence ). In the \\nurban context, the largest adaptation gaps exist in projects that manage \\ncomplex risks, for example in the food–energy– water–health nexus or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'the inter-relationships of air quality and climate risk ( high confidence ). \\nMany funding, knowledge and practice gaps remain for effective \\nimplementation, monitoring and evaluation and current adaptation \\nefforts are not expected to meet existing goals ( high confidence ). \\nAt current rates of adaptation planning and implementation the \\nadaptation gap will continue to grow ( high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.1, \\nWGII SPM C.1.2, WGII SPM C.4.1, WGII TS.D.1.3, WGII TS.D.1.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'Soft and hard adaptation limits100 have already been reached in \\nsome sectors and regions, in spite of adaptation having buffered \\nsome climate impacts (high confidence ). Ecosystems already \\nreaching hard adaptation limits include some warm water coral reefs, \\nsome coastal wetlands, some rainforests, and some polar and mountain \\necosystems ( high confidence ). Individuals and households in low lying \\ncoastal areas in Australasia and Small Islands and smallholder farmers'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'in Central and South America, Africa, Europe and Asia have reached \\nsoft limits (medium confidence ), resulting from financial, governance, \\ninstitutional and policy constraints and can be overcome by addressing \\nthese constraints ( high confidence ). Transitioning from incremental to \\ntransformational adaptation can help overcome soft adaptation limits \\n(high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.3, WGII SPM C.3.1, WGII SPM C.3.2, \\nWGII SPM C.3.3, WGII SPM.C.3.4, WGII 16 ES }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'Adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages, even with \\neffective adaptation and before reaching soft and hard limits. Losses \\nand damages are unequally distributed across systems, regions and \\nsectors and are not comprehensively addressed by current financial, \\ngovernance and institutional arrangements, particularly in vulnerable \\ndeveloping countries. (high confidence ) {WGII SPM.C.3.5 }\\nThere is increased evidence of maladaptation101 in various sectors'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 76,\n", " 'content': 'and regions. Examples of maladaptation are observed in urban areas \\n(e.g., new urban infrastructure that cannot be adjusted easily or affordably), \\nagriculture (e.g., using high-cost irrigation in areas projected to have more \\nintense drought conditions), ecosystems (e.g. fire suppression in naturally'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': '62\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2fire-adapted ecosystems, or hard defences against flooding) and human \\nsettlements (e.g. stranded assets and vulnerable communities that \\ncannot afford to shift away or adapt and require an increase in social \\nsafety nets). Maladaptation especially affects marginalised and vulnerable \\ngroups adversely (e.g., Indigenous Peoples, ethnic minorities, low-income \\nhouseholds, people living in informal settlements), reinforcing and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'entrenching existing inequities. Maladaptation can be avoided by flexible, \\nmulti- sectoral, inclusive and long-term planning and implementation of \\nadaptation actions with benefits to many sectors and systems. ( high \\nconfidence ) {WGII SPM C.4, WGII SPM C.4.3, WGII TS.D.3.1 }\\nSystemic barriers constrain the implementation of adaptation \\noptions in vulnerable sectors, regions and social groups ( high \\nconfidence ). Key barriers include limited resources, lack of private-sector'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'and civic engagement, insufficient mobilisation of finance, lack of political \\ncommitment, limited research and/or slow and low uptake of adaptation \\nscience and a low sense of urgency. Inequity and poverty also constrain \\nadaptation, leading to soft limits and resulting in disproportionate \\nexposure and impacts for most vulnerable groups ( high confidence ). The \\nlargest adaptation gaps exist among lower income population groups'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). As adaptation options often have long implementation \\ntimes, long-term planning and accelerated implementation, particularly \\nin this decade, is important to close adaptation gaps, recognising that \\nconstraints remain for some regions ( high confidence ). Prioritisation of \\noptions and transitions from incremental to transformational adaptation \\nare limited due to vested interests, economic lock-ins, institutional'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'path dependencies and prevalent practices, cultures, norms and belief \\nsystems ( high confidence ). Many funding, knowledge and practice \\ngaps remain for effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation \\nof adaptation ( high confidence ), including, lack of climate literacy at \\nall levels and limited availability of data and information ( medium \\nconfidence ); for example for Africa, severe climate data constraints and \\ninequities in research funding and leadership reduce adaptive capacity'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': '(very high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.1.2, WGII SPM C.3.1, WGII TS.D.1.3, \\nWGII TS.D.1.5, WGII TS.D.2.4 }\\n2.3.3. Lack of Finance as a Barrier to Climate Action \\nInsufficient financing, and a lack of political frameworks and \\nincentives for finance, are key causes of the implementation \\ngaps for both mitigation and adaptation ( high confidence ). \\nFinancial flows remained heavily focused on mitigation, are \\nuneven, and have developed heterogeneously across regions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'and sectors ( high confidence ). In 2018, public and publicly mobilised \\nprivate climate finance flows from developed to developing countries \\nwere below the collective goal under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement \\nto mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of \\nmeaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation \\n(medium confidence ). Public and private finance flows for fossil fuels \\nare still greater than those for climate adaptation and mitigation ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). The overwhelming majority of tracked climate finance \\nis directed towards mitigation ( very high confidence ). Nevertheless, \\naverage annual modelled investment requirements for 2020 to 2030 \\nin scenarios that limit warming to 2°C or 1.5°C are a factor of three \\nto six greater than current levels, and total mitigation investments \\n(public, private, domestic and international) would need to increase \\nacross all sectors and regions ( medium confidence ). Challenges'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'remain for green bonds and similar products, in particular around integrity and additionality, as well as the limited applicability of \\nthese markets to many developing countries ( high confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM C.3.2, WGII SPM C.5.4; WGIII SPM B.5.4, WGIII SPM E.5.1 } \\nCurrent global financial flows for adaptation including from public \\nand private finance sources, are insufficient for and constrain \\nimplementation of adaptation options, especially in developing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'countries (high confidence ). There are widening disparities between \\nthe estimated costs of adaptation and the documented finance \\nallocated to adaptation ( high confidence ). Adaptation finance \\nneeds are estimated to be higher than those assessed in AR5, and \\nthe enhanced mobilisation of and access to financial resources are \\nessential for implementation of adaptation and to reduce adaptation \\ngaps ( high confidence ). Annual finance flows targeting adaptation for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'Africa, for example, are billions of USD less than the lowest adaptation \\ncost estimates for near-term climate change ( high confidence ). Adverse \\nclimate impacts can further reduce the availability of financial resources \\nby causing losses and damages and impeding national economic \\ngrowth, thereby further increasing financial constraints for adaptation \\nparticularly for developing countries and LDCs (medium confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM C.1.2, WGII SPM C.3.2, WGII SPM C.5.4, WGII TS.D.1.6 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'Without effective mitigation and adaptation, losses and damages will \\ncontinue to disproportionately affect the poorest and most vulnerable \\npopulations. Accelerated financial support for developing countries \\nfrom developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler to \\nenhance mitigation action {WGIII SPM. E.5.3}. Many developing \\ncountries lack comprehensive data at the scale needed and lack adequate \\nfinancial resources needed for adaptation for reducing associated'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'economic and non- economic losses and damages. ( high confidence ) \\n{WGII Cross-Chapter Box LOSS, WGII SPM C.3.1, WGII SPM C.3.2, \\nWGII TS.D.1.3, WGII TS.D.1.5; WGIII SPM E.5.3 } \\nThere are barriers to redirecting capital towards climate action both \\nwithin and outside the global financial sector. These barriers include: \\nthe inadequate assessment of climate-related risks and investment \\nopportunities, regional mismatch between available capital and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'investment needs, home bias factors, country indebtedness levels, \\neconomic vulnerability, and limited institutional capacities. Challenges \\nfrom outside the financial sector include: limited local capital markets; \\nunattractive risk-return profiles, in particular due to missing or weak \\nregulatory environments that are inconsistent with ambition levels; \\nlimited institutional capacity to ensure safeguards; standardisation,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 77,\n", " 'content': 'aggregation, scalability and replicability of investment opportunities \\nand financing models; and, a pipeline ready for commercial investments. \\n(high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.5.4; WGIII SPM E.5.2; SR1.5 SPM D.5.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': '63\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2Cross-Section Box.2: Scenarios, Global Warming Levels, and Risks\\nModelled scenarios and pathways102 are used to explore future emissions, climate change, related impacts and risks, and possible mitigation and \\nadaptation strategies and are based on a range of assumptions, including socio-economic variables and mitigation options. These are quantitative'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Global modelled emission pathways, including those based on cost effective approaches \\ncontain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, and have to be assessed with the careful recognition of these assumptions. Most \\ndo not make explicit assumptions about global equity, environmental justice or intra-regional income distribution. IPCC is neutral with regard'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'to the assumptions underlying the scenarios in the literature assessed in this report, which do not cover all possible futures103. {WGI Box SPM.1; \\nWGII Box SPM.1; WGIII Box SPM.1; SROCC Box SPM.1; SRCCL Box SPM.1 } \\nSocio-economic Development, Scenarios, and Pathways\\nThe five Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP1 to SSP5) were designed to span a range of challenges to climate change mitigation and adaptation.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'For the assessment of climate impacts, risk and adaptation, the SSPs are used for future exposure, vulnerability and challenges to adaptation. \\nDepending on levels of GHG mitigation, modelled emissions scenarios based on the SSPs can be consistent with low or high warming levels104. \\nThere are many different mitigation strategies that could be consistent with different levels of global warming in 2100 (see Figure 4.1).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': '{WGI Box SPM.1; WGII Box SPM.1; WGIII Box SPM.1, WGIII Box TS.5, WGIII Annex III; SRCCL Box SPM.1, SRCCL Figure SPM.2 }\\nWGI assessed the climate response to five illustrative scenarios based on SSPs105 that cover the range of possible future development of anthropogenic \\ndrivers of climate change found in the literature. These scenarios combine socio-economic assumptions, levels of climate mitigation, land use and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'air pollution controls for aerosols and non- CH 4 ozone precursors. The high and very high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5) have \\nCO 2 emissions that roughly double from current levels by 2100 and 2050, respectively106. The intermediate GHG emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5) \\nhas CO 2 emissions remaining around current levels until the middle of the century. The very low and low GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9 and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'SSP1-2.6) have CO 2 emissions declining to net zero around 2050 and 2070, respectively, followed by varying levels of net negative CO 2 \\nemissions. In addition, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)107 were used by WGI and WGII to assess regional climate changes, \\nimpacts and risks. { WGI Box SPM.1 } (Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1 )\\nIn WGIII, a large number of global modelled emissions pathways were assessed, of which 1202 pathways were categorised based on their'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'projected global warming over the 21st century, with categories ranging from pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with more than 50% \\nlikelihood108 with no or limited overshoot (C1) to pathways that exceed 4°C (C8). Methods to project global warming associated with the \\nmodelled pathways were updated to ensure consistency with the AR6 WGI assessment of the climate system response109. {WGIII Box SPM.1,WGIII \\nTable 3.1 } (Table 3.1, Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': '102 In the literature, the terms pathways and scenarios are used interchangeably, with the former more frequently used in relation to climate goals. WGI primarily used the term \\nscenarios and WGIII mostly used the term modelled emissions and mitigation pathways. The SYR primarily uses scenarios when referring to WGI and modelled emissions and \\nmitigation pathways when referring to WGIII. {WGI Box SPM.1; WGIII footnote 44 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': '103 Around half of all modelled global emissions pathways assume cost- effective approaches that rely on least-cost mitigation/abatement options globally. The other half look \\nat existing policies and regionally and sectorally differentiated actions. The underlying population assumptions range from 8.5 to 9.7 billion in 2050 and 7.4 to 10.9 billion'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'in 2100 (5–95th percentile) starting from 7.6 billion in 2019. The underlying assumptions on global GDP growth range from 2.5 to 3.5% per year in the 2019–2050 period \\nand 1.3 to 2.1% per year in the 2050–2100 (5–95th percentile). {WGIII Box SPM.1 }\\n104 High mitigation challenges, for example, due to assumptions of slow technological change, high levels of global population growth, and high fragmentation as in the Shared'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'Socio-economic Pathway SSP3, may render modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (> 67%) or lower infeasible (medium confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.1.4; SRCCL Box SPM.1 }\\n105 SSP-based scenarios are referred to as SSPx-y, where ‘SSPx’ refers to the Shared Socio-economic Pathway describing the socioeconomic trends underlying the scenarios, and \\n‘y’ refers to the level of radiative forcing (in watts per square metre, or Wm–2) resulting from the scenario in the year 2100. {WGI SPM footnote 22 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': '106 Very high emission scenarios have become less likely but cannot be ruled out. Temperature levels > 4°C may result from very high emission scenarios, but can also occur from \\nlower emission scenarios if climate sensitivity or carbon cycle feedbacks are higher than the best estimate. { WGIII SPM C.1.3 }\\n107 RCP-based scenarios are referred to as RCPy, where ‘y’ refers to the approximate level of radiative forcing (in watts per square metre, or Wm–2) resulting from the scenario in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 78,\n", " 'content': 'year 2100. {WGII SPM footnote 21 }\\n108 Denoted ‘>50%’ in this report.\\n109 The climate response to emissions is investigated with climate models, paleoclimatic insights and other lines of evidence. The assessment outcomes are used to categorise \\nthousands of scenarios via simple physically-based climate models (emulators). {WGI TS.1.2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 79,\n", " 'content': '64\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Global Warming Levels (GWLs)\\nFor many climate and risk variables, the geographical patterns of changes in climatic impact-drivers110 and climate impacts for a level of global \\nwarming111 are common to all scenarios considered and independent of timing when that level is reached. This motivates the use of GWLs as a \\ndimension of integration. { WGI Box SPM.1.4, WGI TS.1.3.2; WGII Box SPM.1 } (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 )\\nRisks'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 79,\n", " 'content': 'Risks\\nDynamic interactions between climate-related hazards, exposure and vulnerability of the affected human society, species, or ecosystems result \\nin risks arising from climate change. AR6 assesses key risks across sectors and regions as well as providing an updated assessment of the \\nReasons for Concern (RFCs) – five globally aggregated categories of risk that evaluate risk accrual with increasing global surface temperature.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 79,\n", " 'content': 'Risks can also arise from climate change mitigation or adaptation responses when the response does not achieve its intended objective, or when \\nit results in adverse effects for other societal objectives. { WGII SPM A, WGII Figure SPM.3, WGII Box TS.1, WGII Figure TS.4; SR1.5 Figure SPM.2; \\nSROCC Errata Figure SPM.3; SRCCL Figure SPM.2 } (3.1.2, Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1, Figure 3.3 )\\n110 See Annex I: Glossary'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 79,\n", " 'content': '111 See Annex I: Glossary. Here, global warming is the 20-year average global surface temperature relative to 1850–1900. The assessed time of when a certain global warming level \\nis reached under a particular scenario is defined here as the mid-point of the first 20-year running average period during which the assessed average global surface temperature \\nchange exceeds the level of global warming. {WGI SPM footnote 26, Cross-Section Box TS.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': '65\\nCurrent Status and TrendsSection 2which drives that change influence Emissionsa) AR6 integrated assessment framework on future climate, impacts and mitigation\\nClimate Impacts / Risks\\nMitigation Policy Adaptation PolicySocio-economic changes\\n0\\n1\\n2\\n3\\n4\\n5\\n6\\n7\\n°C\\nb) Scenarios and pathways across AR6 Working Group reports c) Determinants of riskTemperature for SSP-based scenarios over the \\n21st century and C1-C8 at 2100Risks\\ncan be \\nrepresented as \\n“burning embers”\\nC1-C8 in 2100\\nincreasing risk'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': 'increasing risk\\n2050\\n2100\\n0\\n50\\n100\\n2050\\n2100\\nGtCO 2/yr\\nSSP1-1.9\\nSSP1-2.6\\nSSP2-4.5\\nSSP3-7.0\\nSSP5-8.5\\nSSP1-1.9\\nSSP1-2.6\\nSSP2-4.5\\nSSP3-7.0\\nSSP5-8.5RFC1\\nUnique and\\nthreatened systemscolor shading shows \\nC1-C8 category\\ncolor shading shows range for SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-2.6\\nCategory \\nin WGIIICategory descriptionGHG emissions scenarios(SSPx-y*) in WGI & WGII RCPy** inWGI & WGII\\nC1limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%)with no or limited overshootVery low (SSP1-1.9)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': 'Low (SSP1-2.6) RCP2.6C2return warming to 1.5°C (>50%)after a high overshoot\\nC3 limit warming to 2°C (>67%)\\nC4 limit warming to 2°C (>50%)\\nC5 limit warming to 2.5°C (>50%)\\nC6 limit warming to 3°C (>50%) Intermediate (SSP2-4.5) RCP 4.5\\nRCP 8.5C7 limit warming to 4°C (>50%) High (SSP3-7.0)\\nC8 exceed warming of 4°C (>50%) Very high (SSP5-8.5)Scenarios and warming levels structure our understanding across the \\ncause-effect chain from emissions to climate change and risks'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': 'CO 2 emissions for SSP-based scenarios \\nand C1-C8 categories\\nVulnerability\\nHazard\\nResponseRisk ExposureClimatic\\nImpact-\\nDrivers\\n0\\n1\\n2\\n3\\n4\\n5°Cinfluence\\nshape\\n* The terminology SSPx-y is used, where ‘SSPx’ refers to the Shared Socio-economic Pathway or ‘SSP’ describing the socio-economic trends \\nunderlying the scenario, and ‘y’ refers to the approximate level of radiative forcing (in watts per square metre, or Wm–2) resulting from the \\nscenario in the year 2100.