Daily Papers

Human feedback has become the de facto standard for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models, and is increasingly being used as a training objective. However, it is not clear which properties of a generated output this single `preference' score captures. We hypothesise that preference scores are subjective and open to undesirable biases. We critically analyse the use of human feedback for both training and evaluation, to verify whether it fully captures a range of crucial error criteria. We find that while preference scores have fairly good coverage, they under-represent important aspects like factuality. We further hypothesise that both preference scores and error annotation may be affected by confounders, and leverage instruction-tuned models to generate outputs that vary along two possible confounding dimensions: assertiveness and complexity. We find that the assertiveness of an output skews the perceived rate of factuality errors, indicating that human annotations are not a fully reliable evaluation metric or training objective. Finally, we offer preliminary evidence that using human feedback as a training objective disproportionately increases the assertiveness of model outputs. We encourage future work to carefully consider whether preference scores are well aligned with the desired objective.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in healthcare, but their reliability is heavily influenced by user-driven factors such as question phrasing and the completeness of clinical information. In this study, we examined how misinformation framing, source authority, model persona, and omission of key clinical details affect the diagnostic accuracy and reliability of LLM outputs. We conducted two experiments: one introducing misleading external opinions with varying assertiveness (perturbation test), and another removing specific categories of patient information (ablation test). Using public datasets (MedQA and Medbullets), we evaluated proprietary models (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash) and open-source models (LLaMA 3 8B, LLaMA 3 Med42 8B, DeepSeek R1 8B). All models were vulnerable to user-driven misinformation, with proprietary models especially affected by definitive and authoritative language. Assertive tone had the greatest negative impact on accuracy. In the ablation test, omitting physical exam findings and lab results caused the most significant performance drop. Although proprietary models had higher baseline accuracy, their performance declined sharply under misinformation. These results highlight the need for well-structured prompts and complete clinical context. Users should avoid authoritative framing of misinformation and provide full clinical details, especially for complex cases.

While large language models have made strides in natural language processing, their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks requiring formal language comprehension, such as chess, remains less investigated. This paper probes the performance of ChatGPT, a sophisticated language model by OpenAI in tackling such complex reasoning tasks, using chess as a case study. Through robust metrics examining both the legality and quality of moves, we assess ChatGPT's understanding of the chessboard, adherence to chess rules, and strategic decision-making abilities. Our evaluation identifies limitations within ChatGPT's attention mechanism that affect its formal language comprehension and uncovers the model's underdeveloped self-regulation abilities. Our study also reveals ChatGPT's propensity for a coherent strategy in its gameplay and a noticeable uptick in decision-making assertiveness when the model is presented with a greater volume of natural language or possesses a more lucid understanding of the state of the chessboard. These findings contribute to the growing exploration of language models' abilities beyond natural language processing, providing valuable information for future research towards models demonstrating human-like cognitive abilities.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.