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': '** The AR5 scenarios (RCPy), which partly inform the AR6 WGI and WGII assessments, are indexed to a similar set of approximate 2100 radiative \\nforcing levels (in W m-2). The SSP scenarios cover a broader range of GHG and air pollutant futures than the RCPs. They are similar but not \\nidentical, with differences in concentration trajectories for different GHGs. The overall radiative forcing tends to be higher for the SSPs compared'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 80,\n", " 'content': 'to the RCPs with the same label (medium confidence ). {WGI TS.1.3.1 }\\n*** Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C global warming by up to about 0.1°C, high overshoot by 0.1°C-0.3°C, in both cases for up to \\nseveral decades.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 81,\n", " 'content': '66\\nSection 2\\nSection 1Section 2Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1:\\xa0Schematic of the AR6 framework for assessing future greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, \\nrisks, impacts and mitigation. Panel (a) The integrated framework encompasses socio-economic development and policy, emissions pathways \\nand global surface temperature responses to the five scenarios considered by WGI (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5) and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 81,\n", " 'content': 'eight global mean temperature change categorisations (C1–C8) assessed by WGIII, and the WGII risk assessment. The dashed arrow indicates \\nthat the influence from impacts/ risks to socio-economic changes is not yet considered in the scenarios assessed in the AR6. Emissions include \\nGHGs, aerosols, and ozone precursors. CO 2 emissions are shown as an example on the left. The assessed global surface temperature changes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 81,\n", " 'content': 'across the 21st century relative to 1850-1900 for the five GHG emissions scenarios are shown as an example in the centre. Very likely ranges \\nare shown for SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0. Projected temperature outcomes at 2100 relative to 1850-1900 are shown for C1 to C8 categories with \\nmedian (line) and the combined very likely range across scenarios (bar). On the right, future risks due to increasing warming are represented by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 81,\n", " 'content': 'an example ‘burning ember’ figure (see 3.1.2 for the definition of RFC1). Panel (b) Description and relationship of scenarios considered across \\nAR6 Working Group reports. Panel (c) Illustration of risk arising from the interaction of hazard (driven by changes in climatic impact-drivers) \\nwith vulnerability, exposure and response to climate change. { WGI TS1.4, Figure 4.11; WGII Figure 1.5, WGII Figure 14.8; WGIII Table SPM.2, \\nWGIII Figure 3.11 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 82,\n", " 'content': '67Section 3\\nLong-Term Climate and \\nDevelopment Futures'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': '68\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3Section 3: Long-Term Climate and Development Futures\\n3.1 Long-Term Climate Change, Impacts and Related Risks\\nFuture warming will be driven by future emissions and will affect all major climate system components, with \\nevery region experiencing multiple and co-occurring changes. Many climate-related risks are assessed to be \\nhigher than in previous assessments, and projected long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'currently observed. Multiple climatic and non-climatic risks will interact, resulting in compounding and cascading \\nrisks across sectors and regions. Sea level rise, as well as other irreversible changes, will continue for thousands \\nof years, at rates depending on future emissions. ( high confidence )\\n3.1.1. Long-term Climate Change\\nThe uncertainty range on assessed future changes in global \\nsurface temperature is narrower than in the AR5. For the first'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'time in an IPCC assessment cycle, multi-model projections of global \\nsurface temperature, ocean warming and sea level are constrained \\nusing observations and the assessed climate sensitivity. The likely \\nrange of equilibrium climate sensitivity has been narrowed to 2.5°C \\nto 4.0°C (with a best estimate of 3.0°C) based on multiple lines of \\nevidence112, including improved understanding of cloud feedbacks. For \\nrelated emissions scenarios, this leads to narrower uncertainty ranges'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'for long-term projected global temperature change than in AR5. \\n{WGI A.4, WGI Box SPM.1, WGI TS.3.2, WGI 4.3 }\\nFuture warming depends on future GHG emissions, with \\ncumulative net CO 2 dominating. The assessed best estimates and \\nvery likely ranges of warming for 2081-2100 with respect to 1850 –1900 \\nvary from 1.4 [1.0 to 1.8]°C in the very low GHG emissions scenario \\n(SSP1-1.9) to 2.7 [2.1 to 3.5]°C in the intermediate GHG emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'scenario (SSP2-4.5) and 4. 4 [3.3 to 5.7]°C in the very high GHG emissions \\nscenario (SSP5-8.5)113. {WGI SPM B.1.1, WGI Table SPM.1, WGI Figure \\nSPM.4 } (Cross-Section Box.2 Figure 1 )\\nModelled pathways consistent with the continuation of policies \\nimplemented by the end of 2020 lead to global warming of \\n3.2 [2.2 to 3.5]°C (5–95% range) by 2100 ( medium confidence ) \\n(see also Section 2.3.1). Pathways of >4°C (≥50%) by 2100 would'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'imply a reversal of current technology and/or mitigation policy trends \\n(medium confidence ). However, such warming could occur in emissions \\npathways consistent with policies implemented by the end of 2020 if \\nclimate sensitivity or carbon cycle feedbacks are higher than the best \\nestimate ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.1.3 }\\n112 Understanding of climate processes, the instrumental record, paleoclimates and model-based emergent constraints (see Annex I: Glossary). {WGI SPM footnote 21 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': '113 The best estimates [and very likely ranges] for the different scenarios are: 1.4 [1.0 to 1.8]°C (SSP1-1.9); 1.8 [1.3 to 2.4]°C (SSP1-2.6); 2.7 [2.1 to 3.5]°C (SSP2-4.5); 3.6 [2.8 to 4.6]°C \\n(SSP3-7.0); and 4.4 [3.3 to 5.7]°C (SSP5-8.5). {WGI Table SPM.1 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\n114 In the near term (2021 –2040), the 1.5°C global warming level is very likely to be exceeded under the very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5), likely to be exceeded under'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'the intermediate and high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0), more likely than not to be exceeded under the low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-2.6) and more likely \\nthan not to be reached under the very low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9). In all scenarios considered by WGI except the very high emissions scenario, the midpoint of the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'first 20-year running average period during which the assessed global warming reaches 1.5°C lies in the first half of the 2030s. In the very high GHG emissions scenario, this \\nmid-point is in the late 2020s. The median five-year interval at which a 1.5°C global warming level is reached (50% probability) in categories of modelled pathways considered \\nin WGIII is 2030 –2035. {WGI SPM B.1.3, WGI Cross-Section Box TS.1, WGIII Table 3.2 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\n115 See Cross-Section Box.2.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': '116 Based on additional scenarios.Global warming will continue to increase in the near term in \\nnearly all considered scenarios and modelled pathways. Deep, \\nrapid, and sustained GHG emissions reductions, reaching net \\nzero CO 2 emissions and including strong emissions reductions \\nof other GHGs, in particular CH 4, are necessary to limit warming \\nto 1.5°C (>50%) or less than 2°C (>67%) by the end of century \\n(high confidence ). The best estimate of reaching 1.5°C of global'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'warming lies in the first half of the 2030s in most of the considered \\nscenarios and modelled pathways114. In the very low GHG emissions \\nscenario ( SSP1-1.9), CO 2 emissions reach net zero around 2050 and the \\nbest-estimate end-of-century warming is 1.4°C, after a temporary overshoot \\n(see Section 3.3.4) of no more than 0.1°C above 1.5°C global warming. \\nGlobal warming of 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century unless \\ndeep reductions in CO 2 and other GHG emissions occur in the coming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'decades. Deep , rapid, and sustained reductions in GHG emissions would \\nlead to improvements in air quality within a few years, to reductions in \\ntrends of global surface temperature discernible after around 20 years, \\nand over longer time periods for many other climate impact-drivers115 \\n(high confidence ). Targeted reductions of air pollutant emissions lead \\nto more rapid improvements in air quality compared to reductions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'in GHG emissions only, but in the long term, further improvements are \\nprojected in scenarios that combine efforts to reduce air pollutants as \\nwell as GHG emissions ( high confidence )116. {WGI SPM B.1, WGI SPM B.1.3, \\nWGI SPM D.1, WGI SPM D.2, WGI Figure SPM.4, WGI Table SPM.1, \\nWGI Cross-Section Box TS.1; WGIII SPM C.3, WGIII Table SPM.2, \\nWGIII Figure SPM.5, WGIII Box SPM.1 Figure 1, WGIII Table 3.2 } (Table 3.1, \\nCross-Section Box.2 Figure 1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 83,\n", " 'content': 'Changes in short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) resulting from the \\nfive considered scenarios lead to an additional net global warming \\nin the near and long term (high confidence ). Simultaneous \\nstringent climate change mitigation and air pollution control'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': '69\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3policies limit this additional warming and lead to strong benefits \\nfor air quality ( high confidence ). In high and very high GHG \\nemissions scenarios (SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8 .5), combined changes \\nin SLCF emissions, such as CH 4, aerosol and ozone precursors, lead to a \\nnet global warming by 2100 of likely 0.4°C to 0.9°C relative to 2019. \\nThis is due to projected increases in atmospheric concentration of CH 4,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'tropospheric ozone, hydrofluorocarbons and, when strong air pollution \\ncontrol is considered, reductions of cooling aerosols. In low and very \\nlow GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2 .6), air pollution \\ncontrol policies , reductions in CH 4 and other ozone precursors lead to a \\nnet cooling, whereas reductions in anthropogenic cooling aerosols lead \\nto a net warming ( high confidence ). Altogether, this causes a likely net'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'warming of 0.0°C to 0.3°C due to SLCF changes in 2100 relative to 2019 \\nand strong reductions in global surface ozone and particulate matter \\n(high confidence ). {WGI SPM D.1.7, WGI Box TS.7 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\nContinued GHG emissions will further affect all major climate \\nsystem components, and many changes will be irreversible on \\ncentennial to millennial time scales. Many changes in the climate \\nsystem become larger in direct relation to increasing global warming.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'With every additional increment of global warming, changes in \\nextremes continue to become larger. Additional warming will lead to \\nmore frequent and intense marine heatwaves and is projected to further \\namplify permafrost thawing and loss of seasonal snow cover, glaciers, \\nland ice and Arctic sea ice ( high confidence ). Continued global warming \\nis projected to further intensify the global water cycle, including its \\nvariability, global monsoon precipitation117, and very wet and very dry'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'weather and climate events and seasons ( high confidence ). The portion \\nof global land experiencing detectable changes in seasonal mean \\nprecipitation is projected to increase ( medium confidence ) with more \\nvariable precipitation and surface water flows over most land regions \\nwithin seasons ( high confidence ) and from year to year ( medium \\nconfidence ). Many changes due to past and future GHG emissions are \\nirreversible118 on centennial to millennial time scales, especially in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'ocean, ice sheets and global sea level (see 3.1.3). Ocean acidification \\n(virtually certain ), ocean deoxygenation ( high confidence ) and global \\nmean sea level ( virtually certain ) will continue to increase in the 21st century, \\nat rates dependent on future emissions. {WGI SPM B.2, WGI SPM B.2.2, \\nWGI SPM B.2.3, WGI SPM B.2.5, WGI SPM B.3, WGI SPM B.3.1, \\nWGI SPM B.3.2, WGI SPM B.4, WGI SPM B.5, WGI SPM B.5.1, WGI SPM B.5.3, \\nWGI Figure SPM.8 } (Figure 3.1 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'With further global warming, every region is projected to \\nincreasingly experience concurrent and multiple changes \\nin climatic impact-drivers. Increases in hot and decreases in \\ncold climatic impact-drivers, such as temperature extremes , are \\nprojected in all regions ( high confidence ). At 1.5°C global warming, \\nheavy precipitation and flooding events are projected to intensify \\nand become more frequent in most regions in Africa, Asia ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ), North America ( medium to high confidence ) and Europe \\n(medium confidence ). At 2°C or above, these changes expand to more \\nregions and/or become more significant ( high confidence ), and more \\nfrequent and/or severe agricultural and ecological droughts are projected \\nin Europe, Africa, Australasia and North, Central and South America \\n(medium to high confidence ). Other projected regional changes include'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': '117 Particularly over South and South East Asia, East Asia and West Africa apart from the far west Sahel. {WGI SPM B.3.3 }\\n118 See Annex I: Glossary.\\n119 See Annex I: Glossary.intensification of tropical cyclones and/or extratropical storms \\n(medium confidence ), and increases in aridity and fire weather119 \\n(medium to high confidence ). Compound heatwaves and droughts \\nbecome likely more frequent, including concurrently at multiple'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 84,\n", " 'content': 'locations ( high confidence ). {WGI SPM C.2, WGI SPM C.2.1, WGI SPM C.2.2, \\nWGI SPM C.2.3, WGI SPM C.2.4, WGI SPM C.2.7 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': '70\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3\\n2011-2020 was \\naround 1.1°C warmer than 1850-1900the last time global surface temperature was sustained at or above 2.5°C was over 3 million years ago\\n4°CThe world at\\n2°CThe world at\\n1.5°C+ +1 0The world at\\n3°CThe world at\\nsmall absolute changes may appear large as % or σ changes \\nin dry regionsurbanisation \\nfurther intensifies \\nheat extremes\\nc) Annual wettest-day precipitation changeGlobal warming level (GWL) above 1850-1900'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': 'a) Annual hottest-day temperature change\\nb) Annual mean total column soil moisture change°C\\nAnnual wettest day precipitation is projected to increase \\nin almost all continental regions, even in regions where projected annual mean soil moisture declines.Annual hottest day temperature is projected to increase most (1.5-2 times the GWL) in some mid-latitude and semi-arid regions, and in the South American Monsoon region.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': 'Projections of annual mean soil moisture largely follow projections in annual mean precipitation but also show some differences due to the influence of evapotranspiration.\\nchange (%)\\n-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40+ +\\nchange (°C)\\n0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7\\n-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5change (σ )With every increment of global warming, regional changes in mean \\nclimate and extremes become more widespread and pronounced'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 3.1: Projected changes of annual maximum daily temperature, annual mean total column soil moisture CMIP and annual maximum daily precipitation \\nat global warming levels of 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C, and 4°C relative to 1850-1900. Simulated (a) annual maximum temperature change (°C), (b) annual mean total column \\nsoil moisture (standard deviation), (c) annual maximum daily precipitation change (%). Changes correspond to CMIP6 multi-model median changes. In panels (b) and (c), large'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': 'positive relative changes in dry regions may correspond to small absolute changes. In panel (b), the unit is the standard deviation of interannual variability in soil moisture during \\n1850-1900. Standard deviation is a widely used metric in characterising drought severity. A projected reduction in mean soil moisture by one standard deviation corresponds to soil'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 85,\n", " 'content': 'moisture conditions typical of droughts that occurred about once every six years during 1850-1900. The WGI Interactive Atlas ( https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/ ) can be used to explore \\nadditional changes in the climate system across the range of global warming levels presented in this figure. { WGI Figure SPM.5, WGI Figure TS.5, WGI Figure 11.11, WGI Figure 11.16, \\nWGI Figure 11.19 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': '71\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 33.1.2 Impacts and Related Risks\\nFor a given level of warming, many climate-related risks are \\nassessed to be higher than in AR5 ( high confidence ). Levels of \\nrisk120 for all Reasons for Concern121 (RFCs) are assessed to become high \\nto very high at lower global warming levels compared to what was \\nassessed in AR5 ( high confidence ). This is based upon recent evidence \\nof observed impacts, improved process understanding, and new'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'knowledge on exposure and vulnerability of human and natural \\nsystems, including limits to adaptation. Depending on the level \\nof global warming, the assessed long-term impacts will be up to \\nmultiple times higher than currently observed ( high confidence ) for \\n127 identified key risks, e.g., in terms of the number of affected people \\nand species. Risks, including cascading risks (see 3.1.3) and risks from \\novershoot (see 3.3.4), are projected to become increasingly severe'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'with every increment of global warming (very high confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM B.3. 3, WGII SPM B.4, WGII SPM B.5, WGII 16.6.3; SRCCL SPM A5.3 } \\n(Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 )\\nClimate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for \\nglobal warming of 1 .5°C than at present ( 1.1°C) but lower than at 2°C \\n(high confidence ) (see Section 2. 1.2). Climate-related risks to health, \\nlivelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1 .5°C. In \\nterrestrial ecosystems, 3 to 14% of the tens of thousands of species \\nassessed will likely face a very high risk of extinction at a GWL of 1.5°C. \\nCoral reefs are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C of \\nglobal warming ( high confidence ). At this GWL, many low-elevation \\nand small glaciers around the world would lose most of their mass or \\ndisappear within decades to centuries (high confidence ). Regions at'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, \\nsmall island developing states and Least Developed Countries ( high \\nconfidence ). {WGII SPM B.3, WGII SPM B.4.1, WGII TS.C.4.2; SR1.5 SPM A.3, \\nSR1.5 SPM B.4.2, SR1.5 SPM B.5, SR1.5 SPM B.5.1 } (Figure 3.3 )\\nAt 2°C of global warming, overall risk levels associated with the unequal \\ndistribution of impacts (RFC3), global aggregate impacts (RFC4) and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'large-scale singular events (RFC5) would be transitioning to high ( medium \\nconfidence ), those associated with extreme weather events (RFC2) would \\nbe transitioning to very high ( medium confidence ), and those associated \\nwith unique and threatened systems (RFC1) would be very high ( high \\nconfidence ) (Figure 3 .3, panel a). With about 2°C warming, climate-related'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': '120 Undetectable risk level indicates no associated impacts are detectable and attributable to climate change; moderate risk indicates associated impacts are both detectable and \\nattributable to climate change with at least medium confidence , also accounting for the other specific criteria for key risks; high risk indicates severe and widespread impacts that'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'are judged to be high on one or more criteria for assessing key risks; and very high risk level indicates very high risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant irreversibility \\nor the persistence of climate-related hazards, combined with limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the hazard or impacts/ risks. {WGII Figure SPM.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': '121 The Reasons for Concern (RFC) framework communicates scientific understanding about accrual of risk for five broad categories (WGII Figure SPM.3). RFC1: Unique and \\nthreatened systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate-related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'properties. Examples include coral reefs, the Arctic and its Indigenous Peoples, mountain glaciers and biodiversity hotspots. RFC2: Extreme weather events: risks/ impacts to \\nhuman health, livelihoods, assets and ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heatwaves, heavy rain, drought and associated wildfires, and coastal flooding. RFC3:'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'Distribution of impacts: risks/ impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change hazards, exposure or vulnerability. \\nRFC4: Global aggregate impacts: impacts to socio-ecological systems that can be aggregated globally into a single metric, such as monetary damages, lives affected, species lost'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'or ecosystem degradation at a global scale. RFC5: Large-scale singular events: relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems caused by global warming, \\nsuch as ice sheet instability or thermohaline circulation slowing. Assessment methods include a structured expert elicitation based on the literature described in WGII SM16.6'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'and are identical to AR5 but are enhanced by a structured approach to improve robustness and facilitate comparison between AR5 and AR6. For further explanations of global \\nrisk levels and Reasons for Concern, see WGII TS.AII. {WGII Figure SPM.3 }changes in food availability and diet quality are estimated to increase \\nnutrition-related diseases and the number of undernourished people, \\naffecting tens (under low vulnerability and low warming) to hundreds of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'millions of people (under high vulnerability and high warming), particularly \\namong low- income households in low- and middle-income countries in \\nsub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America ( high confidence ). \\nFor example, snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected \\nto decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20% \\n(medium confidence ). Climate change risks to cities, settlements \\nand key infrastructure will rise sharply in the mid and long term with'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'further global warming, especially in places already exposed to high \\ntemperatures, along coastlines, or with high vulnerabilities ( high \\nconfidence ). {WGII SPM B.3. 3, WGII SPM B.4.2, WGII SPM B.4.5, WGII TS C.3.3, \\nWGII TS.C.12.2 } (Figure 3.3 )\\nAt global warming of 3°C, additional risks in many sectors and regions \\nreach high or very high levels, implying widespread systemic impacts, \\nirreversible change and many additional adaptation limits (see Section 3.2)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). For example, very high extinction risk for endemic \\nspecies in biodiversity hotspots is projected to increase at least tenfold \\nif warming rises from 1.5°C to 3°C ( medium confidence ). Projected \\nincreases in direct flood damages are higher by 1.4 to 2 times at 2°C \\nand 2.5 to 3.9 times at 3°C, compared to 1.5°C global warming without \\nadaptation ( medium confidence ). {WGII SPM B.4.1, WGII SPM B.4.2, \\nWGII Figure SPM.3, WGII TS Appendix AII, WGII Appendix I Global to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'Regional Atlas Figure AI.46 } (Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 )\\nGlobal warming of 4°C and above is projected to lead to far-reaching \\nimpacts on natural and human systems (high confidence ). Beyond \\n4°C of warming, projected impacts on natural systems include local \\nextinction of ~50% of tropical marine species (medium confidence ) \\nand biome shifts across 35% of global land area (medium confidence ). \\nAt this level of warming, approximately 10% of the global land area'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'is projected to face both increasing high and decreasing low extreme \\nstreamflow, affecting, without additional adaptation, over 2.1 billion people \\n(medium confidence ) and about 4 billion people are projected to \\nexperience water scarcity ( medium confidence ). At 4°C of warming, the \\nglobal burned area is projected to increase by 50 to 70% and the \\nfire frequency by ~30% compared to today ( medium confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM B.4.1, WGII SPM B.4.2, WGII TS.C.1.2, WGII TS.C.2.3,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 86,\n", " 'content': 'WGII TS.C.4.1, WGII TS.C.4.4 } (Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': '72\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3Projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from \\nclimate change escalate with every increment of global warming \\n(very high confidence ), but they will also strongly depend on \\nsocio-economic development trajectories and adaptation actions \\nto reduce vulnerability and exposure ( high confidence ). For \\nexample, development pathways with higher demand for food, animal \\nfeed, and water, more resource-intensive consumption and production,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'and limited technological improvements result in higher risks from \\nwater scarcity in drylands, land degradation and food insecurity ( high \\nconfidence ). Changes in, for example, demography or investments in \\nhealth systems have effect on a variety of health-related outcomes \\nincluding heat-related morbidity and mortality (Figure 3.3 Panel d). \\n{WGII SPM B.3, WGII SPM B.4, WGII Figure SPM.3; SRCCL SPM A.6 }\\nWith every increment of warming, climate change impacts and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'risks will become increasingly complex and more difficult to \\nmanage. Many regions are projected to experience an increase in \\nthe probability of compound events with higher global warming, such \\nas concurrent heatwaves and droughts, compound flooding and fire \\nweather. In addition, multiple climatic and non-climatic risk drivers \\nsuch as biodiversity loss or violent conflict will interact, resulting \\nin compounding overall risk and risks cascading across sectors and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'regions. Furthermore, risks can arise from some responses that are \\nintended to reduce the risks of climate change, e.g., adverse side effects \\nof some emission reduction and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures \\n(see 3.4.1). ( high confidence ) {WGI SPM C.2.7, WGI Figure SPM.6, \\nWGI TS.4.3; WGII SPM B.1.7, WGII B.2.2, WGII SPM B.5, WGII SPM B.5.4, \\nWGII SPM C.4.2, WGII SPM B.5, WGII CCB2 }\\nSolar Radiation Modification (SRM) approaches, if they were'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'to be implemented, introduce a widespread range of new risks \\nto people and ecosystems, which are not well understood. \\nSRM has the potential to offset warming within one or two decades \\nand ameliorate some climate hazards but would not restore climate to \\na previous state, and substantial residual or overcompensating climate \\nchange would occur at regional and seasonal scales ( high confidence ). \\nEffects of SRM would depend on the specific approach used122, and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'a sudden and sustained termination of SRM in a high CO 2 emissions \\nscenario would cause rapid climate change ( high confidence ). SRM \\nwould not stop atmospheric CO 2 concentrations from increasing nor \\nreduce resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic \\nemissions ( high confidence ). Large uncertainties and knowledge \\ngaps are associated with the potential of SRM approaches to reduce \\nclimate change risks. Lack of robust and formal SRM governance'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 87,\n", " 'content': 'poses risks as deployment by a limited number of states could create \\ninternational tensions. { WGI 4.6; WGII SPM B.5.5; WGIII 14.4.5.1; \\nWGIII 14 Cross-Working Group Box Solar Radiation Modification; \\nSR1.5 SPM C.1.4 }\\n122 Several SRM approaches have been proposed, including stratospheric aerosol injection, marine cloud brightening, ground-based albedo modifications, and ocean albedo change. \\nSee Annex I: Glossary.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': '73\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3\\nc1) Maize yield4\\nc2) Fisheries yield5\\nChanges (%) in \\nmaximum catch potentialChanges (%) in yield\\n -20 -10 -3 -30 -25 -15 -35% +20 +30 +35% +10 +3 +25 +151 0 days 300 100 200 10 150 250 50 365 days0.1 0% 80 10 40 1 20 60 5 100%\\nAreas with model disagreementExamples of impacts without additional adaptation\\n2.4 – 3.1°C 4.2 – 5.4°C1.5°C\\n3.0°C\\n1.7 – 2.3°C\\n0.9 – 2.0°C 3.4 – 5.2°C1.6 – 2.4°C 3.3 – 4.8°C 3.9 – 6.0°C2.0°C'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': '4.0°CPercentage of animal species and seagrasses\\n \\nexposed to potentially dangerous temperature conditions\\n1, 2\\nDays per year where combined temperature and humidity conditions pose a risk of mortality to individuals\\n3\\n5Projected regional impacts reflect fisheries and marine ecosystem responses to ocean physical and biogeochemical conditions such as \\ntemperature, oxygen level and net primary production. Models do not represent changes in fishing activities and some extreme climatic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': 'conditions. Projected changes in the Arctic regions have low confidence due to uncertainties associated with modelling multiple interacting drivers and ecosystem responses.4Projected regional impacts reflect biophysical responses to changing temperature, precipitation, solar radiation, humidity, wind, and CO 2'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': 'enhancement of growth and water retention in currently cultivated areas. Models assume that irrigated areas are not water-limited. Models do not represent pests, diseases, future agro-technological changes and some extreme climate responses.Future climate change is projected to increase the severity of impacts \\nacross natural and human systems and will increase regional differences\\nAreas with little or no \\nproduction, or not assessed\\n1Projected temperature conditions above'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': 'the estimated historical (1850-2005) \\nmaximum mean annual temperature experienced by each species, assuming no species relocation. \\n2Includes 30,652 species of birds, \\nmammals, reptiles, amphibians, marine fish, benthic marine invertebrates, krill, cephalopods, corals, and seagrasses.a) Risk of \\nspecies losses\\nb) Heat-humidity \\nrisks to \\nhuman health\\nc) Food production'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': 'c) Food production \\nimpacts3Projected regional impacts utilize a global threshold beyond which daily mean surface air temperature and relative humidity may induce \\nhyperthermia that poses a risk of mortality. The duration and intensity of heatwaves are not presented here. Heat-related health outcomes'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 88,\n", " 'content': 'vary by location and are highly moderated by socio-economic, occupational and other non-climatic determinants of individual health and socio-economic vulnerability. The threshold used in these maps is based on a single study that synthesized data from 783 cases to determine the relationship between heat-humidity conditions and mortality drawn largely from observations in temperate climates.\\nHistorical 1991–2005'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': '74\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3Figure 3.2: Projected risks and impacts of climate change on natural and human systems at different global warming levels (GWLs) relative to 1850-1900 levels. \\nProjected risks and impacts shown on the maps are based on outputs from different subsets of Earth system models that were used to project each impact indicator without'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': 'additional adaptation. WGII provides further assessment of the impacts on human and natural systems using these projections and additional lines of evidence. (a) Risks of species \\nlosses as indicated by the percentage of assessed species exposed to potentially dangerous temperature conditions, as defined by conditions beyond the estimated historical'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': '(1850 –2005) maximum mean annual temperature experienced by each species, at GWLs of 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C and 4°C. Underpinning projections of temperature are from 21 Earth \\nsystem models and do not consider extreme events impacting ecosystems such as the Arctic. (b) Risk to human health as indicated by the days per year of population exposure'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': 'to hypothermic conditions that pose a risk of mortality from surface air temperature and humidity conditions for historical period (1991 –2005) and at GWLs of 1.7°C to 2.3°C \\n(mean = 1.9°C; 13 climate models), 2.4°C to 3.1°C (2.7°C; 16 climate models) and 4.2°C to 5.4°C (4.7°C; 15 climate models). Interquartile ranges of WGLs by 2081 –2100'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': 'under RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5. The presented index is consistent with common features found in many indices included within WGI and WGII assessments. (c) Impacts \\non food production: (c1) Changes in maize yield at projected GWLs of 1.6°C to 2.4°C (2.0°C), 3.3°C to 4.8°C (4.1°C) and 3.9°C to 6.0°C (4.9°C). Median yield changes \\nfrom an ensemble of 12 crop models, each driven by bias-adjusted outputs from 5 Earth system models from the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': '(AgMIP) and the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP). Maps depict 2080 –2099 compared to 1986 –2005 for current growing regions (>10 ha), with the \\ncorresponding range of future global warming levels shown under SSP1-2.6, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5, respectively. Hatching indicates areas where <70% of the climate-crop model'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': 'combinations agree on the sign of impact. (c2) Changes in maximum fisheries catch potential by 2081 –2099 relative to 1986-2005 at projected GWLs of 0.9°C to 2.0°C (1.5°C) \\nand 3.4°C to 5.2°C (4.3°C). GWLs by 2081 –2100 under RCP2.6 and RCP8.5. Hatching indicates where the two climate- fisheries models disagree in the direction of change. Large'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 89,\n", " 'content': 'relative changes in low yielding regions may correspond to small absolute changes. Biodiversity and fisheries in Antarctica were not analysed due to data limitations. Food security \\nis also affected by crop and fishery failures not presented here. { WGII Fig. TS.5, WGII Fig TS.9, WGII Annex I: Global to Regional Atlas Figure AI.1 5, Figure AI.22, Figure AI.23, Figure \\nAI.29; WGII 7.3.1.2, 7.2.4.1, SROCC Figure SPM.3 } (3.1.2, Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': '75\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3Salt\\nmarshesRocky\\nshoresSeagrass\\nmeadowsEpipelagic Warm-water\\ncoralsKelp\\nforestsAR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6 AR5 AR6Global surface temperature change\\nrelative to 1850–1900Global Reasons for Concern (RFCs) in AR5 (2014) vs. AR6 (2022)\\n°C\\n011.52345\\n011.52345°C0\\n–1\\n2000 2015 2050 210012345\\nvery lowlowintermediatehighvery high•••••••• ••••••• ••• ••••• •• ••••• •• ••• •• ••\\ndamageWildfire••• •• ••\\nDryland\\nwater \\nscarcity••• •• ••\\n0234\\n1.5\\n1'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': '0234\\n1.5\\n1\\nIncomplete\\nadaptationProactive\\nadaptationLimited\\nadaptation•• ••\\n•• •• ••Heat-related morbidity and mortality\\nhigh\\nChallenges to Adaptationlow•••••••••••••• ••• ••••••• ••• •••••• •• •••• •• •••• •• ••Confidence level\\nassigned to transition range\\nmidpoint of transitionRisk/impact\\nLow Very highVery high\\nHighModerateUndetectable•\\n•••••\\n••••Transition range\\n°C°C\\nPermafrost \\ndegradation••• ••• ••\\ne.g. increase in the \\nlength of fire seasone.g. over 100 million additional people exposed0\\n–1'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': '–1\\n1950 2000 2015 20501234\\n50100\\n075\\n25\\nResource-rich\\ncoastal citiesLarge tropical\\nagricultural\\ndeltasArctic\\ncommunitiesUrban\\natoll islandsr\\nR\\nMaximum potential\\nresponseNo-to-moderateresponserR rR rR rR\\nGlobal mean sea level rise relative to 1900\\n50100\\n0\\n1950 2000 2050 210075\\n25cm cm\\nvery high\\nhighintermediatelowvery lowc) Risks to coastal geographies increase with sea level rise and depend on responses\\n1986-2005\\nbaselinelow-likelihood, high impact'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': 'storyline, including ice-sheet instability processes\\n•••• ••• ••••••\\n•••• •••d) Adaptation and \\nsocio-economic pathways \\naffect levels of climate related risksb) Risks differ by system\\nSSP1 SSP3Risks are increasing with every increment of warming\\nGlobal\\naggregate\\nimpactsUnique &\\nthreatened\\nsystemsExtreme\\nweather\\neventsDistribution\\nof impactsLarge scale\\nsingular\\neventsrisk is the potential for adverse consequences\\n••• •• ••\\nTree\\nmortality\\ne.g. coral \\nreefs decline >99%\\ne.g. coral'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': 'e.g. coral \\nreefs decline by 70–90%Land-based systems Ocean/coastal ecosystems\\nFood insecurity\\n(availability, access)\\na) High risks are now assessed to occur at lower global warming levels'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': 'The SSP1 pathway illustrates a world with low population growth, high income, and reduced inequalities, food produced in low GHG emission systems, effective land use regulation and high adaptive capacity (i.e., low challenges to adaptation). The SSP3 pathway has the opposite trends.shading represents the uncertainty ranges for the low and high emissions scenarios\\n2011-2020 was \\naround 1.1°C warmer than 1850-1900\\nCarbon\\nloss•• • ••\\n•••• •••\\nBiodiversity\\nloss\\nRisks are'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 90,\n", " 'content': 'loss\\nRisks are \\nassessed with medium confidence\\nLimited adaptation (failure to proactively \\nadapt; low investment in health systems); incomplete adaptation (incomplete adaptation planning; moderate investment in health systems); proactive adaptation (proactive adaptation management; higher investment in health systems)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '76\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3011.5234\\n011.5234°C\\n°C\\n011.5234\\n011.5234°C\\n°CEurope -Risks to people, economies and infrastructures due to coastal and inland flooding\\n-Stress and mortality to people due to increasing temperatures and heat extremes\\n-Marine and terrestrial ecosystems disruptions\\n-Water scarcity to multiple interconnected sectors\\n-Losses in crop production, due to compound heat and dry conditions, and extreme \\nweatherSmall'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': 'weatherSmall\\nIslands-Loss of terrestrial, marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services\\n-Loss of lives and assets, risk to food security and economic disruption due to destruction of settlements and infrastructure\\n-Economic decline and livelihood failure of fisheries, agriculture, tourism and from biodiversity loss from traditional agroecosystems \\n-Reduced habitability of reef and non-reef islands leading to increased displacement\\n-Risk to water security in almost every small island'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': 'Africa -Species extinction and reduction or irreversible loss of ecosystems and their services, including freshwater, land and ocean ecosystems\\n-Risk to food security, risk of malnutrition (micronutrient deficiency), and loss of livelihood due to reduced food production from crops, livestock and fisheries\\n-Risks to marine ecosystem health and to livelihoods in coastal communities'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-Increased human mortality and morbidity due to increased heat and infectious diseases (including vector-borne and diarrhoeal diseases)\\n-Reduced economic output and growth, and increased inequality and poverty rates \\n-Increased risk to water and energy security due to drought and heatAus-\\ntralasia-Degradation of tropical shallow coral reefs and associated biodiversity and ecosystem service values\\n-Loss of human and natural systems in low-lying coastal areas due to sea level rise'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-Impact on livelihoods and incomes due to decline in agricultural production\\n-Increase in heat-related mortality and morbidity for people and wildlife\\n-Loss of alpine biodiversity in Australia due to less snow\\nAsia -Urban infrastructure damage and impacts on human well-being and health due to flooding, especially in coastal cities and settlements\\n-Biodiversity loss and habitat shifts as well as associated disruptions in dependent human systems across freshwater, land, and ocean ecosystems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-More frequent, extensive coral bleaching and subsequent coral mortality induced by ocean warming and acidification, sea level rise, marine heat waves and resource extraction\\n-Decline in coastal fishery resources due to sea level rise, decrease in precipitation in some parts and increase in temperature\\n-Risk to food and water security due to increased temperature extremes, rainfall variability and droughtCentral\\nand\\nSouth\\nAmerica-Risk to water security'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-Severe health effects due to increasing epidemics, in particular vector-borne diseases\\n-Coral reef ecosystems degradation due to coral bleaching\\n-Risk to food security due to frequent/extreme droughts\\n-Damages to life and infrastructure due to floods, landslides, sea level rise, storm surges and coastal erosion North \\nAmerica-Climate-sensitive mental health outcomes, human mortality and morbidity due to increasing average temperature, weather and climate extremes, and compound climate hazards'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-Risk of degradation of marine, coastal and terrestrial ecosystems, including loss of biodiversity, function, and protective services \\n-Risk to freshwater resources with consequences for ecosystems, reduced surface water availability for irrigated agriculture, other human uses, and degraded water quality \\n-Risk to food and nutritional security through changes in agriculture, livestock, hunting, fisheries, and aquaculture productivity and access'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '-Risks to well-being, livelihoods and economic activities from cascading and compounding climate hazards, including risks to coastal cities, settlements and infrastructure from sea level riseDelayed\\nimpacts of\\nsea level\\nrise in the\\nMediterraneanFood\\nproduction\\nfrom crops,\\nfisheries and\\nlivestock\\nin AfricaMortality and\\nmorbidity\\nfrom heat and\\ninfectious\\ndisease\\nin AfricaBiodiversity\\nand\\necosystems\\nin Africa\\nHealth and\\nwellbeing\\nin the\\nMediterraneanWater scarcity\\nto people in\\nsoutheastern'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': 'southeastern\\nEuropeCoastal\\nflooding to\\npeople\\nand\\ninfrastructures\\nin EuropeHeat stress,\\nmortality\\nand\\nmorbidity\\nto people\\nin EuropeWater quality\\nand\\navailability\\nin the\\nMediterranean••• ••• •••••• ••• •••• •• ••\\n•••• ••••••\\nCosts and \\ndamages\\nrelated to\\nmaintenance and\\nreconstruction of\\ntransportation\\ninfrastructure in\\nNorth AmericaLyme\\ndisease in\\nNorth\\nAmerica\\nunder\\nincomplete\\nadaptation\\nscenarioLoss and\\ndegradation of\\ncoral reefs in \\nAustraliaReduced\\nviability of\\ntourism-\\nrelated\\nactivities in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': 'activities in\\nNorth\\nAmericaCascading\\nimpacts on\\ncities and\\nsettlements\\nin Australasia\\nChanges in\\nfisheries catch\\nfor Pollock\\nand\\nPacific Cod\\nin the ArcticCosts\\nand losses\\nfor key \\ninfrastructure\\nin the ArcticSea-ice\\ndependent\\necosystems\\n in the\\nAntarcticChanges \\nin krill\\nfisheries\\nin the\\nAntarcticSea-ice\\necosystems\\nfrom sea-ice\\n change in\\nthe Arctic•••••••••• •• ••\\n••• •• ••••• •• •••\\n••• ••• ••• •• ••• •• •••••• ••\\n•• • •\\n••• •• ••••• ••• •\\n••• •• •\\n•••• •••••• ••• ••'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': '•••• •••••• ••• ••\\n••• ••• ••••••••e) Examples of key risks in different regions\\nAbsence of risk diagrams does not imply absence of risks within a region. The development of synthetic diagrams for Small'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 91,\n", " 'content': 'Islands, Asia and Central and South America was limited due to the paucity of adequately downscaled climate projections, with uncertainty in the direction of change, the diversity of climatologies and socioeconomic contexts across countries within a region, and the resulting few numbers of impact and risk projections for different warming levels.\\nThe risks listed are of at least medium confidence level:'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': '77\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3Figure 3.3: Synthetic risk diagrams of global and sectoral assessments and examples of regional key risks. The burning embers result from a literature based \\nexpert elicitation. Panel (a): Left - Global surface temperature changes in °C relative to 1850 –1900. These changes were obtaine d by combining CMIP6 model simulations with'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'observational constraints based on past simulated warming, as well as an updated assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity. Very likely ranges are shown for the low and high \\nGHG emissions scenarios ( SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7 .0). Right - Global Reasons for Concern, comparing AR6 (thick embers) and AR5 (thin embers) assessments. Diagrams are shown for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'each RFC, assuming low to no adaptation (i.e., adaptation is fragmented, localised and comprises incremental adjustments to existing practices). However, the transition to a very \\nhigh-risk level has an emphasis on irreversibility and adaptation limits. The horizontal line denotes the present global warming of 1 .1°C which is used to separate the observed, past'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'impacts below the line from the future projected risks above it. Lines connect the midpoints of the transition from moderate to high risk across AR5 and AR6. Panel (b) : Risks for \\nland-based systems and ocean /coastal ecosystems. Diagrams shown for each risk assume low to no adaptation. Text bubbles indicate examples of impacts at a given warming level.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'Panel (c): Left - Global mean sea level change in centimetres, relative to 1900. The historical changes (black) are observed by tide gauges before 1992 and altimeters afterwards. \\nThe future changes to 2100 (coloured lines and shading) are assessed consistently with observational constraints based on emulation of CMIP , ice-sheet, and glacier models, and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'likely ranges are shown for SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0. Right - Assessment of the combined risk of coastal flooding, erosion and sali nization for four illustrative coastal geographies in \\n2100, due to changing mean and extreme sea levels, under two response scenarios, with respect to the SROCC baseline period (1986 –2005) and indicating the IPCC AR6 baseline'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'period (1995 –2014). The assessment does not account for changes in extreme sea level beyond those directly induced by mean sea le vel rise; risk levels could increase if other changes in \\nextreme sea levels were considered (e.g., due to changes in cyclone intensity). “No-to-moderate response” describes efforts as of today (i.e., no further significant action or new types of actions).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': '“Maximum potential response” represents a combination of responses implemented to their full extent and thus significant additional efforts compared to today, assuming minimal \\nfinancial, social and political barriers. The assessment criteria include exposure and vulnerability (density of assets, level of degradation of terrestrial and marine buffer ecosystems),'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'coastal hazards (flooding, shoreline erosion, salinization), in-situ responses (hard engineered coastal defences, ecosystem restoration or creation of new natural buffers areas, and \\nsubsidence management) and planned relocation. Planned relocation refers to managed retreat or resettlement. Forced displacement is not considered in this assessment. The term'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'response is used here instead of adaptation because some responses, such as retreat, may or may not be considered to be adaptation. Panel (d): Left - Heat-sensitive human \\nhealth outcomes under three scenarios of adaptation effectiveness. The diagrams are truncated at the nearest whole ºC within the range of temperature change in 2100 under'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'three SSP scenarios. Right - Risks associated with food security due to climate change and patterns of socio- economic development. Risks to food security include availability and \\naccess to food, including population at risk of hunger, food price increases and increases in disability adjusted life years attributable to childhood underweight. Risks are assessed'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'for two contrasted socio-economic pathways (SSP1 and SSP3) excluding the effects of targeted mitigation and adaptation policies . Panel (e) : Examples of regional key risks. Risks \\nidentified are of at least medium confidence level. Key risks are identified based on the magnitude of adverse consequences (pervasiveness of the consequences, degree of change,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'irreversibility of consequences, potential for impact thresholds or tipping points, potential for cascading effects beyond system boundaries); likelihood of adverse consequences; \\ntemporal characteristics of the risk; and ability to respond to the risk, e.g., by adaptation. {WGI Figure SPM.8; WGII SPM B.3.3, WGII Figure SPM.3, WGII SM 16.6, WGII SM 16.7.4; \\nSROCC Figure SPM.3d, SROCC SPM.5a, SROCC 4SM; SRCCL Figure SPM.2, SRCCL 7.3.1, SRCCL 7 SM } (Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': '3.1.3 The Likelihood and Risks of Abrupt and Irreversible \\nChange\\nThe likelihood of abrupt and irreversible changes and their impacts \\nincrease with higher global warming levels ( high confidence ). \\nAs warming levels increase, so do the risks of species extinction or \\nirreversible loss of biodiversity in ecosystems such as forests ( medium \\nconfidence ), coral reefs ( very high confidence ) and in Arctic regions \\n(high confidence ). Risks associated with large-scale singular events'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'or tipping points, such as ice sheet instability or ecosystem loss from \\ntropical forests, transition to high risk between 1.5°C to 2.5°C ( medium \\nconfidence ) and to very high risk between 2.5°C to 4°C ( low confidence ). \\nThe response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations \\ncan be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century \\ntime scales ( high confidence ). The probability of crossing uncertain'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'regional thresholds increases with further warming ( high confidence ). \\n{WGI SPM C.3.2 , WGI Box TS.9, WGI TS.2.6; WGII Figure SPM.3, \\nWGII SPM B.3.1, WGII SPM B.4.1, WGII SPM B.5.2, WGII Table TS.1, \\nWGII TS.C.1, WGII TS.C.13.3; SROCC SPM B.4 }\\nSea level rise is unavoidable for centuries to millennia due \\nto continuing deep ocean warming and ice sheet melt, and \\nsea levels will remain elevated for thousands of years ( high \\nconfidence ). Global mean sea level rise will continue in the 21st'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'century ( virtually certain ), with projected regional relative sea level rise \\nwithin 20% of the global mean along two-thirds of the global coastline \\n(medium confidence ). The magnitude, the rate, the timing of threshold \\nexceedances, and the long-term commitment of sea level rise depend \\non emissions, with higher emissions leading to greater and faster rates \\nof sea level rise. Due to relative sea level rise, extreme sea level events'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'that occurred once per century in the recent past are projected to occur \\nat least annually at more than half of all tide gauge locations by 2100 \\n123 This outcome is characterised by deep uncertainty: Its likelihood defies quantitative assessment but is considered due to its high potential impact. {WGI Box TS.1; \\nWGII Cross-Chapter Box DEEP }and risks for coastal ecosystems, people and infrastructure will continue \\nto increase beyond 2100 ( high confidence ). At sustained warming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'levels between 2°C and 3°C, the Greenland and West Antarctic ice \\nsheets will be lost almost completely and irreversibly over multiple \\nmillennia ( limited evidence ). The probability and rate of ice mass loss \\nincrease with higher global surface temperatures ( high confidence ). \\nOver the next 2000 years, global mean sea level will rise by about \\n2 to 3 m if warming is limited to 1.5°C and 2 to 6 m if limited to 2°C \\n(low confidence ). Projections of multi-millennial global mean sea level'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'rise are consistent with reconstructed levels during past warm climate \\nperiods: global mean sea level was very likely 5 to 25 m higher than today \\nroughly 3 million years ago, when global temperatures were 2.5°C to \\n4°C higher than 1850–1900 ( medium confidence ). Further examples \\nof unavoidable changes in the climate system due to multi-decadal \\nor longer response timescales include continued glacier melt ( very high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ) and permafrost carbon loss ( high confidence ). {WGI SPM B.5.2 , \\nWGI SPM B.5.3, WGI SPM B.5.4, WGI SPM C.2.5, WGI Box TS.4, \\nWGI Box TS.9, WGI 9.5.1; WGII TS C.5; SROCC SPM B.3, SROCC SPM B.6, \\nSROCC SPM B.9 } (Figure 3.4 )\\nThe probability of low- likelihood outcomes associated with \\npotentially very large impacts increases with higher global \\nwarming levels ( high confidence ). Warming substantially above the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': 'assessed very likely range for a given scenario cannot be ruled out, and \\nthere is high confidence this would lead to regional changes greater \\nthan assessed in many aspects of the climate system. Low- likelihood, \\nhigh- impact outcomes could occur at regional scales even for global warming \\nwithin the very likely assessed range for a given GHG emissions scenario. \\nGlobal mean sea level rise above the likely range – approaching 2 m by'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 92,\n", " 'content': '2100 and in excess of 15 m by 2300 under a very high GHG emissions \\nscenario ( SSP5-8.5) ( low confidence ) – cannot be ruled out due to \\ndeep uncertainty in ice-sheet processes123 and would have severe'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': '78\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3impacts on populations in low elevation coastal zones. If global \\nwarming increases, some compound extreme events124 will \\nbecome more frequent, with higher likelihood of unprecedented \\nintensities, durations or spatial extent ( high confidence ). The \\nAtlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation is very likely to weaken \\nover the 21st century for all considered scenarios (high confidence ), \\nhowever an abrupt collapse is not expected before 2100 ( medium'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). If such a low probability event were to occur, it would very \\nlikely cause abrupt shifts in regional weather patterns and water cycle, \\n124 See Annex I: Glossary. Examples of compound extreme events are concurrent heatwaves and droughts or compound flooding. {WGI SPM Footnote 18}such as a southward shift in the tropical rain belt, and large impacts \\non ecosystems and human activities. A sequence of large explosive'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'volcanic eruptions within decades, as have occurred in the past, is a \\nlow-likelihood high-impact event that would lead to substantial cooling \\nglobally and regional climate perturbations over several decades. \\n{WGI SPM B.5.3, WGI SPM C.3, WGI SPM C.3.1, WGI SPM C.3.2, \\nWGI SPM C.3.3, WGI SPM C.3.4, WGI SPM C.3.5, WGI Figure SPM.8, \\nWGI Box TS.3, WGI Figure TS.6, WGI Box 9.4; WGII SPM B.4.5, WGII SPM C.2.8; \\nSROCC SPM B.2.7 } (Figure 3.4, Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': '3.2 Long-term Adaptation Options and Limits\\nWith increasing warming, adaptation options will become more constrained and less effective. At higher levels \\nof warming, losses and damages will increase, and additional human and natural systems will reach adaptation \\nlimits. Integrated, cross-cutting multi- sectoral solutions increase the effectiveness of adaptation. Maladaptation \\ncan create lock-ins of vulnerability, exposure and risks but can be avoided by long-term planning and the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'implementation of adaptation actions that are flexible, multi- sectoral and inclusive. (high confidence )\\nThe effectiveness of adaptation to reduce climate risk is documented \\nfor specific contexts, sectors and regions and will decrease with \\nincreasing warming ( high confidence )125. For example, common \\nadaptation responses in agriculture – adopting improved cultivars and \\nagronomic practices, and changes in cropping patterns and crop'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'systems – will become less effective from 2°C to higher levels of \\nwarming ( high confidence ). The effectiveness of most water-related \\nadaptation options to reduce projected risks declines with increasing \\nwarming ( high confidence ). Adaptations for hydropower and \\nthermo-electric power generation are effective in most regions up to \\n1.5°C to 2°C, with decreasing effectiveness at higher levels of warming \\n(medium confidence ). Ecosystem-based Adaptation is vulnerable to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'climate change impacts, with effectiveness declining with increasing \\nglobal warming (high confidence ). Globally, adaptation options related \\nto agroforestry and forestry have a sharp decline in effectiveness at 3°C, \\nwith a substantial increase in residual risk ( medium confidence ). \\n{WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.2.1, WGII SPM C.2.5, WGII SPM C.2.10, \\nWGII Figure TS.6 Panel (e), 4.7.2 } \\nWith increasing global warming, more limits to adaptation will be'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'reached and losses and damages, strongly concentrated among the \\npoorest vulnerable populations, will increase ( high confidence ). \\nAlready below 1 .5°C, autonomous and evolutionary adaptation \\nresponses by terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems will increasingly \\nface hard limits ( high confidence ) (Section 2.1.2). Above 1.5°C, some \\necosystem-based adaptation measures will lose their effectiveness \\nin providing benefits to people as these ecosystems will reach hard'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation limits ( high confidence ). Adaptation to address the risks of \\nheat stress , heat mortality and reduced capacities for outdoor work \\nfor humans face soft and hard limits across regions that become \\nsignificantly more severe at 1.5°C, and are particularly relevant for \\nregions with warm climates ( high confidence ). Above 1.5°C global \\nwarming level , limited freshwater resources pose potential hard limits \\nfor small islands and for regions dependent on glacier and snow melt'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': '124 See Annex I: Glossary. Examples of compound extreme events are concurrent heatwaves and droughts or compound flooding. {WGI SPM Footnote 18 }\\n125 There are limitations to assessing the full scope of adaptation options available in the future since not all possible future adaptation responses can be incorporated in climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'impact models, and projections of future adaptation depend on currently available technologies or approaches. {WGII 4.7.2 }(medium confidence ). By 2°C, soft limits are projected for multiple \\nstaple crops, particularly in tropical regions ( high confidence ). By 3°C, \\nsoft limits are projected for some water management measures for \\nmany regions, with hard limits projected for parts of Europe (medium \\nconfidence ). {WGII SPM C.3, WGII SPM C.3.3, WGII SPM C.3.4, WGII SPM C.3.5,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'WGII TS.D.2.2, WGII TS.D.2.3; SR1.5 SPM B.6; SROCC SPM C.1 }\\nIntegrated, cross-cutting multi- sectoral solutions increase the \\neffectiveness of adaptation. For example, inclusive, integrated \\nand long-term planning at local, municipal, sub- national and national \\nscales, together with effective regulation and monitoring systems \\nand financial and technological resources and capabilities foster \\nurban and rural system transition. There are a range of cross-cutting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation options, such as disaster risk management, early warning \\nsystems, climate services and risk spreading and sharing that have \\nbroad applicability across sectors and provide greater benefits to other \\nadaptation options when combined. Transitioning from incremental to \\ntransformational adaptation, and addressing a range of constraints, \\nprimarily in the financial, governance, institutional and policy domains, \\ncan help overcome soft adaptation limits. However, adaptation does'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'not prevent all losses and damages, even with effective adaptation and \\nbefore reaching soft and hard limits. (high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.2, \\nWGII SPM C.2.6, WGII SPM.C.2.13, WGII SPM C.3.1, WGII SPM.C.3.4, \\nWGII SPM C.3.5, WGII Figure TS.6 Panel (e) }\\nMaladaptive responses to climate change can create lock-ins of \\nvulnerability, exposure and risks that are difficult and expensive \\nto change and exacerbate existing inequalities. Actions that focus'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 93,\n", " 'content': 'on sectors and risks in isolation and on short-term gains often lead \\nto maladaptation. Adaptation options can become maladaptive due \\nto their environmental impacts that constrain ecosystem services and \\ndecrease biodiversity and ecosystem resilience to climate change or by \\ncausing adverse outcomes for different groups, exacerbating inequity. \\nMaladaptation can be avoided by flexible, multi- sectoral, inclusive and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 94,\n", " 'content': '79\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3long-term planning and implementation of adaptation actions with \\nbenefits to many sectors and systems. (high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.4, \\nWGII SPM.C.4.1, WGII SPM C.4.2, WGII SPM C.4.3 }\\nSea level rise poses a distinctive and severe adaptation challenge \\nas it implies both dealing with slow onset changes and increases \\nin the frequency and magnitude of extreme sea level events ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 94,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). Such adaptation challenges would occur much earlier \\nunder high rates of sea level rise ( high confidence ). Responses to ongoing \\nsea level rise and land subsidence include protection, accommodation, \\nadvance and planned relocation ( high confidence ). These responses \\nare more effective if combined and/or sequenced, planned well ahead, \\naligned with sociocultural values and underpinned by inclusive \\ncommunity engagement processes ( high confidence ). Ecosystem-based'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 94,\n", " 'content': 'solutions such as wetlands provide co-benefits for the environment \\nand climate mitigation, and reduce costs for flood defences ( medium \\nconfidence) , but have site-specific physical limits, at least above 1.5ºC \\nof global warming (high confidence ) and lose effectiveness at high \\nrates of sea level rise beyond 0.5 to 1 cm yr-1 (medium confidence ). \\nSeawalls can be maladaptive as they effectively reduce impacts in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 94,\n", " 'content': 'short term but can also result in lock-ins and increase exposure to climate \\nrisks in the long term unless they are integrated into a long-term adaptive \\nplan ( high confidence ). {WGI SPM C.2.5; WGII SPM C.2.8, WGII SPM C.4.1; \\nWGII 13.10, WGII Cross-Chapter B ox SLR; SROCC SPM B. 9, SROCC SPM C.3.2, \\nSROCC Figure SPM.4, SROCC Figure SPM.5c } (Figure 3.4 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 95,\n", " 'content': '80\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 32020 2100 2050 2150Ecosystem-based adaptation\\nSediment-based protection\\nElevating houses\\nProtect levees\\nProtect barriers\\nPlanned relocation≈30 years\\n≈50 years\\n≥100 years≈100 years≈15 years\\n≈15 years\\nIndicative time for planning and implementation\\nTypical intended lifetime of measuresLong-living \\nsocietal \\nlegacy\\n01m2m3m\\n01m2m4m5m6m7m\\n3m4m5m15m\\n2000 2020 1950 1900 2100 2050 2150 2300Sea level rise \\ngreater than 15m cannot be ruled out with very high emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 95,\n", " 'content': 'Low-likelihood, high-impact storyline, including ice sheet \\ninstability processes under the very high emissions scenarioObservedUnavoidable sea level rise will cause:\\nThese cascade into risks to: livelihoods, settlements, health, \\nwell-being, food and water security and cultural values.Losses of coastal \\necosystems and \\necosystem services Groundwater \\nsalinisation Flooding and damages \\nto coastal infrastructureGlobal sea level rise \\nin meters relative to 1900'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 95,\n", " 'content': 'sea level rise by 2100 depends on the emissions scenariothis can be chronic high tide flooding and extreme flooding during storms\\nlikely ranges of sea level rise\\nvery lowlowintermediatehighvery high\\nlow emissions scenario range\\nvery high emissions scenario range\\na) Sea level rise: observations and projections 2020-2100, 2150, 2300 (relative to 1900)Sea level rise will continue for millennia, but how \\nfast and how much depends on future emissions\\nExample: timing of 0.5m sea level rise'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 95,\n", " 'content': '2000 2100 2200 2300+\\nvery lowvery highHigher greenhouse gas emissions lead to larger and \\nfaster sea level rise, demanding earlier and stronger responses, and reducing the lifetime of some options\\nKey\\nResponding to sea level rise requires long-term planning\\nb) Typical timescales of coastal risk-management measures\\n1 billion\\npeople exposedBy 2050:\\nExtreme sea level events that occured once per century will be \\n20-30 times more frequent'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': '81\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3Figure 3.4: Observed and projected global mean sea level change and its impacts, and time scales of coastal risk management. Panel (a): Global mean sea \\nlevel change in metres relative to 1900. The historical changes (black) are observed by tide gauges before 1992 and altimeters afterwards. The future changes to 2100 and for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': '2150 (coloured lines and shading) are assessed consistently with observational constraints based on emulation of CMIP , ice-sheet, and glacier models, and median values and \\nlikely ranges are shown for the considered scenarios. Relative to 1995-2014, the likely global mean sea level rise by 2050 is between 0.15 to 0.23 m in the very low'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9) and 0.20 to 0.29 m in the very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5); by 2100 between 0.28 to 0.55 m under SSP1-1.9 and 0.63 to 1.01 m under \\nSSP5-8.5; and by 2150 between 0.37 to 0.86 m under SSP1-1.9 and 0.98 to 1.88 m under SSP5-8.5 (medium confidence) . Changes relative to 1900 are calculated by adding 0.158'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'm (observed global mean sea level rise from 1900 to 1995-2014) to simulated changes relative to 1995-2014. The future changes to 2300 (bars) are based on literature assessment, \\nrepresenting the 17th–83rd percentile range for SSP1-2.6 (0.3 to 3.1 m) and SSP5-8.5 (1.7 to 6.8 m). Red dashed lines: Low- likelihood, high-impact storyline, including ice sheet'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'instability processes. These indicate the potential impact of deeply uncertain processes, and show the 83rd percentile of SSP5-8.5 projections that include low- likelihood, high-\\nimpact processes that cannot be ruled out; because of low confidence in projections of these processes, this is not part of a likely range. IPCC AR6 global and regional sea level'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'projections are hosted at https://sealevel.nasa.gov/ipcc-ar6-sea-level-projection-tool . The low-lying coastal zone is currently home to around 896 million people (nearly 11% of the \\n2020 global population), projected to reach more than one billion by 2050 across all five SSPs. Panel (b): Typical time scales for the planning, implementation (dashed bars) and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'operational lifetime of current coastal risk-management measures (blue bars). Higher rates of sea level rise demand earlier and stronger responses and reduce the lifetime of measures (inset). \\nAs the scale and pace of sea level rise accelerates beyond 2050, long-term adjustments may in some locations be beyond the limits of current adaptation options and for some small'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 96,\n", " 'content': 'islands and low-lying coasts could be an existential risk. { WGI SPM B.5, WGI C.2.5, WGI Figure SPM.8, WGI 9.6; WGII SPM B.4.5, WGII B.5.2, WGII C.2.8, WGII D.3.3, WGII TS.D.7, \\nWGII Cross-Chapter Box SLR } (Cross-Section Box.2 )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': '82\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 33.3 Mitigation Pathways\\nLimiting human-caused global warming requires net zero anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. Pathways consistent \\nwith 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets imply rapid, deep, and in most cases immediate GHG emission reductions in \\nall sectors ( high confidence ). Exceeding a warming level and returning (i.e. overshoot) implies increased risks \\nand potential irreversible impacts; achieving and sustaining global net negative CO 2 emissions would reduce'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'warming (high confidence ).\\n3.3.1 Remaining Carbon Budgets\\nLimiting global temperature increase to a specific level requires \\nlimiting cumulative net CO 2 emissions to within a finite carbon \\nbudget126, along with strong reductions in other GHGs. For every \\n1000 GtCO 2 emitted by human activity, global mean temperature rises \\nby likely 0.27°C to 0.63°C (best estimate of 0.45°C). This relationship \\nimplies that there is a finite carbon budget that cannot be exceeded in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'order to limit warming to any given level. { WGI SPM D.1, WGI SPM D.1.1; \\nSR1.5 SPM C.1.3 } (Figure 3.5 )\\nThe best estimates of the remaining carbon budget (RCB) from \\nthe beginning of 2020 for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a 50% \\nlikelihood127 is estimated to be 500 GtCO 2; for 2°C (67% likelihood) \\nthis is 1150 GtCO 2.128 Remaining carbon budgets have been quantified \\nbased on the assessed value of TCRE and its uncertainty, estimates of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'historical warming, climate system feedbacks such as emissions from \\nthawing permafrost, and the global surface temperature change after \\nglobal anthropogenic CO 2 emissions reach net zero, as well as variations \\nin projected warming from non-CO 2 emissions due in part to mitigation \\naction. The stronger the reductions in non-CO 2 emissions the lower the \\nresulting temperatures are for a given RCB or the larger RCB for the \\nsame level of temperature change. For instance, the RCB for limiting'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'warming to 1.5°C with a 50% likelihood could vary between 300 to \\n600 GtCO 2 depending on non-CO 2 warming129. Limiting warming to 2°C \\nwith a 67% (or 83%) likelihood would imply a RCB of 1150 (900) GtCO 2 \\nfrom the beginning of 2020. To stay below 2°C with a 50% likelihood, \\nthe RCB is higher, i.e., 1350 GtCO 2130. {WGI SPM D.1.2, WGI Table SPM.2; \\nWGIII Box SPM.1, WGIII Box 3.4; SR1.5 SPM C.1.3 }\\n126 See Annex I: Glossary.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': '127 This likelihood is based on the uncertainty in transient climate response to cumulative net CO 2 emissions and additional Earth system feedbacks and provides the probability that \\nglobal warming will not exceed the temperature levels specified. {WGI Table SPM.1 }\\n128 Global databases make different choices about which emissions and removals occurring on land are considered anthropogenic. Most countries report their anthropogenic'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'land CO 2 fluxes including fluxes due to human-caused environmental change (e.g., CO 2 fertilisation) on ‘managed’ land in their National GHG inventories. Using emissions \\nestimates based on these inventories, the remaining carbon budgets must be correspondingly reduced. {WGIII SPM Footnote 9, WGIII TS.3, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 6 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': '129 The central case RCB assumes future non-CO 2 warming (the net additional contribution of aerosols and non-CO 2 GHG) of around 0.1°C above 2010 –2019 in line with stringent \\nmitigation scenarios. If additional non-CO 2 warming is higher, the RCB for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a 50% likelihood shrinks to around 300 GtCO 2. If, however, additional'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'non-CO 2 warming is limited to only 0.05°C (via stronger reductions of CH 4 and N 2O through a combination of deep structural and behavioural changes, e.g., dietary changes), \\nthe RCB could be around 600 GtCO 2 for 1.5°C warming. {WGI Table SPM.2, WGI Box TS.7; WGIII Box 3.4 }\\n130 When adjusted for emissions since previous reports, these RCB estimates are similar to SR1.5 but larger than AR5 values due to methodological improvements. {WGI SPM D.1.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': '131 Uncertainties for total carbon budgets have not been assessed and could affect the specific calculated fractions. \\n132 See footnote 131. \\n133 These projected adjustments of carbon sinks to stabilisation or decline of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations are accounted for in calculations of remaining carbon budgets. \\n{WGI SPM footnote 32 }If the annual CO 2 emissions between 2020–2030 stayed, on average, \\nat the same level as 2019, the resulting cumulative emissions would'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'almost exhaust the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C (50%), and \\nexhaust more than a third of the remaining carbon budget for 2°C \\n(67%) (Figure 3.5). Based on central estimates only, historical cumulative \\nnet CO 2 emissions between 1850 and 2019 (2400 ±240 GtCO 2) amount \\nto about four-fifths131 of the total carbon budget for a 50% probability of \\nlimiting global warming to 1. 5°C (central estimate about 2900 GtCO 2) and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'to about two-thirds132 of the total carbon budget for a 67% probability \\nto limit global warming to 2°C (central estimate about 3550 GtCO 2). \\n{WGI Table SPM.2; WGIII SPM B.1.3, WGIII Table 2.1 }\\nIn scenarios with increasing CO 2 emissions, the land and ocean \\ncarbon sinks are projected to be less effective at slowing the \\naccumulation of CO 2 in the atmosphere (high confidence ). While \\nnatural land and ocean carbon sinks are projected to take up, in absolute'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'terms, a progressively larger amount of CO 2 under higher compared to \\nlower CO 2 emissions scenarios, they become less effective, that is, the \\nproportion of emissions taken up by land and ocean decreases with \\nincreasing cumulative net CO 2 emissions ( high confidence ). Additional \\necosystem responses to warming not yet fully included in climate models, \\nsuch as GHG fluxes from wetlands, permafrost thaw, and wildfires,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 97,\n", " 'content': 'would further increase concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere \\n(high confidence ). In scenarios where CO 2 concentrations peak and \\ndecline during the 21st century, the land and ocean begin to take up less \\ncarbon in response to declining atmospheric CO 2 concentrations ( high \\nconfidence ) and turn into a weak net source by 2100 in the very low \\nGHG emissions scenario (medium confidence )133. {WGI SPM B.4, \\nWGI SPM B.4.1, WGI SPM B.4.2, WGI SPM B.4.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': '83\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 30 1000 500 1500 2000\\n2020 a) Carbon budgets and emissions\\nLifetime emissions from fossil fuel \\ninfrastructure without additional abatement, \\nif historical operating patterns are maintained2020–2030 CO 2 emissions \\nassuming constant at 2019 level1.5°C (>50% chance)\\n2°C (83% chance)\\n2°C (>67% chance)\\nExisting\\nExisting and\\n plannedHistorical emissions 1850-20192°C\\n(83%)1.5°C\\n(>50%)Carbon budgets\\n1000 0 2000\\nRemaining \\ncarbon budgets'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'carbon budgets\\ndifferent emissions scenarios and their ranges of warming Remaining carbon budgets to limit warming to 1.5°C could \\nsoon be exhausted, and those for 2°C largely depleted\\nRemaining carbon budgets are similar to emissions from use of existing \\nand planned fossil fuel infrastructure, without additional abatement\\nthese emissions determine how \\nmuch warming we will experienceWarming since 1850-1900°C\\nCumulative CO 2 emissions (GtCO 2) since 1850\\nHistorical global'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'Historical global\\nwarmingSSP1-1.9SSP1-2.6SSP2-4.5SSP3-7.0SSP5-8.5\\n1000 2000 3000 4000 4500\\n–0.500.511.522.53\\nhistorical since 2020 Cumulative CO 2 emissions (GtCO 2)\\nthis line indicates maximum emissions to stay within 2°C of warming (with 83% chance)\\nEvery ton of CO 2 adds to global warming\\nb) Cumulative CO2 emissions and warming until 2050'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'Figure 3.5: Cumulative past, projected, and committed emissions, and associated global temperature changes. Panel (a) Assessed remaining carbon budgets to limit \\nwarming more likely than not to 1.5°C, to 2°C with a 83% and 67% likelihood, compared to cumulative emissions corresponding to constant 2019 emissions until 2030, existing and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'planned fossil fuel infrastructures (in GtCO 2). For remaining carbon budgets, thin lines indicate the uncertainty due to the contribution of non-CO 2 warming. For lifetime emissions from \\nfossil fuel infrastructure, thin lines indicate the assessed sensitivity range. Panel (b) Relationship between cumulative CO 2 emissions and the increase in global surface temperature.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'Historical data (thin black line) shows historical CO 2 emissions versus observed global surface temperature increase relative to the period 1850-1900. The grey range with its central \\nline shows a corresponding estimate of the human-caused share of historical warming. Coloured areas show the assessed very likely range of global surface temperature projections,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 98,\n", " 'content': 'and thick coloured central lines show the median estimate as a function of cumulative CO 2 emissions for the selected scenarios SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5. \\nProjections until 2050 use the cumulative CO 2 emissions of each respective scenario, and the projected global warming includes the contribution from all anthropogenic forcers. { WGI SPM D.1, \\nWGI Figure SPM.10, WGI Table SPM.2; WGIII SPM B.1, WGIII SPM B.7, WGIII 2.7; SR1.5 SPM C.1.3 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '84\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3 \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n 2030 43 \\n[34-60]41 \\n[31-59]48 \\n[35-61]23 \\n[0-44]21 \\n[1-42]27 \\n[13-45]5 \\n[0-14]10 \\n[0-27]\\n2040 \\n2050 84 \\n[73-98]85 \\n[72-100]84 \\n[76-93]75 \\n[62-91]64 \\n[53-77]63 \\n[52-76]68 \\n[56-83]49 \\n[35-65]29\\n[11-48]5\\n[-2 to 18]\\nNet zero \\nCO\\n2 \\n(% net zero \\npathways) \\n 2050-2055 (100%) \\n[2035-2070]2055-2060 \\n(100%) \\n[2045-2070]2070-2075 \\n(93%) \\n[2055-...]2070-2075 \\n(91%) \\n[2055-...]2065-2070 \\n(97%) \\n[2055-2090]2080-2085\\n(86%)\\n[2065-...]\\nNet zero'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'Net zero \\nGHGs\\n(5) \\n(% net zero \\npathways) 2095-2100 \\n(52%) \\n[2050-...]2070-2075 \\n(100%) \\n[2050-2090 ]...-...\\n(0%) \\n[...-...]2070-2075 \\n(87%) \\n[2055-...]...-...\\n(30%) \\n[2075-...]...-... \\n(24%) \\n[2080-...]...-...\\n(41%) \\n[2075-...]...-...\\n(31%) \\n[2075-...]\\n 2020 to \\nnet zero \\nCO 2 510 \\n[330-710]550 \\n[340-760]460 \\n[320-590]720 \\n[530-930]890 \\n[640-1160]860 \\n[640-1180]910 \\n[720-1150]1210\\n[970-1490]1780\\n[1400-2360]\\n2020–\\n2100 320 \\n[-210-570]160 \\n[-220-620]360 \\n[10-540]400 \\n[-90-620]800'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '[-90-620]800 \\n[510-1140]790 \\n[480-1150]800 \\n[560-1050]1160 \\n[700-1490]\\n at peak \\nwarming 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 \\n1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9\\n2100 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 \\nLikelihood \\nof peak \\nglobal \\nwarming \\nstaying \\nbelow (%) \\no <1.5°C 38 \\n[33-58]38 \\n[34-60]37 \\n[33-56]24 \\n[15-42]20 \\n[13-41]21 \\n[14-42]17 \\n[12-35]11\\n[7-22]\\n<2.0°C 90 \\n[86-97]90 \\n[85-97]89 \\n[87-96]82 \\n[71-93]76 \\n[68-91]78 \\n[69-91]73 \\n[67-87]59\\n[50-77]\\n<3.0°C 100 \\n[99-100]100 \\n[99-100]100 \\n[99-100]100 \\n[99-100]99 \\n[98-100]100 \\n[98-100]99'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '[98-100]99 \\n[98-99]98 91 \\n[95-99] p50\\n[p5-p95] (1)GHG emissions \\nreductionsfrom 2019 (%) \\n(3)/uni00A0Emissions milestones (4)/uni00A0Cumulative CO 2\\nemissions [Gt CO 2](6)Likelihood of peak global warming staying below (%)Global mean temperature changes 50% probability (°C)69\\n[58-90]66\\n[58-89]70\\n[62-87]55\\n[40-71]46\\n[34-63]47\\n[35-63]46\\n[34-63]31\\n[20-5]18\\n[4-33]3\\n[-14 to 14]6\\n[-1 to 18]2\\n[-10 to 11]\\nMedian 5-year intervals at \\nwhich projected CO 2 & GHG'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'emissions of pathways in this category reach net-zero, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets. Percentage of net zero pathways is denoted in round brackets. Three dots (…) denotes net zero not reached for that percentile.\\nMedian cumulative net CO\\n2 \\nemissions across the \\nprojected scenarios in this category until reaching net-zero or until 2100, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.\\nProjected temperature'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'change of pathways in this category (50% probability across the range of climate uncertainties), relative to 1850-1900, at peak warming and in 2100, for the median value across the scenarios and the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.\\nMedian likelihood that the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'projected pathways in this category stay below a given global warming level, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.Projected median GHG emissions reductions of pathways in the year across the scenarios compared to modelled 2019, with the 5th-95th percentile in brackets. Negative numbers indicate increase in emissions compared to 2019Modelled global emissions pathways categorised by projected global warming levels (GWL). Detailed likelihood definitions are provided in SPM'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'are provided in SPM Box1. The five illustrative scenarios (SSPx-yy) considered by AR6 WGI and the Illustrative (Mitigation) Pathways assessed in WGIII are aligned with the tempera-ture categories and are indicated in a separate column. Global emission pathways contain regionally differentiated information. This assessment focuses on their global characteristics.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '...-...\\n(41%)\\n[2080-...]\\n...-...\\n(12%) \\n[2090-...]\\nno\\nnet-zero\\nno\\npeaking\\nby 2100no\\nnet-zerono\\nnet-zero\\n1780\\n[1260-2360]2790\\n[2440-3520]\\n[1.4-1.6] [1.4-1.6] [1.5-1.6] [1.5-1.8] [1.6-1.8] [1.6-1.8] [1.6-1.8] [1.7-2.0] [1.9-2.5]\\n[1.1-1.5] [1.1-1.4] [1.3-1.5] [1.2-1.5] [1.5-1.8] [1.5-1.8] [1.5-1.7] [1.5-2.0] [1.9-2.5] [2.4-2.9]2.2\\n2.1 2.7\\n4\\n[0-10]\\n37\\n[18-59]\\n[83-98]710\\n[0-0]\\n8\\n[2-18]\\n[53-88]Category/\\nsubset \\nlabel limit \\nwarming \\nto 1.5°C \\n(>50%) \\nwith no \\nor \\nlimited \\novershoot…\\nwith \\nnet zero'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'with \\nnet zero \\nGHGs … \\nwithout \\nnet zero \\nGHGsreturn \\nwarming \\nto 1.5°C \\n(>50%) \\nafter a \\nhigh \\novershootlimit \\nwarming \\nto 2°C \\n(>67%) …\\nwith \\naction \\nstarting \\nin 2020 …\\nNDCs \\nuntil \\n2030 limit\\nwarming\\nto 2°C\\n(>50%)limit\\nwarming\\nto 2.5°C\\n(>50%)limit\\nwarming\\nto 3°C\\n(>50%)[212]Category \\n(2) \\n[# pathways]C1\\n[97] C1a\\n[50]C1b\\n[47]C2\\n[133]C3\\n[311] C3a \\n[204]C3b[97]C4\\n[159]C5 C6'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '[159]C5 C6\\n[97]Table 3.1: Key characteristics of the modelled global emissions pathways. Summary of projected CO 2 and GHG emissions, projected net zero timings and the resulting global \\nwarming outcomes. Pathways are categorised (columns), according to their likelihood of limiting warming to different peak warming levels (if peak temperature occurs before 2100)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'and 2100 warming levels. Values shown are for the median [p50] and 5–95th percentiles [p5–p95], noting that not all pathways achieve net zero CO 2 or GHGs. { WGIII Table SPM.2 }\\n1 Detailed explanations on the Table are provided in WGIII Box SPM.1 and WGIII Table SPM.2. The relationship between the temperature categories and SSP/RCPs is discussed'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'in Cross-Section Box.2. Values in the table refer to the 50th and [5–95th] percentile values across the pathways falling within a given category as defined in WGIII Box SPM.1. \\nThe three dots (…) sign denotes that the value cannot be given (as the value is after 2100 or, for net zero, net zero is not reached). Based on the assessment of climate emulators'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'in AR6 WG I (Chapter 7, Box 7.1), two climate emulators were used for the probabilistic assessment of the resulting warming of the pathways. For the ‘Temperature Change’ \\nand ‘Likelihood’ columns, the non-bracketed values represent the 50th percentile across the pathways in that category and the median [50th percentile] across the warming'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': 'estimates of the probabilistic MAGICC climate model emulator. For the bracketed ranges in the “ likelihood” column, the median warming for every pathway in that category \\nis calculated for each of the two climate model emulators (MAGICC and FaIR). These ranges cover both the uncertainty of the emissions pathways as well as the climate \\nemulators’ uncertainty. All global warming levels are relative to 1850-1900.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 99,\n", " 'content': '2 C3 pathways are sub-categorised according to the timing of policy action to match the emissions pathways in WGIII Figure SPM.4. \\n3 Global emission reductions in mitigation pathways are reported on a pathway-by-pathway basis relative to harmonised modelled global emissions in 2019 rather than'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': '85\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 33.3.2 Net Zero Emissions: Timing and Implications\\nFrom a physical science perspective, limiting human-caused \\nglobal warming to a specific level requires limiting cumulative \\nCO 2 emissions, reaching net zero or net negative CO 2 emissions, \\nalong with strong reductions of other GHG emissions \\n(see Cross-Section Box.1). Global modelled pathways that reach \\nand sustain net zero GHG emissions are projected to result in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'a gradual decline in surface temperature ( high confidence ). \\nReaching net zero GHG emissions primarily requires deep reductions in \\nCO 2, methane, and other GHG emissions, and implies net negative \\nCO 2 emissions.134 Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) will be necessary to \\nachieve net negative CO 2 emissions135. Achieving global net zero \\nCO 2 emissions, with remaining anthropogenic CO 2 emissions balanced by \\ndurably stored CO 2 from anthropogenic removal, is a requirement to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'stabilise CO 2-induced global surface temperature increase (see 3.3.3) \\n(high confidence ). This is different from achieving net zero GHG \\nemissions, where metric-weighted anthropogenic GHG emissions (see \\nCross-Section Box.1) equal CO 2 removal (high confidence ). Emissions \\npathways that reach and sustain net zero GHG emissions defined by the \\n100-year global warming potential imply net negative CO 2 emissions \\nand are projected to result in a gradual decline in surface temperature'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'after an earlier peak (high confidence ). While reaching net zero CO 2 or net \\nzero GHG emissions requires deep and rapid reductions in gross \\nemissions, the deployment of CDR to counterbalance hard-\\nto-abate residual emissions (e.g., some emissions from agriculture, \\naviation, shipping , and industrial processes) is unavoidable (high \\nconfidence ). {WGI SPM D.1, WGI SPM D.1.1, WGI SPM D.1.8; WGIII SPM C.2, \\nWGIII SPM C.3, WGIII SPM C.11, WGIII Box TS.6; SR1.5 SPM A.2.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'In modelled pathways, the timing of net zero CO 2 emissions, \\nfollowed by net zero GHG emissions, depends on several \\nvariables, including the desired climate outcome, the mitigation \\nstrategy and the gases covered (high confidence ). Global net zero \\nCO 2 emissions are reached in the early 2050s in pathways that limit \\nwarming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and around \\nthe early 2070s in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%). While'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'non-CO 2 GHG emissions are strongly reduced in all pathways that limit \\nwarming to 2°C (>67%) or lower, residual emissions of CH 4 and N2O \\nand F-gases of about 8 [5–11] Gt CO 2-eq yr-1 remain at the time of \\n134 Net zero GHG emissions defined by the 100-year global warming potential. See footnote 70.\\n135 See Section 3.3.3 and 3.4.1.net zero GHG, counterbalanced by net negative CO 2 emissions. \\nAs a result, net zero CO 2 would be reached before net zero GHGs'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.2, WGIII SPM C.2.3, WGIII SPM C.2.4, \\nWGIII Table SPM.2, WGIII 3.3 } (Figure 3.6) the global emissions reported in WGIII SPM Section B and WGIII Chapter 2; this ensures internal consistency in assumptions about emission sources and activities, as well as \\nconsistency with temperature projections based on the physical climate science assessment by WGI (see WGIII SPM Footnote 49). Negative values (e.g., in C5, C6) represent'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'an increase in emissions. The modelled GHG emissions in 2019 are 55 [53–58] GtCO 2-eq, thus within the uncertainty ranges of estimates for 2019 emissions [53-66] GtCO 2-eq \\n(see 2.1.1). \\n4 Emissions milestones are provided for 5-year intervals in order to be consistent with the underlying 5-year time-step data of the modelled pathways. Ranges in square'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': 'brackets underneath refer to the range across the pathways, comprising the lower bound of the 5th percentile 5-year interval and the upper bound of the 95th percentile \\n5-year interval. Numbers in round brackets signify the fraction of pathways that reach specific milestones over the 21st century. Percentiles reported across all pathways in \\nthat category include those that do not reach net zero before 2100.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': '5 For cases where models do not report all GHGs, missing GHG species are infilled and aggregated into a Kyoto basket of GHG emissions in CO 2-eq defined by the 100-year \\nglobal warming potential. For each pathway, reporting of CO 2, CH 4, and N 2O emissions was the minimum required for the assessment of the climate response and the assignment \\nto a climate category. Emissions pathways without climate assessment are not included in the ranges presented here. See WGIII Annex III.II.5.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 100,\n", " 'content': '6 Cumulative emissions are calculated from the start of 2020 to the time of net zero and 2100, respectively. They are based on harmonised net CO 2 emissions, ensuring \\nconsistency with the WG I assessment of the remaining carbon budget. {WGIII Box 3.4, WGIII SPM Footnote 50 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': '86\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 3\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\n0\\n20\\n40\\n60\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\n0\\n20\\n40\\n60\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\n2000\\n2020\\n2040\\n2060\\n2080\\n2100\\nGigatons of CO 2 equivalent per year (GtCO 2-eq/yr) \\nCO 2GHG\\nCO 2GHG\\nCH 4\\nCO 2GHG\\nCH 4a) While keeping warming to 1.5°C \\n(>50%) with no or limited overshootb) While keeping warming to 2°C (>67%)\\nc) Timing for net zero net zero net zeroHistorical HistoricalPolicies in place in 2020 Policies in place in 2020'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'GHGs reach net zero \\nlater than CO 2\\nnot all scenarios reach net zero GHG by 2100\\nGlobal modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with \\nno or limited overshoot reach net zero CO2 emissions around 2050\\nTotal greenhouse gases (GHG) reach net zero later\\nFigure 3.6: Total GHG, CO 2 and CH 4 emissions and timing of reaching net zero in different mitigation pathways. Top row: GHG, CO 2 and CH 4 emissions over time (in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'GtCO 2eq) with historical emissions, projected emissions in line with policies implemented until the end of 2020 (grey), and pathways consistent with temperature goals in colour \\n(blue, purple, and brown, respectively). Panel (a) (left) shows pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1) and Panel (b) (right) shows'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) (C3). Bottom row: Panel (c) shows median (vertical line), likely (bar) and very likely (thin lines) timing of reaching net zero GHG \\nand CO 2 emissions for global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1) (left) or 2°C (>67%) (C3) (right). {WGIII Figure SPM.5 }\\n3.3.3 Sectoral Contributions to Mitigation\\nAll global modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'lower by 2100 involve rapid and deep and in most cases immediate \\nGHG emissions reductions in all sectors (see also 4. 1, 4.5). Reductions \\nin GHG emissions in industry, transport, buildings, and urban areas \\ncan be achieved through a combination of energy efficiency and \\nconservation and a transition to low-GHG technologies and energy \\ncarriers (see also 4.5, Figure 4.4). Socio-cultural options and behavioural \\nchange can reduce global GHG emissions of end-use sectors, with most'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'of the potential in developed countries, if combined with improved \\n136 CCS is an option to reduce emissions from large-scale fossil-based energy and industry sources provided geological storage is available. When CO 2 is captured directly from the \\natmosphere (DACCS), or from biomass (BECCS), CCS provides the storage component of these CDR methods. CO 2 capture and subsurface injection is a mature technology for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'gas processing and enhanced oil recovery. In contrast to the oil and gas sector, CCS is less mature in the power sector, as well as in cement and chemicals production, where it \\nis a critical mitigation option. The technical geological storage capacity is estimated to be on the order of 1000 GtCO 2, which is more than the CO 2 storage requirements through'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': '2100 to limit global warming to 1.5°C, although the regional availability of geological storage could be a limiting factor. If the geological storage site is appropriately selected and \\nmanaged, it is estimated that the CO 2 can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere. Implementation of CCS currently faces technological, economic, institutional, ecological'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'environmental and socio-cultural barriers. Currently, global rates of CCS deployment are far below those in modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C to 2°C. Enabling \\nconditions such as policy instruments, greater public support and technological innovation could reduce these barriers. (high confidence) {WGIII SPM C.4.6 }infrastructure design and access. ( high confidence ) {WGIII SPM C.3, \\nWGIII SPM C.5, WGIII SPM C.6, WGIII SPM C.7.3, WGIII SPM C.8, \\nWGIII SPM C.10.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 101,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII SPM C.10.2 } \\nGlobal modelled mitigation pathways reaching net zero CO 2 and \\nGHG emissions include transitioning from fossil fuels without \\ncarbon capture and storage (CCS) to very low- or zero-carbon \\nenergy sources, such as renewables or fossil fuels with CCS, \\ndemand-side measures and improving efficiency, reducing \\nnon-CO 2 GHG emissions, and CDR136. In global modelled pathways \\nthat limit warming to 2°C or below, almost all electricity is supplied'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': '87\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 3from zero or low-carbon sources in 2050, such as renewables or \\nfossil fuels with CO 2 capture and storage, combined with increased \\nelectrification of energy demand. Such pathways meet energy service \\ndemand with relatively low energy use, through e.g., enhanced energy \\nefficiency and behavioural changes and increased electrification of \\nenergy end use. Modelled global pathways limiting global warming to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': '1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot generally implement such \\nchanges faster than pathways limiting global warming to 2°C (> 67%). \\n(high confidence ) {WGIII SPM C.3, WGIII SPM C.3.2, WGIII SPM C.4, \\nWGIII TS.4.2; SR1.5 SPM C.2.2 }\\nAFOLU mitigation options, when sustainably implemented, can \\ndeliver large-scale GHG emission reductions and enhanced CO 2 \\nremoval; however, barriers to implementation and trade-offs \\nmay result from the impacts of climate change, competing'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'demands on land, conflicts with food security and livelihoods, \\nthe complexity of land ownership and management systems, \\nand cultural aspects (see 3.4.1). All assessed modelled pathways \\nthat limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower by 2100 include land-based \\nmitigation and land-use change, with most including different \\ncombinations of reforestation, afforestation, reduced deforestation, and \\nbioenergy. However, accumulated carbon in vegetation and soils is at'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'risk from future loss (or sink reversal) triggered by climate change and \\ndisturbances such as flood, drought, fire, or pest outbreaks, or future \\npoor management. (high confidence ) {WGI SPM B.4.3; WGII SPM B.2.3, \\nWGII SPM B.5.4; WGIII SPM C.9, WGIII SPM C.11.3, WGIII SPM D.2.3, \\nWGIII TS.4.2, 3.4; SR1.5 SPM C.2.5; SRCCL SPM B.1.4, SRCCL SPM B.3, \\nSRCCL SPM B.7 }\\nIn addition to deep, rapid, and sustained emission reductions, \\nCDR can fulfil three complementary roles: lowering net CO 2'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'or net GHG emissions in the near term; counterbalancing \\n‘hard-to-abate’ residual emissions (e.g., some emissions from \\nagriculture , aviation, shipping, industrial processes) to help reach \\nnet zero CO 2 or GHG emissions, and achieving net negative \\nCO 2 or GHG emissions if deployed at levels exceeding annual \\nresidual emissions ( high confidence ). CDR methods vary in terms \\nof their maturity, removal process, time scale of carbon storage, storage'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'medium, mitigation potential, cost, co-benefits, impacts and risks, and \\ngovernance requirements (high confidence ). Specifically, maturity \\nranges from lower maturity (e.g., ocean alkalinisation) to higher \\nmaturity (e.g., reforestation); removal and storage potential ranges \\nfrom lower potential (<1 Gt CO 2 yr-1, e.g., blue carbon management) \\nto higher potential (>3 Gt CO 2 yr-1, e.g., agroforestry); costs range from \\nlower cost (e.g., –45 to 100 USD tCO 2-1 for soil carbon sequestration)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'to higher cost (e.g., 100 to 300 USD tCO 2-1 for direct air carbon dioxide \\ncapture and storage) ( medium confidence ). Estimated storage timescales \\nvary from decades to centuries for methods that store carbon in \\nvegetation and through soil carbon management, to ten thousand years \\nor more for methods that store carbon in geological formations (high \\nconfidence ). Afforestation, reforestation, improved forest management,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'agroforestry and soil carbon sequestration are currently the only widely \\npracticed CDR methods (high confidence ). Methods and levels of CDR \\ndeployment in global modelled mitigation pathways vary depending on \\nassumptions about costs, availability and constraints (high confidence ). \\n{WGIII SPM C.3.5 , WGIII SPM C.11.1, WGIII SPM C.11.4 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': '137 Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C global warming by up to about 0.1°C, high overshoot by 0.1°C to 0.3°C, in both cases for up to several decades. {WGIII Box SPM.1 }3.3.4 Overshoot Pathways: Increased Risks and Other \\nImplications\\nExceeding a specific remaining carbon budget results in \\nhigher global warming. Achieving and sustaining net negative \\nglobal CO 2 emissions could reverse the resulting temperature \\nexceedance ( high confidence ). Continued reductions in emissions of'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'short-lived climate forcers, particularly methane, after peak temperature \\nhas been reached, would also further reduce warming ( high confidence ). \\nOnly a small number of the most ambitious global modelled pathways \\nlimit global warming to 1.5°C (>50%) without overshoot. {WGI SPM D.1.1, \\nWGI SPM D.1.6, WGI SPM D.1.7; WGIII TS.4.2 }\\nOvershoot of a warming level results in more adverse impacts, some \\nirreversible, and additional risks for human and natural systems'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'compared to staying below that warming level, with risks growing \\nwith the magnitude and duration of overshoot ( high confidence ). \\nCompared to pathways without overshoot, societies and ecosystems \\nwould be exposed to greater and more widespread changes in climatic \\nimpact-drivers, such as extreme heat and extreme precipitation, with \\nincreasing risks to infrastructure, low-lying coastal settlements, and \\nassociated livelihoods ( high confidence ). Overshooting 1. 5°C will result'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'in irreversible adverse impacts on certain ecosystems with low resilience, \\nsuch as polar, mountain, and coastal ecosystems, impacted by ice-sheet \\nmelt, glacier melt, or by accelerating and higher committed sea level \\nrise ( high confidence ). Overshoot increases the risks of severe impacts, \\nsuch as increased wildfires, mass mortality of trees, drying of peatlands, \\nthawing of permafrost and weakening natural land carbon sinks; such'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'impacts could increase releases of GHGs making temperature reversal \\nmore challenging ( medium confidence ). {WGI SPM C.2, WGI SPM C.2.1, \\nWGI SPM C.2.3; WGII SPM B.6, WGII SPM B.6.1, WGII SPM B.6.2; SR1.5 3.6 }\\nThe larger the overshoot, the more net negative CO 2 emissions needed \\nto return to a given warming level (high confidence ). Reducing global \\ntemperature by removing CO 2 would require net negative emissions of \\n220 Gt CO 2 (best estimate, with a likely range of 160 to 370 Gt CO 2)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'for every tenth of a degree ( medium confidence ). Modelled pathways \\nthat limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot reach \\nmedian values of cumulative net negative emissions of 220 Gt CO 2 \\nby 2100, pathways that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after high \\novershoot reach median values of 360 Gt CO 2 (high confidence ).137 \\nMore rapid reduction in CO 2 and non- CO 2 emissions, particularly \\nmethane, limits peak warming levels and reduces the requirement'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 102,\n", " 'content': 'for net negative CO 2 emissions and CDR, thereby reducing feasibility \\nand sustainability concerns, and social and environmental risks ( high \\nconfidence ). {WGI SPM D.1.1; WGIII SPM B.6.4, WGIII SPM C.2, \\nWGIII SPM C.2.2, WGIII Table SPM.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': '88\\nSection 3\\nSection 1Section 33.4.1 Synergies and trade-offs, costs and benefits\\nMitigation and adaptation options can lead to synergies and \\ntrade-offs with other aspects of sustainable development \\n(see also Section 4.6, Figure 4.4). Synergies and trade-offs depend \\non the pace and magnitude of changes and the development context \\nincluding inequalities, with consideration of climate justice. The \\npotential or effectiveness of some adaptation and mitigation options'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'decreases as climate change intensifies (see also Sections 3.2, 3.3.3, \\n4.5). ( high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.2, WGII Figure SPM.4b; WGIII SPM D.1, \\nWGIII SPM D.1.2, WGIII TS.5.1, WGIII Figure SPM.8; SR1.5 SPM D.3, \\nSR1.5 SPM D.4; SRCCL SPM B.2, SRCCL SPM B.3, SRCCL SPM D.3.2, \\nSRCCL Figure SPM.3 }\\nIn the energy sector, transitions to low-emission systems will have \\nmultiple co-benefits, including improvements in air quality and health.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'There are potential synergies between sustainable development and, \\nfor instance, energy efficiency and renewable energy. ( high confidence ) \\n{WGIII SPM C.4.2, WGIII SPM D.1.3 }\\nFor agriculture, land, and food systems, many land management \\noptions and demand-side response options (e.g., dietary choices, \\nreduced post-harvest losses, reduced food waste) can contribute to \\neradicating poverty and eliminating hunger while promoting good health'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'and well-being, clean water and sanitation, and life on land ( medium \\nconfidence) . In contrast, certain adaptation options that promote \\nintensification of production, such as irrigation, may have negative \\neffects on sustainability (e.g., for biodiversity, ecosystem services, \\ngroundwater depletion, and water quality) ( high confidence ). {WGII \\nTS.D.5.5; WGIII SPM D.10; SRCCL SPM B.2.3 }\\nReforestation, improved forest management, soil carbon sequestration,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'peatland restoration and coastal blue carbon management are \\nexamples of CDR methods that can enhance biodiversity and ecosystem \\nfunctions, employment and local livelihoods, depending on context139. \\nHowever, afforestation or production of biomass crops for bioenergy \\nwith carbon dioxide capture and storage or biochar can have adverse \\nsocio-economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity, \\nfood and water security, local livelihoods and the rights of Indigenous'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'Peoples, especially if implemented at large scales and where land \\ntenure is insecure. ( high confidence ) {WGII SPM B.5.4, WGII SPM C.2.4; \\nWGIII SPM C.11.2; SR1.5 SPM C.3.4, SR1.5 SPM C.3.5; SRCCL SPM B.3, \\nSRCCL SPM B.7.3, SRCCL Figure SPM.3 }\\n139 The impacts, risks, and co-benefits of CDR deployment for ecosystems, biodiversity and people will be highly variable depending on the method, site-specific context, \\nimplementation and scale (high confidence). {WGIII SPM C.11.2}'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': '140 The evidence is too limited to make a similar robust conclusion for limiting warming to 1.5°C. {WGIII SPM footnote 68}Modelled pathways that assume using resources more efficiently or shift \\nglobal development towards sustainability include fewer challenges, such \\nas dependence on CDR and pressure on land and biodiversity, and have \\nthe most pronounced synergies with respect to sustainable development \\n(high confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.3.6; SR1.5 SPM D.4.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'Strengthening climate change mitigation action entails more \\nrapid transitions and higher up-front investments, but brings \\nbenefits from avoiding damages from climate change and \\nreduced adaptation costs. The aggregate effects of climate change \\nmitigation on global GDP (excluding damages from climate change and \\nadaptation costs) are small compared to global projected GDP growth. \\nProjected estimates of global aggregate net economic damages and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'the costs of adaptation generally increase with global warming level. \\n(high confidence ) {WGII SPM B. 4.6, WGII TS.C.10; WGIII SPM C.12.2, \\nWGIII SPM C.12.3 } \\nCost-benefit analysis remains limited in its ability to represent all \\ndamages from climate change, including non-monetary damages, \\nor to capture the heterogeneous nature of damages and the risk of \\ncatastrophic damages ( high confidence ). Even without accounting for'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'these factors or for the co- benefits of mitigation, the global benefits \\nof limiting warming to 2°C exceed the cost of mitigation (medium \\nconfidence ). This finding is robust against a wide range of assumptions \\nabout social preferences on inequalities and discounting over time \\n(medium confidence ). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C \\nwould increase the costs of mitigation, but also increase the benefits \\nin terms of reduced impacts and related risks (see 3. 1.1, 3.1. 2) and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'reduced adaptation needs (high confidence )140. {WGII SPM B.4, WGII \\nSPM B.6; WGIII SPM C.12, WGIII SPM C.12.2, WGIII SPM C.12.3 WGIII Box TS.7; \\nSR1.5 SPM B.3, SR1.5 SPM B.5, SR1.5 SPM B.6 }\\nConsidering other sustainable development dimensions, such as the \\npotentially strong economic benefits on human health from air quality \\nimprovement, may enhance the estimated benefits of mitigation \\n(medium confidence ). The economic effects of strengthened mitigation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'action vary across regions and countries, depending notably on economic \\nstructure, regional emissions reductions, policy design and level of \\ninternational cooperation ( high confidence ). Ambitious mitigation \\npathways imply large and sometimes disruptive changes in economic \\nstructure, with implications for near-term actions (Section 4.2), equity \\n(Section 4.4), sustainability (Section 4.6), and finance (Section 4.8)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': '(high confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.12.2, WGIII SPM D.3.2, WGIII TS.4.2 }3.4 Long-Term Interactions Between Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development\\nMitigation and adaptation can lead to synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development (high confidence ). \\nAccelerated and equitable mitigation and adaptation bring benefits from avoiding damages from climate \\nchange and are critical to achieving sustainable development (high confidence). Climate resilient development138'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': 'pathways are progressively constrained by every increment of further warming (very high confidence ). There is a \\nrapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all (very high confidence ).\\n138 See Annex I: Glossary.\\n139 The impacts, risks, and co-benefits of CDR deployment for ecosystems, biodiversity and people will be highly variable depending on the method, site-specific context, \\nimplementation and scale ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM C.11.2 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 103,\n", " 'content': '140 The evidence is too limited to make a similar robust conclusion for limiting warming to 1.5°C. {WGIII SPM footnote 68 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': '89\\nLong-Term Climate and Development FuturesSection 33.4.2 Advancing Integrated Climate Action for Sustainable \\nDevelopment\\nAn inclusive, equitable approach to integrating adaptation, mitigation \\nand development can advance sustainable development in the long \\nterm ( high confidence ). Integrated responses can harness synergies for \\nsustainable development and reduce trade-offs ( high confidence ). Shifting \\ndevelopment pathways towards sustainability and advancing climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'resilient development is enabled when governments, civil society \\nand the private sector make development choices that prioritise risk \\nreduction, equity and justice, and when decision-making processes, \\nfinance and actions are integrated across governance levels, sectors \\nand timeframes ( very high confidence ) (see also Figure 4.2 ). Inclusive \\nprocesses involving local knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge \\nincrease these prospects ( high confidence ). However, opportunities'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'for action differ substantially among and within regions, driven by \\nhistorical and ongoing patterns of development ( very high confidence ). \\nAccelerated financial support for developing countries is critical to enhance \\nmitigation and adaptation action ( high confidence ). {WGII SPM C.5.4, \\nWGII SPM D.1, WGII SPM D.1.1, WGII SPM D.1.2, WGII SPM D.2, \\nWGII SPM D.3, WGII SPM D.5, WGII SPM D.5.1, WGII SPM D.5.2; \\nWGIII SPM D.1, WGIII SPM D.2, WGIII SPM D.2.4, WGIII SPM E.2.2,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII SPM E.2.3, WGIII SPM E.5.3, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 5 } \\nPolicies that shift development pathways towards sustainability \\ncan broaden the portfolio of available mitigation and adaptation \\nresponses ( medium confidence ). Combining mitigation with action \\nto shift development pathways, such as broader sectoral policies , \\napproaches that induce lifestyle or behaviour changes, financial \\nregulation, or macroeconomic policies can overcome barriers and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'open up a broader range of mitigation options ( high confidence ). \\nIntegrated, inclusive planning and investment in everyday decision-\\nmaking about urban infrastructure can significantly increase the \\nadaptive capacity of urban and rural settlements. Coastal cities and \\nsettlements play an important role in advancing climate resilient \\ndevelopment due to the high number of people living in the Low \\nElevation Coastal Zone, the escalating and climate compounded risk'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'that they face, and their vital role in national economies and beyond \\n(high confidence ). {WGII SPM.D.3, WGII SPM D.3.3; WGIII SPM E.2, \\nWGIII SPM E.2.2; SR1.5 SPM D.6 }\\nObserved adverse impacts and related losses and damages, \\nprojected risks, trends in vulnerability, and adaptation limits \\ndemonstrate that transformation for sustainability and climate \\nresilient development action is more urgent than previously \\nassessed ( very high confidence ). Climate resilient development'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'integrates adaptation and GHG mitigation to advance \\nsustainable development for all. Climate resilient development \\npathways have been constrained by past development, emissions and \\nclimate change and are progressively constrained by every increment \\nof warming, in particular beyond 1.5°C ( very high confidence ). \\nClimate resilient development will not be possible in some regions \\nand sub-regions if global warming exceeds 2°C ( medium confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'Safeguarding biodiversity and ecosystems is fundamental to climate \\nresilient development, but biodiversity and ecosystem services have \\nlimited capacity to adapt to increasing global warming levels, making climate resilient development progressively harder to achieve beyond \\n1.5°C warming (very high confidence ). {WGII SPM D.1, WGII SPM D.1.1, \\nWGII SPM D.4, WGII SPM D.4.3, WGII SPM D.5.1; WGIII SPM D.1.1 } \\nThe cumulative scientific evidence is unequivocal: climate change'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 104,\n", " 'content': 'is a threat to human well-being and planetary health ( very \\nhigh confidence ). Any further delay in concerted anticipatory \\nglobal action on adaptation and mitigation will miss a brief and \\nrapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and \\nsustainable future for all ( very high confidence ). Opportunities for \\nnear-term action are assessed in the following section. {WGII SPM D.5.3; \\nWGIII SPM D.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf', 'page': 105, 'content': '90'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 106,\n", " 'content': '91Section 4\\nNear-Term Responses \\nin a Changing Climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': '92\\nSection 4\\nSection 1Section 4Section 4 : Near-Term Responses in a Changing Climate\\n4.1 The Timing and Urgency of Climate Action\\nThe magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks \\ndepend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions \\n(very high confidence ). Global warming is more likely than not to reach \\n1.5°C between 2021 and 2040 even under the very low GHG emission \\nscenarios (SSP1-1.9), and likely or very likely to exceed 1.5°C under'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'higher emissions scenarios141. Many adaptation options have medium \\nor high feasibility up to 1.5°C ( medium to high confidence , depending \\non option), but hard limits to adaptation have already been reached \\nin some ecosystems and the effectiveness of adaptation to reduce \\nclimate risk will decrease with increasing warming ( high confidence ). \\nSocietal choices and actions implemented in this decade determine the \\nextent to which medium- and long-term pathways will deliver higher or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'lower climate resilient development ( high confidence ). Climate resilient \\ndevelopment prospects are increasingly limited if current greenhouse \\ngas emissions do not rapidly decline, especially if 1. 5°C global warming \\nis exceeded in the near term ( high confidence ). Without urgent, effective \\nand equitable adaptation and mitigation actions, climate change \\nincreasingly threatens the health and livelihoods of people around \\nthe globe, ecosystem health, and biodiversity, with severe adverse'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'consequences for current and future generations ( high confidence ). \\n{WGI SPM B.1.3, WGI SPM B.5.1, WGI SPM B.5.2; WGII SPM A, WGII \\nSPM B.4, WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.3.3, WGII Figure SPM.4, WGII SPM \\nD.1, WGII SPM D.5, WGIII SPM D.1.1 SR1.5 SPM D.2.2 }. (Cross-Section \\nBox.2, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.3 )\\n141 In the near term (2021 –2040), the 1.5°C global warming level is very likely to be exceeded under the very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5), likely to be exceeded under'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'the intermediate and high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0), more likely than not to be exceeded under the low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-2.6) and more likely \\nthan not to be reached under the very low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9). The best estimates [and very likely ranges] of global warming for the different scenarios in the'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'near term are: 1.5 [1.2 to 1.7]°C (SSP1-1.9); 1.5 [1.2 to 1.8]°C (SSP1-2.6); 1.5 [1.2 to 1.8]°C (SSP2-4.5); 1.5 [1.2 to 1.8]°C (SSP3-7.0); and 1.6[1.3 to 1.9]°C (SSP5-8.5). \\n{WGI SPM B.1.3, WGI Table SPM.1 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\n142 Values in parentheses indicate the likelihood of limiting warming to the level specified (see Cross-Section Box.2).\\n143 Median and very likely range [5th to 95th percentile]. {WGIII SPM footnote 30 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': '144 These numbers for CO 2 are 48 [36 to 69]% in 2030, 65 [50 to 96] % in 2035, 80 [61 to109] % in 2040 and 99 [79 to 119]% in 2050.\\n145 These numbers for CO 2 are 22 [1 to 44]% in 2030, 37 [21 to 59] % in 2035, 51 [36 to 70] % in 2040 and 73 [55 to 90]% in 2050.\\n146 In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO 2 from power plants, or 50 to 80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply. {WGIII SPM footnote 54 }In modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with \\nno or limited overshoot and in those that limit warming to \\n2°C (>67%), assuming immediate actions , global GHG emissions \\nare projected to peak in the early 2020s followed by rapid and \\ndeep GHG emissions reductions ( high confidence ) 142. In pathways'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, net \\nglobal GHG emissions are projected to fall by 43 [34 to 60]%143 below \\n2019 levels by 2030, 60 [49 to 77]% by 2035, 69 [58 to 90]% by 2040 \\nand 84 [73 to 98]% by 2050 ( high confidence ) (Section 2.3.1, Table 2.2, \\nFigure 2.5, Table 3.1)144. Global modelled pathways that limit warming \\nto 2°C (>67%) have reductions in GHG emissions below 2019 levels \\nof 21 [1 to 42]% by 2030 , 35 [22 to 55] % by 2035, 46 [34 to 63]'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': '% by 2040 and 64 [53 to 77]% by 2050145 (high confidence ). Global \\nGHG emissions associated with NDCs announced prior to COP26 would \\nmake it likely that warming would exceed 1.5°C ( high confidence ) \\nand limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) would then imply a rapid \\nacceleration of emission reductions during 2030–2050, around \\n70% faster than in pathways where immediate action is taken to \\nlimit warming to 2°C (>67%) ( medium confidence ) (Section 2.3.1)'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'Continued investments in unabated high-emitting infrastructure146 and \\nlimited development and deployment of low-emitting alternatives \\nprior to 2030 would act as barriers to this acceleration and increase \\nfeasibility risks ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.6.3, WGIII 3.5.2, \\nWGIII SPM B.6, WGIII SPM B.6., WGIII SPM C.1, WGIII SPM C1.1, \\nWGIII Table SPM.2 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )Deep, rapid, and sustained mitigation and accelerated implementation of adaptation reduces the risks of climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 107,\n", " 'content': 'change for humans and ecosystems. In modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited \\novershoot and in those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) and assume immediate action, global GHG emissions \\nare projected to peak in the early 2020s followed by rapid and deep reductions. As adaptation options often have \\nlong implementation times, accelerated implementation of adaptation, particularly in this decade, is important \\nto close adaptation gaps. ( high confidence )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': '93\\nNear-Term Responses in a Changing ClimateSection 4All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) \\nor lower by 2100 involve reductions in both net CO 2 emissions \\nand non-CO 2 emissions (see Figure 3.6) ( high confidence ). \\nFor example, in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) \\nwith no or limited overshoot, global CH 4 (methane) emissions are \\nreduced by 34 [21 to 57]% below 2019 levels by 2030 and by \\n44 [31 to 63]% in 2040 (high confidence ). Global CH 4 emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': 'are reduced by 24 [9 to 53]% below 2019 levels by 2030 and by \\n37 [20 to 60]% in 2040 in modelled pathways that limit warming to \\n2°C with action starting in 2020 (>67%) (high confidence ). {WGIII SPM \\nC1.2, WGIII Table SPM.2, WGIII 3.3; SR1.5 SPM C.1, SR1.5 SPM C.1.2 } \\n(Cross-Section Box.2 )\\nAll global modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) \\nor lower by 2100 involve GHG emission reductions in all sectors \\n(high confidence ). The contributions of different sectors vary across'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': 'modelled mitigation pathways. In most global modelled mitigation \\npathways, emissions from land-use, land-use change and forestry , via \\nreforestation and reduced deforestation, and from the energy supply \\nsector reach net zero CO 2 emissions earlier than the buildings, industry \\nand transport sectors (Figure 4.1). Strategies can rely on combinations \\nof different options (Figure 4.1, Section 4.5), but doing less in one \\nsector needs to be compensated by further reductions in other sectors if'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': 'warming is to be limited. ( high confidence ) {WGIII SPM C.3, WGIII SPM \\nC.3.1, WGIII SPM 3.2, WGIII SPM C.3.3 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\nWithout rapid, deep and sustained mitigation and accelerated \\nadaptation actions, losses and damages will continue to \\nincrease, including projected adverse impacts in Africa, LDCs, \\nSIDS, Central and South America147, Asia and the Arctic, and will \\ndisproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations ( high'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': 'confidence ). {WGII SPM C.3.5, WGII SPM B.2.4, WGII 12.2, WGII 10. \\nBox 10.6, WGII TS D.7.5, WGII Cross-Chapter Box 6 ES, WGII Global \\nto Regional Atlas Annex A1.15, WGII Global to Regional Atlas Annex \\nA1.27; SR1.5 SPM B.5.3, SR 1.5 SPM B.5.7; SRCCL A.5.6 } (Figure 3.2; \\nFigure 3.3 )\\n147 The southern part of Mexico is included in the climatic subregion South Central America (SCA) for WGI. Mexico is assessed as part of North America for WGII. The climate change'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 108,\n", " 'content': 'literature for the SCA region occasionally includes Mexico, and in those cases WGII assessment makes reference to Latin America. Mexico is considered part of Latin America and \\nthe Caribbean for WGIII. {WGII 12.1.1, WGIII AII.1.1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 109,\n", " 'content': '94\\nSection 4\\nSection 1Section 4\\na) Sectoral emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C\\nb) Greenhouse gas emissions by sector at \\nthe time of net zero CO2, compared to 2019The transition towards net zero CO2 will \\nhave different pace across different sectors\\nCO2 emissions from the electricity/fossil fuel industries sector and \\nland-use change generally reach net zero earlier than other sectors\\nincludes halting \\ndeforestationPercentage reduction in CO 2 emissions relative to 2015'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 109,\n", " 'content': 'includes decarbonised electricity supplyTransport, industry \\nand buildings\\nEnergy supply \\n(including electricity)Non-CO 2 emissions\\nLand-use change\\nKey\\nPathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C by 2100\\nIMP-GS\\nIMP-Neg*\\nIMP-LD\\nIMP-SP\\nIMP-RenGradual strengthening\\nHigh reliance on net negative emissionsHigh reliance on efficient resource useFocus on sustainable developmentFocus on renewablesTransport, industry and buildingsNon-CO 2 emissions \\nLand-use change and forestry'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 109,\n", " 'content': 'Energy supply (including electricity)\\n*High overshoot\\npathways to 2°C also reach net zero CO 2GHG emissions\\n(GtCO 2-eq/yr)\\nSources\\nSinks\\n0\\n2020\\n2030\\n2040\\n2050\\n−125%\\n−100%\\n−75%\\n−25%\\n0%net zerohalfway \\nto net zeropathways for \\n2°C reach net zero somewhat later\\n−20/uni00A0\\n20/uni00A0\\n40/uni00A0\\n60/uni00A0\\n2019\\ncomparison\\nIMP-Neg\\nIMP-GS\\nIMP-Ren\\nIMP-LD\\nIMP-SP\\nthese are different ways to achieve net zero CO\\n2Illustrative Mitigation \\nPathways (IMPs)\\nnet zero'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': '95\\nNear-Term Responses in a Changing ClimateSection 44.2 Benefits of Strengthening Near-Term ActionFigure 4.1: Sectoral emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C. Panel (a) shows sectoral CO 2 and non-CO 2 emissions in global modelled pathways that limit \\nwarming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. The horizontal lines illustrate halving 2015 emissions (base year of the pathways) (dashed) and reaching net zero emissions'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': '(solid line). The range shows the 5–95th percentile of the emissions across the pathways. The timing strongly differs by sector, with the CO 2 emissions from the electricity/fossil fuel \\nindustries sector and\\xa0land-use change generally reaching net zero earlier.\\xa0Non-CO 2 emissions from agriculture are also substantially reduced compared to pathways without climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'policy but do not typically reach zero. Panel (b) Although all pathways include strongly reduced emissions, there are different pathways as indicated by the illustrative mitigation \\npathways used in IPCC WGIII. The pathways emphasise routes consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C with a high reliance on net negative emissions (IMP-Neg), high resource'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'efficiency (IMP-LD ), a focus on sustainable development (IMP-SP) or renewables (IMP-Ren) and consistent with 2°C based on a less rapid introduction of mitigation measures followed \\nby a subsequent gradual strengthening (IMP-GS). Positive (solid filled bars) and negative emissions (hatched bars) for different illustrative mitigation pathways are compared to'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'GHG emissions from the year 2019. The category “energy supply (including electricity)” includes bioenergy with carbon capture and storage and direct air carbon capture and storage. \\n{WGIII Box TS.5, WGIII 3.3, WGIII 3.4, WGIII 6.6, WGIII 10.3, WGIII 11.3 } (Cross-Section Box.2 )\\nAccelerated implementation of adaptation will improve well-being by reducing losses and damages, especially'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'for vulnerable populations. Deep, rapid, and sustained mitigation actions would reduce future adaptation costs \\nand losses and damages, enhance sustainable development co-benefits, avoid locking-in emission sources, \\nand reduce stranded assets and irreversible climate changes. These near-term actions involve higher up-front \\ninvestments and disruptive changes, which can be moderated by a range of enabling conditions and removal or \\nreduction of barriers to feasibility. ( high confidence )'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'Accelerated implementation of adaptation responses will bring \\nbenefits to human well-being (high confidence ) (Section 4.3). \\xa0As \\nadaptation options often have long implementation times, long-term \\nplanning and accelerated implementation, particularly in this decade, is \\nimportant to close adaptation gaps, recognising that constraints remain \\nfor some regions. The benefits to vulnerable populations would be high \\n(see Section 4.4). (high confidence) {WGI SPM B.1, WGI SPM B.1.3, WGI'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'SPM B.2.2, WGI SPM B.3; WGII SPM C.1.1, WGII SPM C.1.2, WGII SPM \\nC.2, WGII SPM C.3.1, WGII Figure SPM.4b; SROCC SPM C.3.4, SROCC \\nFigure 3.4, SROCC Figure SPM.5 }\\nNear-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C \\nwould substantially reduce projected losses and damages related \\nto climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared \\nto higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all ( very \\nhigh confidence ). The magnitude and rate of climate change and'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation \\nactions, and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages \\nescalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence ). \\nDelayed mitigation action will further increase global warming which \\nwill decrease the effectiveness of many adaptation options, including \\nEcosystem-based Adaptation and many water-related options, as well'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'as increasing mitigation feasibility risks, such as for options based on \\necosystems ( high confidence ). Comprehensive, effective, and innovative \\nresponses integrating adaptation and mitigation can harness synergies \\nand reduce trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation, as well as in \\nmeeting requirements for financing ( very high confidence ) (see Section \\n4.5, 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9). { WGII SPM B.3, WGII SPM B.4, WGII SPM B.6.2,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.3, WGII SPM D.1, WGII SPM D.4.3, WGII SPM D.5, \\nWG II TS D.1.4, WG II TS.D.5, WGII TS D.7.5; WGIII SPM B.6.3,WGIII SPM B.6.4, \\nWGIII SPM C.9, WGIII SPM D.2, WGIII SPM E.13; SR1.5 SPM C.2.7, \\nSR1.5 D.1.3, SR1.5 D.5.2 }\\nMitigation actions will hav e other sustainable development \\nco-benefits (high confidence ). Mitigation will improve air quality and \\nhuman health in the near term notably because many air pollutants are'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': '148 In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life \\ncycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO 2 from power plants, or 50 to 80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply. {WGIII SPM footnote 54 }co-emitted by GHG emitting sectors and because methane emissions \\nleads to surface ozone formation ( high confidence ). The benefits from'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'air quality improvement include prevention of air pollution-related \\npremature deaths, chronic diseases and damages to ecosystems \\nand crops. The economic benefits for human health from air quality \\nimprovement arising from mitigation action can be of the same order \\nof magnitude as mitigation costs, and potentially even larger ( medium \\nconfidence ). As methane has a short lifetime but is a potent GHG, \\nstrong, rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions can limit'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'near-term warming and improve air quality by reducing global surface \\nozone (high confidence ). {WGI SPM D.1.7, WGI SPM D.2.2, WGI 6.7, \\nWGI TS Box TS.7, WGI 6 Box 6.2, WGI Figure 6.3, WGI Figure 6.16, \\nWGI Figure 6.17; WGII TS.D.8.3, WGII Cross-Chapter Box HEALTH, \\nWGII 5 ES, WGII 7 ES; WGII 7.3.1.2; WGIII Figure SPM.8, WGIII SPM \\nC.2.3, WGIII SPM C.4.2, WGIII TS.4.2 }\\nChallenges from delayed adaptation and mitigation actions \\ninclude the risk of cost escalation, lock-in of infrastructure,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'stranded assets, and reduced feasibility and effectiveness \\nof adaptation and mitigation options ( high confidence ). The \\ncontinued installation of unabated fossil fuel148 infrastructure \\nwill ‘lock-in’ GHG emissions ( high confidence ). Limiting global \\nwarming to 2°C or below will leave a substantial amount of fossil fuels \\nunburned and could strand considerable fossil fuel infrastructure \\n(high confidence ), with globally discounted value projected to be'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'around USD 1 to 4 trillion from 2015 to 2050 ( medium confidence ). \\nEarly actions would limit the size of these stranded assets, whereas \\ndelayed actions with continued investments in unabated high-emitting \\ninfrastructure and limited development and deployment of low-emitting \\nalternatives prior to 2030 would raise future stranded assets to the \\nhigher end of the range – thereby acting as barriers and increasing \\npolitical economy feasibility risks that may jeopardise efforts to limit'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 110,\n", " 'content': 'global warming. ( high confidence ). {WGIII SPM B.6.3, WGIII SPM C.4, \\nWGIII Box TS.8 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': '96\\nSection 4\\nSection 1Section 4Scaling-up near-term climate actions (Section 4.1) will mobilise a \\nmix of low-cost and high-cost options. High-cost options, as in energy \\nand infrastructure, are needed to avoid future lock-ins, foster innovation \\nand initiate transformational changes (Figure 4.4). Climate resilient \\ndevelopment pathways in support of sustainable development for all are \\nshaped by equity, and social and climate justice ( very high confidence ).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'Embedding effective and equitable adaptation and mitigation in \\ndevelopment planning can reduce vulnerability, conserve and restore \\necosystems, and enable climate resilient development. This is especially \\nchallenging in localities with persistent development gaps and limited \\nresources. ( high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.5, WGII SPM D1; WGIII TS.5.2, \\nWGIII 8.3.1, WGIII 8.3.4, WGIII 8.4.1, WGIII 8.6 }\\nScaling-up climate action may generate disruptive changes in'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'economic structure with distributional consequences and need \\nto reconcile divergent interests, values and worldviews, within \\nand between countries. Deeper fiscal, financial, institutional and \\nregulatory reforms can offset such adverse effects and unlock mitigation \\npotentials. Societal choices and actions implemented in this decade will \\ndetermine the extent to which medium and long-term development \\npathways will deliver higher or lower climate resilient development'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'outcomes. (high confidence ) {WGII SPM D.2, WGII SPM D.5, WGII Box TS.8; \\nWGIII SPM D.3, WGIII SPM E.2, WGIII SPM E.3, WGIII SPM E.4, WGIII TS.2, \\nWGIII TS.4.1, WGIII TS.6.4, WGIII 15.2, WGIII 15.6 }\\nEnabling conditions would need to be strengthened in the near-\\nterm and barriers reduced or removed to realise opportunities \\nfor deep and rapid adaptation and mitigation actions and \\nclimate resilient development ( high confidence ) (Figure 4.2).'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'These enabling conditions are differentiated by national, regional \\nand local circumstances and geographies, according to capabilities, \\nand include: equity and inclusion in climate action (see Section 4.4), \\nrapid and far-reaching transitions in sectors and system (see Section \\n4.5), measures to achieve synergies and reduce trade-\\noffs with sustainable development goals (see Section 4.6), \\ngovernance and policy improvements (see Section 4.7), access'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'to finance, improved international cooperation and technology \\nimprovements (see Section 4.8), and integration of near-term \\nactions across sectors, systems and regions ( see Section 4.9). \\n{WGII SPM D.2; WGIII SPM E.1, WGIII SPM E.2 }\\nBarriers to feasibility would need to be reduced or removed \\nto deploy mitigation and adaptation options at scale. Many \\nlimits to feasibility and effectiveness of responses can be overcome \\nby addressing a range of barriers, including economic, technological,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'institutional, social, environmental and geophysical barriers. The \\nfeasibility and effectiveness of options increase with integrated, \\nmulti- sectoral solutions that differentiate responses based on climate \\nrisk, cut across systems and address social inequities. Strengthened \\nnear-term actions in modelled cost- effective pathways that limit global \\nwarming to 2°C or lower, reduce the overall risk to the feasibility of the \\nsystem transitions, compared to modelled pathways with delayed or'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'uncoordinated action. ( high confidence ) {WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.3, \\nWGII SPM C.5; WGIII SPM E.1, WGIII SPM E.1.3 }\\nIntegrating ambitious climate actions with macroeconomic \\npolicies under global uncertainty would provide benefits \\n(high confidence ). This encompasses three main directions: (a) economy-wide mainstreaming packages supporting options to \\nimproved sustainable low-emission economic recovery, development \\nand job creation programs (Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9) (b) safety'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'nets and social protection in the transition (Section 4.4, 4.7); and \\n(c) broadened access to finance, technology and capacity-building \\nand coordinated support to low-emission infrastructure (‘leap-frog’ \\npotential), especially in developing regions, and under debt stress \\n(high confidence ). (Section 4.8) { WGII SPM C.2, WGII SPM C.4.1, \\nWGII SPM D.1.3, WGII SPM D.2, WGII SPM D.3.2, WGII SPM E.2.2, \\nWGII SPM E.4, WGII SPM TS.2, WGII SPM TS.5.2, WGII TS.6.4,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 111,\n", " 'content': 'WGII TS.15, WGII TS Box TS.3; WGIII SPM B.4.2, WGIII SPM C.5.4, \\nWGIII SPM C.6.2, WGIII SPM C.12.2, WGIII SPM D.3.4, WGIII SPM E.4.2, \\nWGIII SPM E.4.5, WGIII SPM E.5.2, WGIII SPM E.5.3, WGIII TS.1, WGIII Box TS.15, \\nWGIII 15.2, WGIII Cross-Chapter Box 1 on COVID in Chapter 1 }'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': '97\\nNear-Term Responses in a Changing ClimateSection 4Climate Resilient Development\\nEmissions reductions\\nAdaptation\\nSustainable DevelopmentMultiple interacting choices and actions can shift \\ndevelopment pathways towards sustainability\\nSustainable Development \\nGoal (SDG) achievement\\nIPCC AR62030 Present\\nworldPast \\nconditionsThere is a rapidly narrowing window of opportunity \\nto enable climate resilient development\\nProspects for climate'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'resilient development will be further limited if global warming exceeds 1.5°C and if progress towards the SDGs is inadequate\\nEarly action and enabling conditions create future opportunities for climate resilient development\\nPast conditions (emissions, climate change, development) have increased warming and development gaps persistopportunities missed\\nIllustrative ‘shock’ that disrupts development\\nwarming limited to below 1.5°C \\nLow emissions\\nSystem transitions\\nTransformation\\nLow climate risk'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'Low climate risk\\nEquity and justice\\nSDG achievement\\nHigh emissions\\nEntrenched systems\\nAdaptation limits\\nMaladaptation\\nIncreasing climate risk\\nReduced options \\nfor development\\nEcosystem \\ndegradationOutcomes characterising development pathways\\nCivil \\nsocietyGovernments\\nPrivate \\nsectorConditions that enable \\nindividual and collective actions\\n•Inclusive governance \\n•Diverse knowledges and values\\n•Finance and innovation\\n•Integration across sectors \\nand time scales\\n•Ecosystem stewardship'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': '•Synergies between climate and development actions\\n•Behavioural change supported by policy, infrastructure and socio-cultural factors\\nConditions that constrain \\nindividual and collective actions\\n•Poverty, inequity and injustice\\n•Economic, institutional, social \\nand capacity barriers\\n•Siloed responses\\n•Lack of finance, and barriers to finance and technology\\n•Tradeoffs with SDGs2100 \\n& beyond'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': '& beyond\\nFigure 4.2: The illustrative development pathways (red to green) and associated outcomes (right panel) show that there is a rapidly narrowing window of \\nopportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. Climate resilient development is the process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'measures to support sustainable development. Diverging pathways illustrate that interacting choices and actions made by diverse government, private sector and civil society actors \\ncan advance climate resilient development, shift pathways towards sustainability, and enable lower emissions and adaptation. Diverse knowledges and values include cultural values,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'Indigenous Knowledge, local knowledge, and scientific knowledge. Climatic and non-climatic events, such as droughts, floods or pandemics, pose more severe shocks to pathways \\nwith lower climate resilient development (red to yellow) than to pathways with higher climate resilient development (green). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, and with every increment of warming, losses and damages will increase. The development pathways taken by \\ncountries at all stages of economic development impact GHG emissions and hence shape mitigation challenges and opportunities, which vary across countries and regions.'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'Pathways and opportunities for action are shaped by previous actions (or inactions and opportunities missed, dashed pathway), and enabling and constraining conditions \\n(left panel), and take place in the context of climate risks, adaptation limits and development gaps. The longer emissions reductions are delayed, the fewer effective'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'adaptation options. {WGI SPM B.1; WGII SPM B.1 to B.5, WGII SPM C.2 to 5, WGII SPM D.1 to 5, WGII Figure SPM.3, WGII Figure SPM.4, WGII Figure SPM.5, WGII TS.D.5, WGII 3.1, \\nWGII 3.2, WGII 3.4, WGII 4.2, WGII Figure 4.4, WGII 4.5, WGII 4.6, WGII 4.9; WGIII SPM A, WGIII SPM B1, WGIII SPM B.3, WGIII SPM B.6, WGIII SPM C.4, WGIII SPM D1 to 3,'},\n", " {'document': 'IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf',\n", " 'page': 112,\n", " 'content': 'WGIII SPM E.1, WGIII SPM E.2, WGIII SPM E.4, WGIII SPM E.5, WGIII Figure TS.1, WGIII Figure TS.7, WGIII Box TS.3, WGIII Box TS.8, Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3, \\nWGIII Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4; SR1.5 SPM D.1 to 6; SRCCL SPM D.3 }\\n4.3 Near-Term Risks\\nMany changes in the climate system, including extreme events, will become larger in the near term with increasing \\nglobal warming ( high confidence ). Multiple climatic and non-climatic risks will interact, resulting in increased'},\n", " ...]" ] }, "metadata": {}, "execution_count": 9 } ] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "### 4. Nettoyage de la base documentaire" ], "metadata": { "id": "sHc7e4a-Hj8R" } }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Créez une fonction pour nettoyer le contenu de chaque chunk\n", "\n", "special_chars = [\" \", '-', '&', '(', ')', '_', ';', '†', '+', '–', \"'\", '!', '[', ']', '’', '́', '̀', '\\u2009', '\\u200b', '\\u202f', '©', '£', '§', '°', '@', '€', '$', '\\xa0', '~','\\n','�']\n", "\n", "def remove_char(text, char):\n", " \"\"\"Remove each specific character from the text for each character in the chars list.\"\"\"\n", " return text.replace(char, ' ')\n", "\n", "def remove_chars(text, chars):\n", " \"\"\" Apply remove_char() function to text \"\"\"\n", " for char in chars:\n", " text = remove_char(text, char)\n", " return text\n", "\n", "def remove_multiple_white_spaces(text):\n", " \"\"\"Remove multiple spaces.\"\"\"\n", " text = re.sub(\" +\", \" \", text)\n", " return text\n", "\n", "def clean_text(text, special_chars=special_chars):\n", " \"\"\"Generate a text without chars expect points and comma and multiple white spaces.\"\"\"\n", " text = remove_chars(text, special_chars)\n", " text = remove_multiple_white_spaces(text)\n", " return text\n", "\n" ], "metadata": { "id": "O9yaTDVnQRit" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Créez différentes fonction pour retirer les chunks sans intérêt\n", "\n", "\n", "def remove_short_chunks(chunks, min_length=5):\n", " return [chunk for chunk in chunks if len(chunk[\"content\"].split()) >= min_length]\n", "\n", "import re\n", "\n", "def contains_mainly_digits(text, threshold=0.5):\n", " \"\"\"\n", " Checks if a text string contains a high percentage of digits compared to letters.\n", "\n", " Args:\n", " text (str): The input text to analyze.\n", " threshold (float, optional): The threshold value for the proportion of digits to letters.\n", " Defaults to 0.5.\n", "\n", " Returns:\n", " bool: True if the proportion of digits in the text exceeds the threshold, False otherwise.\n", " \"\"\"\n", " if not text:\n", " return False\n", " letters_count = 0\n", " nbs_count = 0\n", " for char in text:\n", " if char.isalpha():\n", " letters_count += 1\n", " elif char.isdigit():\n", " nbs_count += 1\n", " if letters_count + nbs_count > 0:\n", " digits_pct = (nbs_count / (letters_count + nbs_count))\n", " else:\n", " return True\n", " return digits_pct > threshold\n", "\n", "def remove_mostly_digits_chunks(chunks, threshold=0.5):\n", " return [chunk for chunk in chunks if not contains_mainly_digits(chunk['content'])]\n", "\n", "# (Eventuellement utiliser le layout du pdf avec pdfminer pour retirer les en-têtes et les pieds de page)\n" ], "metadata": { "id": "2jrcJTWlvAi5" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "### BONUS : Augmentation des métadonnées" ], "metadata": { "id": "CHYcIXSVILKz" } }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "source": [ "Avoir un maximum d'informations sur chaque chunk (titre du document, page, nom du chapitre, description du document, date ...) est toujours intéressant : comme informations complémentaires pour l'utilisateur mais aussi potentiellement pour affiner la recherche en elle-même." ], "metadata": { "id": "VouSGpceIR2e" } }, { "cell_type": "code", "source": [ "# Implémentez des fonctions permettant d'ajouter des métadonnées\n", "\n", "# Utilisez les différentes polices et tailles de police pour retrouver le sous-titre antérieur le plus proche (bibliothèque pdfminer)\n" ], "metadata": { "id": "LjazqXvkI-DS" }, "execution_count": null, "outputs": [] } ] }